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Global Carbon Mechanisms
Emerging lessons and implications
*  Three Climate Strategies studies examined the emerging lessons from the three main Kyoto mechanisms: P. Castro and A. Michaelowa, Empirical analysis 
of the performance of CDM projects (June 2008); A. Korppoo and O. Gassan-Zade, Joint Implementation: looking back and forward (October 2008);  
D. Urge-Vorsatz et al., Green Investment Schemes: maximising their benefits for climate and society (November 2008). The report also draws tangentially 
upon two other Climate Strategies studies: P. Baalman and B. Schlamadinger, Scaling up AFOLU Mitigation activities in Non-Annex I countries (June 2008); 
and Neuhoff et al., International support for domestic climate policy (December 2008).
This Carbon Trust report draws in part upon research by Climate Strategies*, an international network organisation 
that develops and delivers rigorous, independent academic analysis to meet the needs of international climate 
change policymaking. The Carbon Trust is a founding supporter of Climate Strategies.
This report is dedicated to the memory of Bernhard Schlamadinger, Research Director of Climate Strategies, 
who tragically passed away in August 2008. Bernhard made huge contributions to the world’s understanding 
of the links between land-use, forestry and climate change policy, and was widely regarded as the world’s 
leading expert on their potential incorporation in the Global Carbon Mechanisms. 
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Preface
To tackle climate change, a key challenge is creating 
incentives for companies – and indeed governments – to 
invest in activities that reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
internationally. This report provides an overview of the 
various different ‘Global Carbon Mechanisms’ that exist 
today, and surveys the evidence on how they have 
developed to date. 
Over the next year or so, the shape of the next global 
deal on climate change will be negotiated. The 
successor to the current Kyoto Protocol commitments 
offers an opportunity to improve the Mechanisms that 
are used to motivate countries around the world and 
their companies to change what they do. The final 
sections of this report highlight the strengths and 
weaknesses of the existing Mechanisms, where changes 
are appropriate and where carbon markets are unlikely 
to work and therefore other policies are required. 
This report focuses on global mechanisms; however, 
local carbon markets such as the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) are increasing in 
number and importance – the Carbon Trust has analysed 
the EU ETS in a series of reports culminating in an 
analysis of the future of the scheme. More directed and 
interventional policies are also required, particularly to 
stimulate innovation, as identified for instance in a major 
Carbon Trust report on the offshore wind sector. We 
have also examined how the global transition to a low 
carbon economy could be accelerated by a network of 
‘innovation’ centres, designed to stimulate low carbon 
technology innovation and diffusion, with an emphasis 
upon their possible contribution in developing countries. 
Finally, the power of consumer and employee choice  
to influence corporate behaviour needs to be nurtured 
and supported, topics that the Carbon Trust has recently 
addressed through: standards for measuring and 
reporting carbon emitted by products, services and 
organisations; and work with companies to measure  
and communicate these carbon footprints in practice. 
Through such different and complementary approaches, 
tackling climate change will result in opportunities for 
well-prepared companies to make significant profits 
and the unprepared to make significant losses – as 
described in our ‘Climate Change: a business revolution’ 
report last year. 
The report in your hands represents our latest 
contribution to the international debate as we enter a 
crucial year for international policy – and its consequent 
implications for business. 
Tom Delay 
Chief Executive
Michael Grubb 
Chief Economist
Catherine Willan 
Strategy Manager
Thomas Counsell 
Strategy Associate
March 2009.
02 Key findings
The global carbon offset and trading Mechanisms 
established under the Kyoto Protocol have grown 
rapidly to support compliance with national commitments 
and to channel billions of euros towards lower carbon 
investments in developing countries.
Their success has overcome initial scepticism and 
persuaded most countries to support market-based 
flexible mechanisms: the existing Mechanisms can, 
should and will continue post 2012 as a key part of 
tackling climate change globally.
 To cope with the rapidly growing volumes in the  
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), to learn from 
experience gained, and to increase public confidence, 
reforms are required in implementation structures and 
operating rules, supported by a more sophisticated 
debate about ensuring environmental integrity:
•  Too many roles are concentrated in the Executive 
Board: strategy and governance should be separated 
from executive project decisions, with a separate 
appeals procedure.
•  This would free the Board to focus on increasing 
stability, transparency and administrative efficiency 
of the rules for assessing the additionality of project 
emission savings, and adapting rules to facilitate  
a broader interpretation of environmental integrity 
and wider scope of individual project types and 
programmes.
Despite shortfalls in project performance, the strong 
response to the mechanisms overall, combined with the 
progress in cutting emissions (particularly in some of 
the big EU emitting countries) and the impact of high 
energy prices in 2008, means that supply will exceed 
demand to 2012:
•  Several factors including the ability to bank European 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and Kyoto 
allowances forward will soften the impact of this 
surplus, but the market may heavily discount for 
political risk and a major ‘shakeout’ will occur as 
prices fall below €10/tCO2.
•  Industrialised countries could choose to support 
prices by making early commitments on post-2012 
cutbacks; by purchasing and retiring credits; by 
announcing decisions to bank allowances forward; 
and/or by setting a reserve price on EU ETS auctions 
(predominantly in the UK and Germany).
Sustaining project inflow at present rates could make a 
large contribution by 2020 to the abatement required in 
the sectors currently engaged. This reinforces the need 
for a strong global agreement and for far more attention 
to the future balance of supply and demand:
•  Cutbacks over 2013-2020 will have to absorb  
15-20,000 MtCO2 of credits and allowances – equivalent 
to over one third of one year’s global emissions. This 
is divided roughly three ways between the existing 
surplus from transition economies, ongoing credits 
from projects already active by 2012, and projects  
that would be implemented post-2012 if they continue 
at the present rate – plus any EU ETS allowances 
banked forward.
•  The lack of any internationally accepted process  
to analyse the interaction of supply from the 
Mechanisms with the demand implied by future 
emission targets is the greatest single weakness in 
the current negotiating process.
 Tackling climate change to 2020 will require new 
mechanisms for engaging developing countries that 
should learn from the experience with the wider diversity 
of mechanisms available to industrialised countries:
•  The CDM is an effective vehicle for decarbonising 
investments in no more than three of the seven main 
sectors that need to be addressed.
•  At least four international mechanisms operate across 
the industrialised countries and each has found a niche; 
Green Investment Schemes are particularly interesting 
for their potential to finance programmes upfront that 
harness multiple and longer term benefits, notably in 
building and land use sectors, though much remains to 
be proven given their slow start.
Key findings
The Global Carbon Mechanisms are and will continue to be a central pillar in 
the global response to climate change to 2020, but are not on their own sufficient.
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The Mechanisms can only deliver part of the overall 
effort required:
•  Harnessing the economy-wide potential for low-cost 
mitigation requires extensive policy reforms, for 
example around building and vehicle efficiency 
standards, land use policies, and regulatory structures 
to overcome diverse barriers.
•  The Mechanisms will not drive innovation at the pace 
or scale required to prepare the world for longer term, 
deeper emission reductions.
Thus the Global Carbon Mechanisms are and will 
continue to be a central pillar in the global response to 
2020, but are not on their own sufficient.
Key recommendations 
1  The Global Carbon Mechanisms should continue post-2012, but reforms are required particularly to 
professionalise the operation of the Clean Development Mechanism and to provide greater public confidence 
about its environmental integrity.
2  Because the additional emission savings delivered by individual projects cannot generally be measured 
directly – it is a judgement not a science – environmental integrity can and should be defined at a higher level. 
The unifying theme should be to work from project-by-project emissions additionality towards the wider goal 
of channelling additional investment into low carbon economic development, with debate also extended to 
consider whether and how ‘additionality’ should be appropriately applied to Green Investment Schemes.
3  With a looming surplus of supply over demand, governments cannot rely on markets to maintain carbon prices 
based on uncertain expectations about the scope or strength of post-2012 cutbacks: 
–  Industry should prepare for a year (at least) of mostly low but very volatile prices driven by fluctuating 
expectations about the prospects for a meaningful post-2012 deal.
– If governments wish to support prices the options to consider are: coordinate retirement of credits/
allowances; commit to ‘bank’ part of current Kyoto targets; specify post-2012 cutbacks prior to a global deal; 
and/or set a reserve price in the major countries auctioning EU ETS allowances (predominantly Germany 
and the UK).
4  The Kyoto post-2012 negotiations process should develop a capacity to analyse the consequences of its 
decisions on post-2012 mechanisms and targets for the balance of supply and demand in an integrated manner.
5  The range of mechanisms available to developing countries should be expanded beyond the current CDM and 
World Bank/Global Environment Facility (GEF) financing mechanisms, and learn from the wider diversity of 
mechanisms available to industrialised countries (mainly as a result of accepting emission caps).
6  The following should be examined as options to evolve the geographic, sectoral and temporal effectiveness  
of the Mechanisms and thereby support low carbon economic development:
–  Incremental reform of CDM project additionality methodologies and eligibility rules to streamline  
(e.g. programmatic CDM) and to review current exclusions.
–  Radical reform of project crediting rules towards ‘top-down’ assessments based on benchmarked 
performance and/or levels of market penetration.
–  Evolution to sector and possibly policy-based crediting and trading mechanisms for more advanced 
developing countries.
–  Establishing norms for Green Investment Schemes, mostly likely through a forum of participating countries 
which could also ensure collective international learning.
Credit discounting could be applied to any or all such developments, to help maintain aggregate additionality 
and/or contribute to the global supply-demand balance. 
7  Beyond the Global Carbon Mechanisms, the international negotiations also need to consider incentives for 
policy reforms and low carbon infrastructure, and more direct means to enhance technology innovation and 
commercialisation.
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Executive summary
The Kyoto Protocol established several global incentive 
mechanisms that rely on the international transfer of 
emission ‘offset credits’ or allowances:
•  Projects in developing countries can generate ‘certified 
emission reductions’ for transfer through the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM).
•  Projects in industrialised countries can generate 
‘emission reduction units’ for transfer through Joint 
Implementation (JI). This takes two forms (‘Track 1’  
or ‘Track 2’) depending on the host countries’ depth 
of institutional compliance with the full set of Kyoto 
inventory and reporting provisions.
•  Industrialised countries can also directly trade emission 
allowances, which has also generated two variants  
– direct industry trading such as the EU ETS, and 
intergovernmental Green Investment Schemes (GIS).
These complement funds operated by the World  
Bank, notably the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
established in the early 1990s. Together these form  
a range of mechanisms that each have different focal 
areas regarding the intersection between: countries 
with and without emission caps; private and public 
sectors; and project versus programmatic-type activities 
(Chart 1). The desire for simplicity would suggest fewer 
mechanisms; practical experience suggests that even 
the present mix is insufficient for the real depth and 
complexities of the global challenge. 
To stabilise the atmosphere, emissions must be reduced globally. In an unequal 
world, moving towards this requires richer countries (and companies) to fund 
emission reductions elsewhere. Mechanisms that create incentives for countries 
and companies to support emission reductions wherever they are cheapest 
also enable targets to be met as efficiently as possible. 
Chart 1 The different Mechanisms
Note: Joint Implementation (JI) has two variants: ‘Track 2’ refers to projects that are subject to direct international oversight (like the CDM); ‘Track 1’ 
involves bilateral procedures.
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The response to date
The response to these Mechanisms has confounded 
expectations in both scale and nature:
•  The most heavily regulated Mechanism – the CDM 
– has seen explosive growth, with around 3,000 MtCO2e 
of emission savings out to 2012 projected in the 
‘nameplate’ estimates of design documents, assuming 
prompt implementation. A little over half of this  
is likely to be delivered by 2012 in practice, due to 
under-performance in approved projects, the potential 
for rejection or revision in those awaiting approval, 
and delays in project registration and start-up.
•  Growth in Joint Implementation has focused mainly 
upon the component subject to direct multilateral 
supervision (‘Track 2’). A phase of early growth in 
Central and Eastern Europe was eclipsed by the 
processes of EU Accession and EU ETS in the New 
Member States; about 300 MtCO2e (to 2012) is now 
proposed in ‘nameplate’ estimates from projects 
mostly in Russia and Ukraine. Procedures for the 
simplified ‘Track 1’ process, which formally relies on 
internal supervision within countries that have met the 
Protocol’s full set of national inventory and reporting 
procedures, have been established more recently and 
in practice generally still involve third-party verification. 
Their greater flexibility in terms of scope and process 
has attracted about twenty ‘Track 1’ projects across 
Germany, Hungary and New Zealand; the volume 
remains small, but growing.
•  The first direct intergovernmental emission trades 
under the Kyoto Protocol were only finalised in 
Autumn 2008, consisting of pilot sales of allowances 
to finance Green Investment Schemes that have  
been legislated in Hungary and Latvia to guarantee 
appropriate use of the revenues. 
These experiences underline that for international 
exchanges of a publicly-created good – ‘credited’ 
emission reductions – political and environmental 
legitimacy of the product is crucial. No country has acted 
purely to ‘minimise costs’ through use of the international 
Mechanisms: governments have avoided least-cost 
purchases of surplus allowances, and mostly (except 
New Zealand) blocked private sector access to foreign 
surplus in domestic trading schemes. Regulated markets 
can grow only when relevant authorities on both sides 
of any transaction are convinced that it does indeed 
provide ‘a good.’ 
A voluntary market for offset credits has also grown 
rapidly and traded 65 MtCO2e in 2007, but is undermined 
both by the lack of a regulatory driver and greater 
exposure to public doubts about the legitimacy of the 
product. To address these concerns and criticisms (and 
in some cases to help shape expected future regulation), 
the markets are seeking to establish credible voluntary 
standards, but voluntary buyers are also increasingly 
looking to the CDM for supplies of greater legitimacy 
and official oversight. However, the voluntary market 
remains the only route for activities – like most land-use 
projects – that remain either exempt or impractical 
under the regulated mechanisms, and this provides 
valuable experience. 
There is no evidence that the existence of these 
Mechanisms has weakened the efforts of industrialised 
countries to control emissions. Domestic action, as 
constrained by domestic politics, has led; and some of 
the strongest efforts are emerging in countries that face 
the biggest gap and have made the biggest financial 
provisions for international purchases, like Spain. The 
Canadian government, the only other large Kyoto Party 
with a shortfall comparable to that of Spain, is eschewing 
both use of the Mechanisms and stronger domestic 
action, the consequences of which remain to be 
determined. In all other Kyoto Parties, the Mechanisms 
are facilitating compliance with commitments in 
appropriate ways, and channelling several €bn/yr 
toward emission reductions in developing countries  
in the process. 
06 Executive Summary
Strengths and weaknesses of  
the Mechanisms 
The Mechanisms were introduced into the Kyoto 
Protocol by the US government in the face of 
considerable scepticism and fierce opposition from 
many developing countries. In the decade since, they 
have proved a remarkable political success.
The Mechanisms have attracted growing support 
globally. One of the few decisions so far taken in 
post-2012 negotiations is that the Mechanisms will 
continue. In such a divided world with almost two 
hundred sovereign governments, this is no small 
achievement. 
Inevitably, growth and attention has led to many 
criticisms. Potentially the most fundamental was the 
risk that crediting emission savings from individual 
projects relative to a ‘baseline’ would create perverse 
policy incentives to worsen the baseline, or at least, 
reduce incentives to improve policy. This has been 
addressed through provisions that allow policy 
baselines to be ‘backdated.’ 
A second criticism – particularly levelled at the early 
industrial projects – was that paying a uniform carbon 
price resulted in large profits for cheap projects. This is 
inevitable when any new, single-product market (like the 
CDM) succeeds in uncovering low cost options. Critics 
recommended instead a centralised funding approach, 
but this already exists in the form of the UN Global 
Environment Facility. The GEF’s impact is constrained 
by its centralised public funding and the difficulty of 
applying this to private investments; these constraints, 
coupled with continuing political disputes and its failure 
to support some of the least-cost options subsequently 
identified under the CDM, suggest that a centralised 
fund approach is not credible as the primary means for 
driving the scale and nature of global decarbonisation 
efforts required. 
Indeed, the most striking feature of criticisms of the 
Mechanisms has been the lack of credible alternative 
approaches proposed. The main debates now are not 
about replacing the Mechanisms, but improving them. 
Specifically, debates over the CDM have identified 
issues in rules, implementation, structures and scope.
Rules and implementation
A founding principle in the CDM is the need for 
environmental legitimacy. This has been widely equated 
with proving that each project generates additional 
emission savings as credited. However this is theoretically 
problematic, and experience confirms that assessing 
such ‘additionality’ unavoidably involves judgement 
that can be challenged. Moreover experience suggests 
that the task of ‘proving additionality’ is getting more 
difficult over time, not less. 
In addition, the CDM has become a victim in part of its 
own success, with long procedural delays and growing 
criticism about the consistency of decision-making when 
the Executive Board has sought to learn from experience 
and thus deviate from precedents. 
An honest political debate is required based on 
recognition that project-by-project additionality is an 
imperfect art with an unavoidable trade-off between 
administrative costs and the level of assurance. Several 
other options have been proposed, including credit 
discounting to account for the uncertainties in 
additionality associated with different types of projects 
and rules. Increasing economic returns to low carbon 
investment, particularly in emergent industries,  
itself has value and such wider benefits indicate that 
‘environmental legitimacy’ could be recognised as a 
broader concept than just project-by-project additionality. 
With an expanding scale of operation, the CDM  
cannot efficiently deliver its mission without greater 
professionalisation of staffing (rather than relying on 
government secondees) and its structures.
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Structures and scope
The CDM’s structures need reform to improve operations, 
clarify accountability and facilitate strategic development. 
The key need is to separate more clearly the governance 
and strategic tasks of the Executive Board from the 
implementation task of accredited agencies; a separate 
appeals procedure could further increase the legitimacy 
of decisions. 
Such reforms, however, will not in themselves address 
other concerns that have focused on the realised scope 
of CDM activities:
•  The main investments have focused upon certain 
regions and kinds of projects: the CDM has brought 
least benefit to the poorest regions (like Africa).
•  The extent to which projects have brought ‘sustainable 
development’ benefits is varied and contested.
•  In addition to officially excluded project categories 
(like nuclear), others like forestry and infrastructure 
projects are in practice also almost absent, and efforts 
to launch ‘programmatic’ activities in the CDM have 
yielded little to date. 
These concerns all reflect fundamental features of a 
market mechanism that specifically credits greenhouse 
gas emission reductions: the market will seek out the 
most cost-effective options with the highest returns 
within the given set of rules. The biggest and most 
cost-effective opportunities will be in the biggest emitters 
with stable, attractive operating environments for 
investment; governments may seek to vet projects for 
their contribution to national development, but this will 
never be a driving force. The focus of investment will  
be upon projects that deliver maximum returns on  
the timescales for which credits can be generated, for 
minimum risk. 
Some objectives cannot credibly be delivered by the 
CDM: rather than seeking to distort its fundamental 
principles, developing countries need rather to consider 
additional mechanisms. 
The industrialised country Mechanisms
The experience in Central and Eastern Europe  
sheds important light on these issues. Initial Joint 
Implementation activities focused upon the most 
developed countries in this region and this provided  
a spur for other countries to improve procedures. 
However, the collapse of JI in the EU’s New Member 
States illustrates the complexities of introducing 
mandatory standards and emissions trading on top of 
pre-existing crediting mechanisms; revisions in CDM 
rules should carefully consider the lessons.
Subsequent Joint Implementation projects, which could 
not start until 2008 and whose credits formally expire 
after 2012, have focused upon projects under direct 
international supervision (‘Track 2’) that generate very 
high returns, like plugging methane leaks from pipelines 
and mines, and on industrial gas and energy efficiency 
projects. The emerging interest in ‘Track 1’ projects 
suggests that full-scale national inventory and reporting 
procedures can build trust that facilitates greater 
flexibility around projects and procedures. 
Early decisions are needed regarding future crediting  
to facilitate longer term investments under Joint 
Implementation. J1 ‘Track 1’ should continue after 2012 
and maintaining ‘Track 2’ could provide a valuable bridge 
for projects (including CDM projects) in countries that 
move to take on emission caps post-2012.
Green Investment Schemes are now also emerging as a 
means through which governments can attract finance 
to projects and programmes that generate multiple social 
and developmental benefits. Additionally, benefits may 
have much longer time horizons reflected through the 
ability to sell the present emission allowances that would 
otherwise be banked forward. Securing such benefits 
requires governments themselves to trade on the basis 
of criteria other than simple short-term minimisation  
of abatement costs. It remains too early to evaluate  
the practical experience – and there is a danger that the 
experience will be missed due to a collapse in demand. 
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Supply, demand and market outlook
The prices of over €20/tCO2e prevalent during 2008  
are unsustainable. This mirrors the situation in Phase 1 
of the EU ETS, but the outcome will be different.
During 2008, estimates of CDM supply declined as 
analysts looked more critically at project performance 
and delays in the system, and as the CDM Executive 
Board toughened its stance on approvals: likely delivery 
from the project mechanisms (CDM and JI) out to  
2012 is about 1,800 MtCO2e +- 15%. Prices initially rose 
accordingly given expectations of reduced supply. 
However earlier projections that demand out to 2012 
would exceed this are not credible (at least without 
Canada): after accounting for the impact of recent 
trends in emissions and fuel prices, demand from the 
remaining Kyoto Parties is unlikely to exceed about 
1,500 MtCO2e (Chart 2), and could be much lower 
particularly if recession is prolonged. The prices of over 
€20/tCO2e prevalent during 2008 are thus unsustainable, 
particularly after allowing for carbon sinks and GIS.
As with Phase 1 of the EU ETS, this reflects a combination 
of response exceeding expectations matched against 
insufficient overall cutbacks. The spectacular growth  
of the CDM has been joined by credible JI projects and 
GIS programmes. The Kyoto emission targets have 
proved less onerous than projected at least in some  
of the biggest European emitters; German success in 
renewables has greatly curtailed its emissions and UK 
progress on energy efficiency has contributed to an 
overall surplus; Spain is also now making rapid progress. 
The situation also of course reflects the impact of high 
fuel prices, and the absence of US and (at present) 
Canadian demand. Nevertheless, the resulting situation 
poses major dilemmas. 
The price will not collapse to zero (as in the EU ETS 
Phase 1). Many factors will support prices despite the 
looming surplus, the single most important being that 
surplus EU ETS and governmental allowances can be 
banked forward post-2012. The ultimate value of this 
will depend entirely upon the strength of post-2012 
commitments, and the extent to which these drive  
a demand that can absorb the likely supply. 
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Note: The data on demand do not include Canada, which is a Party to the Kyoto Protocol but not currently participating in the Mechanisms (see pp.46-47). 
Canadian participation would add c. 500-600 MtCO2e/yr of demand and so do much to restore a balance between demand and the supply of project-based 
emission reductions.
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During 2013-20, projects already established or expected 
from current inflow are likely to generate more than 
5,000 MtCO2e credited savings. Continued expansion  
at present rates would add as much again. Assuming 
the banking provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, the likely 
surplus of Kyoto allowances from the EU’s New Member 
States, other east European countries, and Russia may 
add another 7,500 MtCO2e, to which would be added any 
surplus EU ETS allowances banked forward by industry. 
Over these eight years, the total supply is thus likely  
to be 15,000-20,000 MtCO2e, divided roughly equally 
between credits from the CDM and the combination  
of credits and banked allowances from industrialised 
countries. This is more than 20% of total projected 
emissions from the EU and Japan over the period, which 
clearly could not on their own absorb such volumes. 
The Kyoto structure needs major cutbacks after 2012 
across all the industrialised countries to ensure a carbon 
price sufficient to tackle climate change meaningfully. 
During 2009, private markets are likely to apply a strong 
discount to the prospects for the deep and wide-ranging 
cutbacks that would be required to drive up carbon 
prices substantially post-2012. Also government demand 
is likely to broaden to include more significant purchases 
at lower cost from Green Investment Schemes, increasing 
downward price pressures.
If governments wish to shore up prices, different options 
would have different consequences. The present EU 
policy to protect its post-2012 package from excessive 
imports can help to sustain EU ETS prices and domestic 
action, but will further weaken demand and price in the 
global mechanisms. However, opening up the EU ETS 
unilaterally could not remotely absorb the future supply. 
Approaches that could support near-term term prices 
more broadly include: 
•  Retiring units (or buying units specifically for 
retirement) would support prices generally, but looks 
implausible particularly given the credit crunch.
•  Government commitments to bank some of their 
Kyoto allowances post-2012 could increase demand in 
the present period, but would add further to the level 
of post-2012 supply.
•  A reserve price set on forthcoming EU ETS auctions 
(dominated by the UK and Germany) could sustain both 
EU ETS and to some degree international credit prices.
•  Commitments to steeper cutbacks post-2012, in 
advance of a global agreement, would send the 
strongest and most consistent signals but still only 
provide a partial solution.
In the absence of such measures, credit and allowance 
prices are likely to fall, and average below €10/tCO2 
during 2009, provoking a major shakeout in the global 
carbon markets. Prices may also be highly volatile as 
perceptions of the prospects for an effective post-2012 
agreement fluctuate. The only positive side to this is 
that such a shock would focus attention on the need for 
post-2012 negotiations to embody an integrated balance 
of supply (from the Mechanisms) and demand (implied 
by negotiated cutbacks on a wider group of countries, 
and possibly sectors). The lack of any internationally 
acknowledged independent source for such analysis  
is the greatest single weakness facing the global 
negotiating process.
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The future challenge
The Global Carbon Mechanisms are only effective in 
some sectors, and other instruments will be required to 
address the parts they cannot reach.
Pathways to stabilising the atmosphere at concentrations 
of 450-550ppmCO2e imply cutbacks (relative to 
projections) by up to 10 GtCO2e/yr by 2020 – at least half 
of this from within the OECD. The cutbacks will require, 
at a minimum, strong action across the industrialised 
countries; and approaching the tougher targets requires 
strong global action. If developing country action is 
financed predominantly through crediting mechanisms, 
much deeper targets will need to be adopted across 
industrialised countries. Lesser cutbacks to 2020 imply 
much higher costs and cutbacks later on to achieve a 
given stabilisation goal.
Financially, pathways to stabilisation at 450-550ppmCO2e 
are estimated to require additional investments of 40-15% 
respectively in the energy sector alone, over and above 
the $26 trillion required out to 2030 to finance ‘business 
as usual’ growth. If spread evenly over the period, this 
implies incremental costs globally of around $200bn/yr 
for 550ppmCO2e or over $500bn/yr for 450ppm.
If project inflow to the Mechanisms continues at the rate 
experienced since 2006, by 2020 they would be crediting 
about 2 GtCO2e savings annually, and financial transfers 
from the project Mechanisms could approach levels for 
550ppm pathways by about 2020 for the sectors they 
address. However, this would be insufficient to prevent 
huge lock-in to carbon-intensive investments in the 
interim, and will not prepare the world for lower levels 
and the more radical global transformations required  
in 2020-30.
Experience has demonstrated that the CDM is 
appropriate to incentivise investment in commercially-
available low carbon technologies, mainly in energy 
supply (including power generation) and industry, and 
potentially waste sectors. These are sectors in which 
major investment decisions are driven by informed 
analysis of financial costs and benefits. CDM growth at 
current rates could reasonably capture most of the lower 
cost potential in these sectors by 2020. However, these 
technologies and sectors form only a minority of the 
total global saving potentials identified to 2030 (Chart 3). 
 Energy supply  Transport  Buildings  Industry  Agriculture  Forestry Waste
Common project scale Years construction, lasting 
decades; €m or €bn
Vehicle purchase: few years; 
€1,000s. Infrastructure: 
decades, €bns
Retrofit: household scale, few 
years, €100s. Construction: 
years lasting decades
Varied but often €m 
investments lasting decades
Distributed farm-level 
actions; plans as short  
as annual 
Cumulation over years/
decades 
Varied but often €m 
investments
Dominant investment  
driver/barriers
Costs, risks and returns at 
commercial or World Bank 
interest rates
Behavioural choice:  
fuel cost savings minor 
influence. Infrastructure: 
usually strategic state-
funded decisions taking 
decades
Planning, tenant-landlord 
splits, high consumer 
discount rates. Dispersed, 
small scale companies for 
building insulation/services
Costs, risks and returns at 
commercial interest rates.
Subject to focus on core 
business
Varies between agrobusiness 
and small farmers. Multiple 
considerations including 
nature of national agricultural 
support schemes
Long-term returns subject 
to multiple land risks in 
developing countries
Complex chains: emission/ 
cost savings modest influence
Relevance of CDM/JI Highly relevant for mature 
technologies close to 
cost-effective
Very limited Almost irrelevant – a handful 
of projects – except through 
indirect effect of power 
sector decarbonisation
Highly relevant Poor track record where 
attempted
Only one project registered Relevant mainly to landfill  
gas capture.
Chart 3 Long-term (2030) abatement potential by sector, with sector characteristics and focus of current CDM and JI
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The CDM is intrinsically far less appropriate for capturing 
the potential in building efficiency, transport, agriculture 
and forestry and additional support is required to  
drive innovation. 
•  Project-based crediting mechanisms cannot overcome 
the main barriers that account for the large ‘negative 
cost’ potential, predominantly around buildings and 
transport energy efficiency.
•  Perceived risks and high transaction costs in the face 
of measurement uncertainties and dispersed sources, 
combined with a conservative approach to crediting, 
deter projects in agriculture and land use.
•  The limited time periods of crediting and uncertainties 
around future prices preclude options that deliver 
long-term or more uncertain benefits (like infrastructure 
and forestry projects).
•  Innovation support is required to bring new 
technologies to market. Renewables and CCS are 
examples where support over and above the CDM  
is required short term – the CDM should, however, 
stimulate investment in these technologies once they 
have been adequately developed and could be crucial 
in their commercialisation and international diffusion.
Experience with the four Mechanisms in industrialised 
(Annex I) countries has shown the value of a diversity  
of instruments: though they share a common basic 
economic incentive, each has found a niche and started 
to deliver opportunities that others could not. Annex I 
countries do not have too many instruments; rather, there 
are not enough that engage developing countries across 
the full spectrum of potentials. The Annex I experience 
should inform the development of new instruments 
post-2012 to assist lower carbon developments in the 
developing world.
However, mechanisms that hinge on crediting or carbon 
pricing can only address the central part of the global 
‘supply curve’ potential. Tapping the ‘negative cost’ 
potential mainly from energy efficiency hinges upon 
domestic regulatory policies. Other instruments will be 
required to foster large scale innovation and structural 
changes. These fall outside the scope of the Global 
Carbon Mechanisms and remain the biggest missing 
components in the global armoury. Ideas and support 
to fill these gaps could be one of the biggest contributions 
of the new United States Administration as it starts  
to engage with the international system after its  
long absence. 
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years, €100s. Construction: 
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Varied but often €m 
investments lasting decades
Distributed farm-level 
actions; plans as short  
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Varied but often €m 
investments
Dominant investment  
driver/barriers
Costs, risks and returns at 
commercial or World Bank 
interest rates
Behavioural choice:  
fuel cost savings minor 
influence. Infrastructure: 
usually strategic state-
funded decisions taking 
decades
Planning, tenant-landlord 
splits, high consumer 
discount rates. Dispersed, 
small scale companies for 
building insulation/services
Costs, risks and returns at 
commercial interest rates.
Subject to focus on core 
business
Varies between agrobusiness 
and small farmers. Multiple 
considerations including 
nature of national agricultural 
support schemes
Long-term returns subject 
to multiple land risks in 
developing countries
Complex chains: emission/ 
cost savings modest influence
Relevance of CDM/JI Highly relevant for mature 
technologies close to 
cost-effective
Very limited Almost irrelevant – a handful 
of projects – except through 
indirect effect of power 
sector decarbonisation
Highly relevant Poor track record where 
attempted
Only one project registered Relevant mainly to landfill  
gas capture.
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Part I: From theory to practice
The first part of this report explains the intellectual and political origins of the 
Global Carbon Mechanisms, describes how the main mechanisms established 
by the Kyoto Protocol work, and outlines the response over the past decade. 
The final section explores the roles of the different mechanisms and presents  
a way of thinking about how they relate to each other. 
1. Origins and development
Origins
The idea of introducing some flexibility into pollution 
control, to increase its scope and reduce the costs, is not 
new. Pollution can come from many sources. If some of 
these sources are directly capped by regulation, others 
may still be tackled if companies subject to a cap can 
receive credits for reducing these other emissions. In 
theory, that enables the regulated companies to reduce 
emissions however and wherever it is cheapest to do so 
– thereby also enabling stronger and deeper emission 
reduction targets to be set. 
Such mechanisms were used extensively in pollution 
control programmes in the United States from the 
1980s. The diffuse and global nature of greenhouse  
gas emissions made climate change a natural candidate 
to consider the use of such mechanisms. In the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) (1992), a number of countries insisted  
on a phrase enabling ‘flexibility’ in the application  
of commitments, and a programme of ‘Activities 
Implemented Jointly’ (AIJ) was sanctioned, to encourage 
industrialised countries to invest in emission reduction 
projects in others – itself a sensitive topic at the time. 
However, the quantified commitments in the UNFCCC 
were vague and non-binding, and the AIJ programme 
was based on a general exhortation to cooperate, 
without crediting. Whilst there was useful learning and 
engagement, with over 150 projects developed, the 
results overall were very modest, for obvious reasons: 
one critic commented that it was like constructing a 
cage in the forest and then wondering why the tigers 
wouldn’t go inside, when there was no meat. 
The three basic mechanisms
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in December 1997, provided 
the ‘meat’ in the form of legally binding emission caps 
on industrialised countries, and adopted three forms of 
flexible mechanisms:
•  The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows 
industrialised countries to meet part of their caps using 
credits from emission-reduction projects in developing 
countries, subject to international oversight to ensure 
that the projects represent real and ‘additional’ 
emission savings.
•  Joint Implementation (JI) enables similar project-based 
exchanges between industrialised countries that have 
caps under the Protocol, providing these are matched 
with a corresponding transfer of the negotiated overall 
emission caps.
•  Emissions trading allows direct exchange of emission 
caps between industrialised countries.
The CDM was the most complex, novel and controversial 
of these, with two main concerns addressed in the 
Protocol. One was the need to establish that such projects 
would result in real and ‘additional’ emission savings, 
compared to what would have happened otherwise – if 
not, the net effect would be a weakening of the overall 
environmental integrity of the commitments. Yet 
establishing a likely ‘baseline’ projection and estimating 
‘additional’ emission savings relative to this is inherently 
complex. The Marrakech Accords (2000) that defined 
the ‘rulebook’ for implementing the Kyoto Protocol 
established a 10 person Executive Board, which is 
charged with formally registering projects and giving 
final approval to the issuance of ‘certified emission 
reduction’ credits (CERs) from them on the basis of 
subsequent monitored performance. 
Mechanisms that give companies – and countries – incentives to reduce emissions 
internationally can increase the scope and efficiency of the effort to tackle climate 
change and can provide finance to engage poorer countries. After a long, slow 
effort to turn these ideas into practice, the response has been spectacular. 
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The other main concern was whether such a mechanism 
might enable rich, northern countries – and in particular 
companies – to impose projects that were in fact contrary 
to the development interests of host countries. However, 
the idea that the international community should try  
to define such criteria was anathema, and the CDM 
instead requires that host countries confirm that CDM 
projects ‘contribute to their sustainable development’. 
Nevertheless, the international rules do prohibit credits 
for some kinds of activities, notably from nuclear power 
and avoided deforestation. 
Joint Implementation was widely regarded as less 
potentially problematic: because emission credits 
would be accompanied by a corresponding transfer of 
emission caps, JI projects could not inflate the overall 
cap adopted by industrialised countries. For the same 
reason, however, crediting could not start until the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol began in 2008. 
In practice, the Marrakech Accords established two 
variants of JI, one being modelled broadly on CDM 
procedures to enable countries to start developing 
projects before they had met the full panoply of Kyoto 
inventory and reporting requirements, as explained later.
The provisions for direct emissions trading took concrete 
form with the development of the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which was launched in 2005. 
The EU ETS caps emissions from industrial facilities in 
the EU and forms the core instrument for the EU to meet 
its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Its second phase, which is synchronised to the Kyoto 
Protocol’s first commitment period (2008-12), utilises 
the Kyoto trading provisions to ensure that transfers  
of emission allowances between EU countries are 
matched by equivalent transfers of their national 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. The rules also 
enable companies to comply with their obligations  
by using emission credits generated under the Kyoto 
project mechanisms (with some exceptions, like 
land-use projects), up to a certain limit. Our earlier 
studies have examined the EU ETS in considerable 
depth, and it is only addressed here as it relates to  
the global mechanisms. 
Whilst the intergovernmental community was slowly 
establishing the institutional architecture to enable 
formal crediting of emission savings under the Kyoto 
Protocol, the desire for emission offsets was gathering 
pace in the private sector. This was for a mix of reasons, 
including a desire to hedge against possible future 
regulation, but more generally, a desire to be ‘green’ – 
or at least, to be seen to be green. The voluntary market 
continues to grow (section 12), but credits trade at a 
much lower price and volume than the regulated market, 
on which most of this report focuses.
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The response
The legal basis established under the Kyoto Protocol 
and Marrakech Accords took several more years to 
spring into life, as the institutions were established, and 
then awaited the entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol, 
which finally occurred in February 2005. However, 
starting around then – and aided by the establishment 
of the European Emissions Trading Scheme – a massive 
surge in projects began (see Chart 4), particularly under 
the CDM. Over 4,000 projects have been submitted, 
dominated by the CDM, in which projects already 
approved at the time of writing (by 1st November 2008) 
are projected to save around 1,400 million tonnes of 
greenhouse gas emissions cumulatively by 2012 (when 
the current provisions expire). As Chart 4 shows, the 
generation and trading of the emissions reductions 
both achieved and expected has been very active. 
Development of JI projects has been much slower,  
as explained in this report. In addition, the ‘voluntary 
offset’ market has grown rapidly, mostly through 
projects in emission-reducing (or absorbing) activities 
that fall outside the scope of the official international 
regulatory framework. 
As can be seen from Chart 5, CDM projects dominate both 
the volume of the trading activities, and their economic 
value to an even greater extent, because voluntary 
offsets are much cheaper per unit of emission credits1.
Chart 4 Volume of credits traded each year from the different Mechanisms 2002-2008
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1  For comparison, the value of emissions trading itself under the EU ETS during 2007 was €34bn – almost entirely based upon forward trading  
of allowances for emitting during Phase II of the scheme, 2008-12.
Most recently there has also been development of 
‘Green Investment Schemes’ that operate under the third 
possible form of flexible mechanism. These Schemes 
link the revenues from intergovernmental emissions 
trading to specific emission reduction investment 
programmes, with the first transactions completed in 
autumn 2008, as explained in section 4 of this report. 
The explosive growth of these ‘offset’ activities has 
inevitably led to heated debate around a number of 
issues. How good (or bad) are these mechanisms?  
Do these projects really result in emission savings in the 
host countries, and what other consequences are there? 
To what extent is there a risk that the volume of emission 
credits through these mechanisms may undermine 
actions in the rich world to get their own emissions under 
control? And, most broadly, what are the lessons from 
the emerging experience with these mechanisms, and 
what does this imply for the future? 
This report sets out to explain the developments and  
to answer these questions. 
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Sources: World Bank, Ecosystem Marketplace, New Carbon Finance, Point Carbon
Chart 5 Volume and value of transactions in the Mechanisms during 2007 and 2008 
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2. The growth of  the CDM 
For the first half of this decade, the flow of projects under 
the regulated carbon market mechanisms amounted to  
a slow trickle: by 1st January 2005 projects submitted  
to the CDM amounted to less than 100 MtCO2e of total 
projected savings by 2012, and other mechanisms had 
not started (see Chart 4 earlier and Chart 6 opposite). 
Technical work gradually clarified the ‘CDM project cycle’ 
through which projects can be submitted for validation 
and registration under the Kyoto Protocol, enabling them 
to be issued with CERs according to their subsequent 
monitored performance (Box 1 below). 
Methodologies for calculating emission savings were 
approved, and institutions established and certified. Thus 
the system was slowly primed, but still waiting for larger 
political developments to give impetus to the proposed 
global carbon market. 
The long wait was eventually rewarded in a spectacular 
fashion. In addition to the culmination of technical work, 
two big developments revolutionised the situation. 
January 2005 saw the start of the EU ETS, the first 
instrument to set a significant price on carbon emissions 
– a price that rose steadily in the first few months to levels 
much higher than had been anticipated. By allowing 
companies the option to comply with caps under the 
scheme by buying offset credits, this transmitted through 
to a perception of real and measurable value associated 
with such projects. 
And a month after the EU ETS started, in February 2005, 
the Kyoto Protocol finally entered into force. This made 
emission caps on participating industrialised countries 
legally binding under international law and set the 
intergovernmental machinery for managing the CDM  
on a firm legal footing. 
After its slow build-up, explosive growth revealed a huge appetite for emission-
reduction projects under the CDM. The emerging experience across different 
project types reveals important lessons.
18 Part I: From theory to practice 
Box 1 The CDM project cycle
Project
participant
DOE* DNA*
DOE*
Project
participant
Executive
Board
Executive
Board
Issuance
of CERs*
Validation
Registration
Monitoring
Verification
Issuance
Design
Activity Details for a typical project*
The PDD is the key document that sets out all the basics of
the project. It includes, for example, planned emissions
savings, methodology to be used and justification of additionality.
The CDM Board officially approves the project. In doing so,
it may request further clarification on the PDD plans.
It will typically take around a year for a project to progress from
the start of its validation to registration.
The PDD will contain a monitoring plan for the emission savings
to be made. For example, it could include meter readings,
maintenance needed to keep the meters accurate, and processes
for storing the data they generate.
A 3rd party (DOE) will be called in to check the emissions
savings to be claimed (’verification’). If the DOE is satisfied with the
claim, it issues a written assurance to this effect (’certification’).
The official CER registry, acting on behalf of the Executive Board,
will issue CERs equivalent to the amount of emissions reductions
certified. The CERs are then forwarded to the project participant
and entries made in the registry. For a typical project, it will be 
around a year between the date of registration and the date 
that the first CERs are issued. 
1. The host country (via the DNA) must approve the project
by issuing a ‘Letter of Approval’.
2. A 3rd party (DOE) assesses the project against
CDM criteria, and, if satisfied, issues a validation report.
Validation will include interviews with stakeholders
(e.g. impact on local community).
Prepare
PDD*
Letter of
Approval
Clarifications &/or
corrections/failure
Request
review/reject
Request
review/reject
Stakeholder
consultation, validation
of PDD* & submission
to Exec Board
Registration of
CDM projects
Project monitoring 
in accordance
with plan
Verifies & certifies
emission
reductions as CERs*
Authorises
issuance
of CERs*
*Note:
• PDD = Project Design Document
• DOE = Designated Operational Entity
• DNA = Designated National Authority
• CERs = Certified Emission Reductions
For a full explanation of these abbreviations and other terms please see the Glossary.
Sources: adapted from Norton Rose CDM – an introduction (May 2008)
What had seemed nebulous and uncertain to many in 
the business world was suddenly on a convincing, legal 
footing with strong incentives derived from the EU ETS. 
As has often proved the case with market-based 
mechanisms, the response was quite unexpected in its 
scale and nature. In particular, companies and countries 
came forward with a flood of projects that reduce 
emissions of industrial greenhouse gases, notably 
hydrofluorocarbon-23 (HFC-23) and nitrous oxide (N2O) 
that have a high climate change impact but can be 
reduced at low cost. Given the incentive of the CDM, 
such projects proved highly profitable, and there was 
no doubt about the emission savings from these projects. 
A veritable ‘gold rush’ ensued. Some specific concerns 
were subsequently raised about these projects, and 
rules were later modified to exclude new greenfield 
HFC-23 projects, as discussed in section 11. During 2006, 
a wider diversity of projects came forward, and the 
industrial HFC and N2O projects tailed off in 2007 whilst 
others continued to expand apace (Chart 6a). 
By the end of 2008, over 4,000 CDM projects had been 
submitted for validation and of those over 1,000 were 
already registered at the CDM Executive Board and 
therefore entitled to generate CERs. The registered 
projects alone could save around 1.4 billion tonnes 
CO2e cumulative to 2012, the end of the Kyoto  
Protocol’s first compliance period; in total, including all 
submissions for validation, projects could save twice 
this, based on the performance estimated in the official 
registration documents. 
Later parts of this report examine the emerging 
evidence on the actual performance of projects to  
date, and implications for likely issued CER volumes. 
As noted above, HFC-23 and N2O projects made up a 
large portion of the initial rush, with around 750 MtCO2e 
of potential savings by 2012, from only about 80 projects. 
Energy-related projects had a minority share, with a 
very small contribution from energy efficiency projects. 
However, the balance has shifted as most HFC and N2O 
projects are already identified and taken, the role of other 
types of projects has sharply increased. The distribution 
between project types, and their performance and the 
reasons, is analysed more closely in Section 6 of  
this report. 
The way in which projects have been distributed between 
host countries has also developed (Chart 6b). The initial 
rush of industrial gas removal projects included large 
contributions from South Korea and Brazil, which were 
rapidly joined by projects in India and other countries. 
From late in 2005 these were followed by rapid expansion 
in China, which had been initially cautious, but which 
within two years had come to account for half of all the 
projected emission savings. The geographic distribution 
– and notably, the absence of Africa – has been a source 
of concern (section 11).
Since the response to the CDM has dominated the Global 
Carbon Mechanisms to date, it forms the main focus of 
our analysis of project performance and supply (Part II), 
and its environmental effectiveness and efficiency is 
examined in Part III of this report.
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Chart 6  Accumulation of total expected CERs by 2012
(a) by project type
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(b) by host country
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Source: UNEP Risoe database November 2008
Note: The charts indicates the total CERs that could be generated by the end of 2012 from all of the projects currently in the CDM pipeline, across all stages 
from beginning of validation to those already registered and issuing. CERs are counted at the date that the project began its public comment period in 
validation. The values used are the ‘nameplate’ unadjusted values taken from Project Design Documents – i.e. before making any adjustments to estimate 
delivery in practice. 
3. The growth of  Joint Implementation 
Unlike CDM projects, which could accumulate credits  
in principle from 2000 onwards, the formal crediting 
period for Joint Implementation is aligned with the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, and thus did 
not start until January 2008.
In addition, whilst special provisions had been enacted 
to establish the governing machinery for the CDM on an 
interim basis prior to the Protocol entering into force, the 
equivalent machinery for JI was not put into place until 
the Montreal Conference of Parties at the end of 2005. 
Joint Implementation – projects between industrialised countries that generate 
‘emission reduction units’ (ERUs) – had a later start than the CDM, and its 
more recent growth reveals different kinds of lessons. 
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Chart 7  Accumulation of total expected ERUs by 2012
(a) by project type
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Source: UNEP Risoe database November 2008
Note: The chart indicates the total ERUs that could be generated by the end 
of 2012 from all of the projects currently in the JI pipeline, across all stages 
from beginning of public comments to those already registered. ERUs 
are counted at the date that the project began its public comment period. 
The values used are the “nameplate” unadjusted values taken from project 
plans – i.e. before making any adjustments to estimate delivery in practice. 
The chart includes projects from both Track 1 and Track 2 JI.
Source: UNEP Risoe database November 2008
Note: The chart indicates the total ERUs that could be generated by the end of 
2012 from all of the projects currently in the JI pipeline, across all stages from 
beginning of publication of project documents to those already registered. 
ERUs are counted at the date that the project design publication began its public 
comment period. The values used are the “nameplate” unadjusted values taken 
from project plans – i.e. before making any adjustments to estimate delivery in 
practice. The chart includes projects from both Track 1 and Track 2 JI.
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plans – i.e. before making any adjustments to estimate delivery in practice. 
The chart includes projects from both Track 1 and Track 2 JI.
Source: UNEP Risoe database November 2008
Note: The chart indicates the total ERUs that could be generated by the end of 
2012 from all of the projects currently in the JI pipeline, across all stages from 
beginning of publication of project documents to those already registered. 
ERUs are counted at the date that the project design publication began its public 
comment period. The values used are the “nameplate” unadjusted values taken 
from project plans – i.e. before making any adjustments to estimate delivery in 
practice. The chart includes projects from both Track 1 and Track 2 JI.
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Despite this, in anticipation a surge of JI projects were 
initiated in eastern Europe. However the initial impetus in 
several of the New Member States of the EU was choked 
off by the body of legislation they had to incorporate as 
part of joining the EU, and emergence of the EU ETS and 
associated rules to prevent ‘double counting’ of emission 
savings2. Officials in these countries also became 
overwhelmed by the rush of EU legislation they had  
to incorporate and respond to as part of the process  
of Accession to the EU. 
Russia, having hesitated so long before ratifying the 
Kyoto Protocol, remained struggling with internal 
procedural disputes, and few other east European 
countries were in a position to move forward with JI 
projects. As a result, little happened until late in 2006. 
Chart 7 shows the subsequent growth in submitted 
projects, and how these are distributed between project 
types (7a) and countries (7b). The total projected emission 
savings (by 2012) from JI projects submitted to date 
(only 22 had been officially approved and registered at 
the time of writing this report, November 2008) is about 
one tenth that of the CDM.
Despite its hesitant start, Russia accounts for almost 
two thirds of the projected savings to 2012. Most of the 
remainder is divided roughly equally between Ukraine 
and the EU’s New Member States3. In 2008, the Russian 
portfolio has been the only one growing significantly 
while Ukraine and the European countries have only 
submitted a few new projects since September 2007. 
A paradox of JI is that these projects almost all utilise 
procedures conceived after the Kyoto Protocol was 
adopted, to provide a ‘second track’ of JI. The original 
idea had involved minimal international oversight of 
projects originating in countries that had complied with 
the full panoply of the Protocol’s provisions for annual 
reporting and review of national emission inventories. 
Many transition economies were worried that they 
would be unable to meet these extensive requirements, 
which include for example reporting full inventories on 
land-use and non-CO2 emissions, and argued that this 
should not inhibit them developing projects, for example 
in the energy sector, that could go through procedures 
akin to the CDM. A ‘second track’ of JI was thus 
established, which operates more like the CDM, with 
projects being directly endorsed through a multilateral 
Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee (Box 2). 
Most JI projects to date have gone through this route. 
The respective project cycles are outlined in Box 2.
21Global Carbon Mechanisms
2  The rules to prevent ‘double counting’ applied both directly (prohibiting ERUs from emission reduction projects at facilities that now fell within the 
scope of the EU ETS), and indirectly (notably, any energy efficiency project that reduced electricity consumption would indirectly save emissions 
from power stations in the EU ETS – and that part of the emission savings would be discounted). The double counting rules thus undermined any 
incentive for JI projects to increase end-use electricity efficiency. In addition, some abatement efforts now become mandatory under the EU’s acquis 
communitaire. The net result meant that most of the emerging JI projects in the new Member States became ineligible for crediting.
3  This and subsequent discussion refers to projects submitted under the JI ‘Track 2’ procedures: see Climate Strategies (2008): A. Korppoo and O. 
Gassan-Zade, ‘Joint Implementation: looking back and forward’, www.climatestrategies.org
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Box 2 JI project cycle
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Issuance of ERUs
Has the country met the eligibility criteria?
(i.e. can it meet all the provisions for monitoring, 
reporting and verification of its national emissions?)
Yes – choose
track 1 or track 2
No – choose
track 2
Project planned
Track 1 Track 2
Determination by Host Country
Monitoring and verification subject 
to Host Country rules
Prepare PDD* in accordance with 
JISC* procedure
Project receives Letter of Endorsement
from Host Country
Determination by AIE*
JISC* right to review
Monitoring report to AIE*, emissions
verified
Host Country converts AAUs* to ERUs* 
and transfers into buyer’s account
*Note:
• PDD = Project Design Document
• AAUs = Assigned Amount Units
• ERUs = Emission Reduction Units
• JISC = Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee
• AIE = Accredited Independent Entity
For full explanation of these abbreviations and other terms please see the Glossary.
Source: adapted from Norton Rose JI – an introduction (May 2008)
The distribution between project types varies 
fundamentally between the three main contributing 
regions, as indicated in Chart 8. Russian projects were 
initially dominated by gas pipeline refurbishment. These 
accounted for 60% of the volume in September 20074, but 
are now less dominant (see Chart 8 below where pipeline 
projects fall under the category of fugitive emissions) 
as they are joined by other major project types such as 
coal mine methane projects and N2O reduction. Some of 
the special issues around the ‘additionality’ of Russian 
gas projects are considered in section 10. 
The vast majority (almost 90%) of projected emission 
savings from Ukrainian projects come from just two 
categories, namely coal mine methane and industrial 
energy saving. The latter are mostly in the steel sector 
but there is also one significant cement project. 
Ukraine was the first country to receive final 
determination for a JI project in March 2007. 
In sharp contrast, by number most JI projects in the EU 
focus on renewable energy, mainly small hydro, wind  
and biomass, though overall emission reductions are 
dominated by a few large N2O projects in western Europe. 
The vast majority of the EU projects originate from the 
transition economies which joined the EU in the 2000s. 
However, participation is open to any industrialised 
country, and more recently some JI projects have also 
been submitted and registered from Germany and New 
Zealand. Together with some projects from Hungary, 
these were the only ones to utilise the bilateral Track 1 
procedures until recently, when interest in Track 1 has 
begun to expand.
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Chart 8  Distribution of projected emission reductions from Joint Implementation projects by country and project type
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4  Korppoo, Anna (2007). Joint Implementation in Russia and Ukraine: Review of projects submitted to JISC. Climate Strategies Briefing Paper, October 2007. 
Percentage relates to specific country. Overall percentage in brackets.
Source: Climate Strategies (2008): Korppoo and Gassan-Zade. 
Data derived from JISC Track 2 project database, as of 1 Oct 2008.
4. Intergovernmental emissions trading and 
Green Investment Schemes 
Intergovernmental emissions trading is already implicitly 
used in the context of the EU ETS: although it applies to 
industrial emissions, emission trades between facilities 
in different EU Member States are matched by an 
equivalent transfer of national obligations under the Kyoto 
Protocol. Apart from that, however, no intergovernmental 
emissions trade was completed in the ten years after 
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol – despite the almost 
complete freedom to do so under the terms of the 
Protocol and its subsequent Marrakesh Accords. 
The essential stumbling block was concern about the 
environmental legitimacy of such trading, driven by 
doubts not about the principle, but rather the specific 
Kyoto Protocol targets. With a couple of exceptions (the 
UK being the most notable), most OECD countries look 
to be falling short of delivering their targets domestically. 
Thus they are looking to acquire, not to sell, Kyoto 
emission units in order to comply. This would be 
acceptable if such trade did not increase overall 
emissions – which would require additional effort in  
the country exporting the allowances. However, this  
is only true as long as the targets do actually constrain 
emissions in all countries that have caps. 
This is not the case. Specifically, the Kyoto targets were 
negotiated in the years after the collapse of central 
planning in the former Soviet Union and east European 
countries, with the consequent massive contraction of 
their heavy industry-based economies and associated 
reductions in their fossil fuel consumption and emissions. 
The common assumption was that, after the transition, 
their economies would recover and their emissions 
would rise again. For most such ‘transition economies’, 
economic recovery did arrive but it was largely associated 
with reducing waste, increasing efficiency and often the 
closing down of old, energy intensive manufacturing 
capacity. In many cases, emissions continued to fall for 
some years even as strong economic growth resumed. 
Chart 9 shows that overall emissions from these regions 
remain well below their Kyoto targets, for reasons  
that have little to do with their climate change policies. 
Moreover, their degree of surplus far exceeds the 
potential shortfall in the OECD Kyoto countries without 
the United States. Emissions projections for the different 
regions are outlined in section 8, but no scenarios to 
2012 change this basic picture. 
The third of the ‘Kyoto flexibility mechanisms’ is intergovernmental emissions 
trading. In concept this is by far the simplest – but its development has not 
entirely been as expected. 
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Chart 9  2005 net surplus emissions relative to Kyoto targets for signatories
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Some of the transition economies regard their resulting 
‘Kyoto surplus’ as potential compensation for the trauma 
of the transition and a reflection of the global benefits 
associated with this; the rest of the world, however, has 
labelled it as ‘hot air’. Selling it would alleviate the cap 
elsewhere but not require any additional emission 
reduction effort in these countries (at least in the absence 
of commitments to steep future reductions that might 
mop up the surplus, if banked). Consequently all OECD 
governments have spurned this apparently ‘easy way out.’ 
The theory of intergovernmental emissions trading  
was that by increasing flexibility in the face of uncertain 
emission trends, it would also facilitate countries 
agreeing to tougher targets. This to some degree it  
did; but the practical application of intergovernmental 
trading looked like being still-born, due to the highly 
asymmetric nature of the Kyoto targets in the aftermath 
of economic transition.
Realising the unacceptability of simply selling their 
surplus, however, several of the transition economies 
have started to develop a creative solution. Hungary 
and Latvia were the first to enact legislation based on 
detailed, concrete proposals for targeting revenues 
from selling some of their Kyoto allowances, to projects 
and programmes that would reduce their emissions. 
They have been joined by several others. 
Turning this basic idea into concrete action took several 
years. The transition countries had first to accept that 
simply selling their surplus was unlikely to be an option; 
the growth of the CDM was probably vital to the 
realisation that they would have to compete for buyers of 
their allowances, with environmentally credible proposals. 
To be credible would require a long-term commitment 
to appropriate use of the revenues, and a high degree  
of international transparency to convince buyers of  
this. In some transition countries this is still regarded 
with suspicion, as a foreign intrusion in their domestic 
budgetary affairs. 
The required conditions were most easily achieved in the 
transition economies that had joined the EU. However, 
another hurdle raised its head, namely EU State Aid 
legislation that prohibits use of public funds for many 
commercially-related applications. Designed to protect 
a level competitive playing field in the EU, this restricted 
the kinds of projects that could be funded. 
These complexities took a long time to navigate. However 
during 2007/8, Hungary and Latvia both passed laws 
through full Parliamentary procedures to establish such 
‘Green Investment Schemes’ that met these criteria; 
Ukraine has now also done so, though in a less complete 
form and without the constraints of EU State Aid 
legislation. Laws in the Czech Republic and Romania are 
now also well advanced. The first GIS transactions took 
place in autumn 2008, with Hungary selling 8 MtCO2e  
of their Kyoto Allowances (AAUs) to Belgium and Spain.5
The main characteristics of the different GIS schemes at 
present are summarised in Table 2 overleaf. This shows 
that Green Investment Schemes can take different 
forms. The Hungarian pilot GIS focuses upon a major 
programme to refurbish its building stock, which like 
many in central and eastern Europe remains inefficient. 
The Latvian scheme includes this, but also small scale 
renewable projects such as biomass CHP and biogas 
recovery and use. Others target district heating schemes, 
as well as a range of ‘softer’ measures. 
25Global Carbon Mechanisms
5  At the end of 2008, Slovakia was reported to have sold 10 million AAUs to a private company, at a price of €6.05/tCO2. It stated that the money would 
go to a pre-existing environmental fund. However, the ultimate buyer was unclear, we were unable to ascertain details of the deal or the application 
and governance of the fund, and the Slovakian Environment Ministry later denied the reports. Slovakia was also reported to have sold AAUs to Japan 
in 2003, but again we could not find subsequent corroboration or details.
Table 1 Principal applications of main Green Investment Schemes
Potential Greening activities Country examples
Hard greening
Retrofitting old buildings
Hungary, Latvia, Ukraine, 
Czech Republic, Romania
Other energy efficiency in buildings Czech Republic, Romania
Construction of small co-generation installations Romania
Rehabilitation of district heating systems
Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Ukraine, Romania
Renewable energy (small scale) Hungary, Latvia, Romania
Soft greening GIS management capacity building Czech Republic
Capacity related climate change awareness –
Monitoring and observation on climate system –
Building capacity on climate-related legislation and policy Latvia
Source: Climate Strategies: Urge Vorsatz et al. (2008)
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Indeed an important distinction to emerge is that 
between ‘hard greening’, which funds specific activities 
that directly reduce emissions in ways that can be 
quantified and monitored, and ‘soft greening’, which 
funds supporting activities. The principal activities in 
these two classes are summarised in Table 1 on page 25. 
Overall, the GIS schemes can differ in many respects 
other than just the activities funded, including the  
time horizon, extent and nature of any ‘additionality’ 
requirements, the extent and governance of financial 
separation from other funds, and the legal channels 
through which this is guaranteed. Also GIS in the New 
Member States are more constrained (notably by State 
Aid legislation) than in Ukraine.
The initial experience and case studies illustrate five 
main characteristics of Green Investment Schemes that 
distinguish them from the project mechanisms.
Flexibility. The various schemes and proposals display a 
diversity of potential activities. Free from the restrictions 
of the project-by-project additionality criteria of the 
project mechanisms, GIS proposals within the EU New 
Member States include programmes in residential  
and public sector building refurbishment, efficiency 
programmes with small businesses, various renewable 
energy schemes, waste reduction and methane capture 
– with agriculture and forestry projects also under 
consideration. Outside the EU, the absence of State Aid 
restrictions enables the list of potential activities to 
expand even further to include, for example, industrial 
energy efficiency. 
Time horizons. Any unused emission allowances under 
the Kyoto Protocol can be banked forward into the Kyoto 
second period, post-2012. Thus, countries with a surplus 
can in effect sell a future stream of emission allowances, 
brought forward and sold to help other countries comply 
with the present Kyoto commitments. This offers a way 
in which the present surplus in transition countries can 
be eroded over time, providing that their future emission 
obligations do represent binding constraints. 
Upfront finance. GIS deals intrinsically involve upfront 
finance. Whereas CDM and JI transactions are financed 
against the expectation that they will generate emission 
credits in the future, GIS contracts involve an immediate 
transfer of national emission allowances (AAUs) that can 
be used by a purchasing country for compliance with its 
Kyoto obligations. 
Government-led. National emission allowances cannot 
be used for compliance under the EU ETS, thus GIS deals 
are led by governments as part of national strategies  
for complying with Kyoto obligations. Of course, the 
private sector can be involved in implementing the 
deals – which could for example offer a major boost for 
the buildings refurbishment industry – but the operation 
is very different from a decentralised market operating 
under internationally negotiated rules for crediting. 
Co-benefits. GIS projects may have a broad range of 
socio-economic and ecological co-benefits. For instance, 
improving building energy efficiency can yield many 
benefits beyond the value of saved energy and reduced 
emissions: improved health and comfort, jobs and new 
business opportunities, lower energy bills, and improved 
energy security. This is a direct consequence of GIS being 
government-led. The private sector could not monetise 
most of these benefits, and although ‘contribution to 
sustainable development’ is a criterion for CDM projects, 
it has little operational value to private investment. In 
contrast, host governments can use GIS to finance efforts 
that address a wide range of public concerns, within 
which carbon savings may be merely one element 
amongst many. The public sector can also seek to 
co-finance programmes in which emission savings are 
just one of the benefits. 
These characteristics may make GIS increasingly 
attractive as time goes by and willingness to engage  
on both sides increases. However, there are important 
issues that remain. The schemes vary in their 
commitment to matching AAU transfers 1-to-1 with 
verifiable ‘additional’ emission savings even for the ‘hard 
greening’ components; this could be justified in terms 
of other benefits accruing, or addressed over a longer 
time frame, but its acceptability remains to be tested. 
Also, with the first transactions only just completed, the 
actual performance remains to be proven. Nevertheless, 
GIS is an interesting concept that, as illustrated later, 
could address important gaps in the coverage of the 
project mechanisms. 
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5. Implementation and development of  the 
Mechanisms: a comparative overview
At the time that the fundamental decision to adopt the 
Mechanisms was made in the Kyoto Protocol, many 
economists were sceptical of the case for having more 
than two instruments – the CDM for developing countries 
without an emissions cap, and emissions trading 
between those countries that took on a cap. They were 
not alone in suspecting that JI might prove to be simply  
a more bureaucratic and less attractive version of 
emissions trading. 
In practice, in addition to the distinction between capped 
and non-capped countries, experience has spawned 
several additional variants.
These are illustrated in Chart 10, and their different 
legal and procedural channels and other characteristics 
are summarised in Table 3. This underlines in particular 
the fundamental difference between the two tracks of 
Joint Implementation. The CDM-like ‘JI Track 2’ involves 
direct international oversight to assure the integrity  
of project credits, whereas ‘JI Track 1’ allows bilateral 
exchanges of project credits between countries that 
have fulfilled a deeper level of compliance with the 
Protocol’s requirements on annual monitoring, reporting 
and review of national emission inventories.
In many ways, the different Mechanisms all spring from the same basic idea, 
namely that global emission reductions can be secured most effectively, fairly 
and efficiently by separating who pays from where reductions are delivered.  
In practice, their different structures and governance serve different needs. 
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Chart 10  Characteristics of the Global Carbon Mechanisms 
Reduction in a
country that has 
a Kyoto target?  
Country in full 
compliance with Kyoto 
annual reporting, review 
and registry requirements?
Selling allowances 
that the country
won’t need because
it will easily meet its
Kyoto target?   
Selling the
emissions
savings? 
Reduction projects
proposed and considered
individually?
International grant 
contribution?
Country spending the
money on reducing
emissions?
Yes
Yes
No
No
(Mainly
developing
countries) (Participating in a
carbon market)
No
(Selling reductions from
specific activities)
No
(Aggregated programme
of projects)
No
(Country doesn’t make an explicit
link between sale and reduction projects)
Programmatic – CDM
CDM
JI Track 1
JI Track 2
Green Investment 
Schemes
AAU Sale
Global Environment Facility
or other UN/Multilateral 
Development Bank support
Yes
(Each project
considered individually)
Yes
(No other multilateral 
oversight required)
Yes
(Sale dependent on money being spent
on programmes to mitigate climate change)
No
(JI Supervisory Committee
must confirm project)
Yes
(Selling the allowances the country
has been given under the Kyoto Protocol)
(Mainly
industrialised
countries)
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The developing country effort is focused on the CDM, 
plus the direct financing programmes of the pre-existing 
World Bank/Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the 
new Climate Investment Funds. The CDM developed 
first because its ‘prompt start’ provisions (crediting in 
theory from 2000) created a strong incentive both to 
initiate projects and to sort out the institutional machinery 
(which was developed and began operating in ‘shadow’ 
form well before the Protocol finally entered into force 
in 2005). So primed, within one year the CDM eclipsed 
the scale of GEF programmes – indicating the power of 
carbon market mechanisms to generate levels of activity 
and finance far greater than centralised, donor-dependent, 
funding programmes. The underlying engine, however, 
was the establishment of the EU ETS, bringing Kyoto’s 
cap and trade principles down to the industry level.
The EU ETS forms only one of several mechanisms of 
bilateral exchanges between countries that comply with 
the panoply of national inventory reporting and review 
requirements. Industries outside the scope of the EU ETS 
can exchange project credits under JI; and governments 
can transfer national allowances directly – in practice, 
most such exchanges are being considered in the context 
of Green Investment Schemes. In total the industrialised 
world has thus developed four mechanisms. They have 
come into conflict only when the adoption of EU ETS – 
and other EU policies – in the New Member States arrived 
on top of initiated JI (Track 2) projects, many of which 
were then aborted due to the double counting rules (see 
note 2 earlier). The mechanisms see some competition 
in Ukraine, where JI (Track 1) and GIS – freed from 
constraints like the EU’s State Aid rules – offer similar 
routes for some project types. Apart from this, the 
instruments do not noticeably compete. Moreover, the 
different instruments have different risk profiles, as 
indicated in Table 4, and this also means the diversity  
of instruments has some benefits. 
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Mechanism Clean 
Development 
Mechanism 
(CDM)
Joint 
Implementation 
(JI) ‘Track 2’
JI ‘Track 1’ Green 
Investment 
Schemes 
(GIS) 
Industry-level 
cap-and-trade 
(EU ETS)
Market price 
risk1 • • • • •
Developer 
risk2 • • • • •
Seller risk3 • • • • •
Buyer risk4 • • • • •
Table 4 Indicative risk profiles of the different Mechanisms
1.  Prices for credits from the project credits are generally driven by the primary buyer market of EU ETS and some governments, and thus have  
some added risk element. However, this may change if and as governments become more active buyers and/or other national or regional trading 
schemes develop. 
2.  Developers of CDM and JI Track 2 projects face risk of rejection by international panels; these risks are mitigated for projects developed in and requiring 
consent primarily by host governments.
3.  Risk facing the seller after projects have been approved and credits/allowances issued. GIS and EU ETS face the risk that the seller has miscalculated 
and could face future compliance problems due to selling of allowances.
4.  The main buyer risks arise either from third-party risks of non-delivery, or reputational risks that the environmental integrity of specific units they buy  
is challenged.
Source: Authors. For a similar table with breakdown of components of seller and buyer risk, see Climate Strategies (2008): Urge-Vorsatz et al., Green 
Investment Schemes.
• High • Medium • Low
Indeed, the evidence from sections 3 and 4 is that the 
different instruments now available to industrialised 
countries mostly complement each other, with each 
adapted to different niches. The key insight from this  
is that industrialised countries have used the greater 
flexibility afforded to countries with emissions caps  
to address two other distinctions:
•  Public vs private. Structures based on clear rules and 
procedures facilitate private sector participation. The 
strong and growing role of private capital in many  
of the relevant emitting sectors means that this has 
dominated CDM and JI projects. The bilateral and 
discretionary nature of JI Track 1 tends to mean greater 
government involvement, but frequently still led by the 
private sector, in open competition to sell the credits 
on to the carbon market. In contrast, governments 
take the lead in GIS, and indeed in the EU have to focus 
mainly on non-commercial end-user domains (such 
as building refurbishment) to avoid challenges under 
the EU’s State Aid rules. 
•  Project vs programme. CDM and JI are explicitly 
designed to credit specific project investments.  
More than three years after a decision to launch a 
‘programmatic’ variant of CDM, it remains largely 
moribund, reflecting the difficulty of designing 
procedures that enable programmes to fulfil efficiently 
the underlying principles of discrete investments  
that directly generate continuously monitored and 
additional emission savings. However, GIS has been 
equally applied to programmes – most of the proposed 
GIS schemes are explicitly designed for both. 
Together with the distinction between the routes available 
to industrialised vs developing countries this enables 
the different instruments to be roughly mapped on a  
‘2 x 2 x 2’ cube (see Chart 1 in the Executive Summary 
for illustration), that corresponds approximately to the 
end points in Chart 10. The present ‘carbon market 
mechanisms’ directly target four of the eight possible 
combinations, with some others partly but incompletely 
addressed by the programmatic CDM and ‘Track 1’ JI. 
Far from the original concern that Kyoto had spawned a 
superfluous instrument for industrialised countries, the 
evidence is that on the contrary, there are good reasons 
for the diversity, as they fulfil different roles and engage 
different actors and types of activity – and that the 
existing mechanisms still do not provide a comprehensive 
set of incentives, as illustrated more fully in Part III of 
this report. 
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Part II: Performance, delivery and projections 
Part II of this report looks at the evidence on project performance in the  
Clean Development Mechanism, by comparing initial projections with realised 
delivery, and uses this to build up a picture of likely supply of emission credits. 
The section also critically examines projections of emissions, which drive the 
overall demand for credits from OECD countries – and the additional potential 
supplies from many of the transition economies. These are combined to give 
an overall assessment of the balance of supply and demand, out to 2012 and 
beyond to 2020.
6. Project performance in the CDM 
Growing experience with the CDM now makes it possible 
to start comparing actual performance against that 
initially predicted in the ‘project design documents’. In 
addition to the possibility that submitted projects may 
not be accepted (registered), registered projects may 
still ‘under-perform’ for various reasons. This section 
looks at the emerging evidence on project performance, 
and identifies key factors affecting this. It is based on  
an initial in-depth analysis of a random sample of over 
300 of the 650 projects that had been submitted for 
registration by July 2007 published by Climate Strategies, 
supplemented with more recent data from a study by 
New Carbon Finance (for more details, please see web 
Annex 1)6. 
The first phase: revision, acceptance 
or rejection 
The first hurdle is to complete procedures that lead to  
a project being officially registered with the CDM. Box 1 
in section 2 illustrated the stages. The project must be 
accepted by the host government’s Designated National 
Authority, and a Designated Operational Entity has to 
validate the documents so that the project can be sent 
(along with a validation report) for registration by the 
CDM Executive Board. Project design and estimated 
emission savings can go through several revisions as 
the project passes through these various stages. Detailed 
data are not available but the in-depth project sample 
concluded that compared to first estimates, ‘… each step 
of the CDM project cycle tends to lead to a downward 
adjustment of [predicted] emission savings.’ 
Out of the sample of 300 projects, 20 were ultimately 
rejected by the Executive Board. Of these rejected 
projects, 65% were categorised as ‘energy efficiency’ 
projects, although energy efficiency only accounted for 
17% of submitted projects. A significant proportion of 
the rejected projects involved cement blending, where 
it was judged that the emission savings were not really 
‘additional’ – the projects would have proceeded anyway7. 
This in itself hints at one limitation of the CDM. Energy 
efficiency projects account for only a small part of  
the total portfolio (see Chart 6a earlier), and featured 
disproportionately in rejections. Yet energy efficiency 
offers a huge potential that is also often cost-effective. 
The paradox is that the sheer cost-effective nature of 
many energy efficiency projects makes them harder  
to justify as additional to what would have happened 
otherwise; once such a project is identified, would  
it not proceed anyway? A separate study identifies 
numerous other potential barriers to foreign investment 
in energy efficiency in China8, but some are linked to 
this paradox in terms of how China has implemented  
its CDM programme.
With more than a thousand projects now operating, evidence is accumulating 
about the performance of CDM projects in reality. As with many industrial 
projects and ‘new markets’, the emerging evidence suggests that many projects 
have not so far performed as well as hoped, but to a degree that differs greatly 
between project types. 
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6  Technical Annex I: CDM project performance available from the Climate Strategies website at www.climatestrategies.org. The original study  
was published as Climate Strategies (2008): A. Michaelowa and P. Castro, Empirical analysis of the performance of CDM projects.
7  Out of 22 such cement blending projects submitted for registration, 8 were rejected as the Executive Board clarified its interpretation of  
additionality arguments. 
8  W. Chandler and H. Gwin, Financing energy efficiency in China, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 2008.
Subsequent performance 
Once a project has been officially accepted and registered 
by the CDM Executive Board, it can start to generate 
CERs on the basis of retrospective verified assessment 
of its actual performance. The most basic indicator of 
its performance relative to expectations is thus the ratio 
of delivered, verified CERs to the amount projected in 
the project design documents at registration – its ‘yield’. 
Chart 11 shows the growth of issued CERs to date, which 
remains a very small fraction of the projected total over 
the next few years. The CDM itself is only just now 
moving into the era of full, verified delivery. The volume 
of issued CERs has more than doubled between the 
cut-off of the initial sample (of 300 projects by Climate 
Strategies), and the more recent (but smaller) sample by 
New Carbon Finance, and remains heavily dominated 
by the large industrial gas projects.
The projects in the initial sample were expected to save 
85 MtCO2e per year; however only 65 million CERs were 
actually subsequently issued (in terms of standardised 
‘annual equivalent’)9. The average yield across the 
sample by July 2007 was thus 76% of that projected in 
the registered design documents. Failure to perform as 
initially projected is not surprising, and is hardly unique 
to CDM projects – optimism, regarding timescale and/or 
other dimensions of performance, pervades industrial 
project planning, like many other walks of life. However, 
a shortfall close to 25% merits closer attention. 
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9  For these purposes ‘annual equivalent’ has been calculated as the total CERs issued at the time of analysis divided by the total period in days for which 
the project has been issuing and multiplied by 365 to gain an estimate of annual issuance rate.
Chart 11  Issued CERs accumulated over time, by project type 
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The yield would be expected to vary for different  
types of projects. For example projects involving new 
technologies might face more implementation and 
monitoring difficulties, and/or be harder to predict. The 
emerging evidence, summarised in Chart 12a, confirms 
that different types of projects have indeed performed 
very differently. N2O projects have had the highest 
yields – indeed these are the only project type that 
generated more CERs than expected, by almost  
30%. The performance of the eight HFC-23 projects 
disappointed in aggregate, mainly due to two poorly 
performing projects in China (though their performance 
has subsequently improved). 
Hydro, a well established and understood technology, 
performed close to prediction. Landfill gas projects 
(particularly those which produce electricity) and 
animal waste projects showed the lowest performance, 
delivering under one third of projected CERs10. Other 
renewables have tended to under-perform by about 
10%, and energy efficiency projects in aggregate by 
almost 20%, with distinct differences also between the 
underlying project sub-categories11. 
Chart 12  Forecast and issuance of CERs
(a) by project category 
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10  This is noted in the World Bank’s State and Trends of the Carbon Market (2007) report, which suggests as causes ‘overestimation of the potential generation 
of gas at the modelling stage, inadequate design of gas capture systems, suboptimal operation of the landfills, or other external factors’ (p.28).
11  Agricultural plant waste projects performed better (95%) than wood waste projects (76%). Run-of-river hydropower projects perform slightly better 
(94%) than projects based on reservoirs. The very few geothermal and cement blending projects had produced disappointing performance as of the 
sample’s mid-2007 cut-off (47% and 45%, respectively). 
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12  Limits to qualify for small-scale procedures are expressed as a maximum of either 15 MW capacity of the project activity, 60 GWh annual energy savings 
or 60,000 CO2 emission reductions in any year of the crediting period. Amalgamating all projects below 60,000 tCO2, the yield is 84%.
13  New Carbon Finance research note False Expectation: Why CDM projects under perform November 2008. This assessment sampled 150 projects. 
The size of project seems to matter. Very large projects 
(above 540,000 tCO2e) include the big N2O projects that 
have performed exceptionally well. However, in general 
smaller projects tend to be simpler and easier to assess; 
over most of the size range, the yield has been higher 
for smaller projects, and very small projects (below 
20,000 tCO2e) produced 12% more CERs than predicted. 
CDM rules embody simplified procedures for ‘small’ 
projects, which encompass roughly the two smallest 
categories in Chart 12b and imply an average performance 
around 84%12. 
The more recent study from 2008, although with a smaller 
overall project sample, appears to support most of these 
findings13. 
About half (48%) of sampled projects that had issued 
CERs by August 2008 were yielding within +/- 20% of 
predicted performance. The 10% of projects exceeding 
this were mostly industrial gas projects, with a few 
renewable, cement and industrial energy efficiency 
projects. Agricultural, coal bed methane and most biogas 
projects systematically fell far below expectations. 
Various types of energy efficiency projects also delivered 
very varied yields. Overall, with the exception of a few 
big HFC projects and some improvement in hydro, there 
was little evidence of improving performance in the 
year between the two studies, and the broad patterns 
appear consistent. 
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The more detailed earlier analysis also examined 
whether project performance varied according to  
other factors such as the host country, the degree of 
international participation, or the choice of consultant 
or validator involved. 
•  The host country determines the political and 
economic context, and specific energy, industry and 
other sector-specific policies that may affect a project. 
As indicated in Part 1, most CDM activity has focused 
on China, India and Brazil, which provide relatively 
stable investment environments, well established 
procedures and large markets. More than half the  
20 rejected projects in the sample were from India  
and 5 from Brazil, but none were from China; but in 
aggregate, Indian projects in the sample had performed 
above expectations, whereas projects in Brazil and 
China had underperformed. However, all these results 
are dominated by a few large industrial gas projects 
and the survey found no evidence that any one 
country performs consistently better or consistently 
worse – in all projects – than the others. 
•  CDM projects do not have to involve foreign 
participants – to be ‘bilateral’ in their development 
and registration. ‘Unilateral’ projects can be developed 
principally by the host country to generate CERs for 
sale on the international market. After registration, 
bilateral projects had a somewhat higher yield, about 
three quarters compared to two thirds from unilateral 
projects. Possible reasons for the better performance 
of bilateral projects – apart from differences in project 
type – might be improved access to technology, 
technical support and upfront financing. 
•  The type of consultant may influence prospects, with 
technology-specific consultants having had more 
success than multi-project ones in getting their CDM 
projects registered, but the picture is more mixed  
in terms of subsequent performance. Projects with 
in-house development of design documents performed 
better on average than those led by external 
consultants, but the limited number of sampled projects 
and high variance in each type suggests that other 
factors are probably more important. 
•  Project performance also varied with different 
validators – the Designated Operational Entities that 
perform due diligence for the design documents –  
but this appears to depend mostly upon the type of 
projects they were handling: poorer performers are 
associated with project types that have struggled to 
deliver. The data also show the market for validation 
services is quite concentrated, with one validator 
accounting about half of all the CERs issued. 
The main data are summarised in the Technical Annex 
(note 6). Overall, there are interesting observations 
about other factors that could affect performance,  
but the data on these cannot be taken as statistically 
significant compared to the dominant driver: the widely 
divergent performance of different project types, 
including the performance of individual very large 
projects. Also notable is that many projects have now 
been placed under review by the Executive Board, 
introducing substantial delays and raising questions 
about the performance of and relationship between 
these different parts of the approval process. 
There is indeed some debate about whether the fact 
that project developers pay for the validation services 
may influence their assessments. This reflects the  
norm in other areas of private sector quality assurance 
services – where producers are paying to convince 
purchasers of the quality of their products or services 
– or to comply with legal requirements (as with financial 
auditing). However, with the CDM there is at least one 
difference, as the Executive Board stands between 
validated projects and final approval. At its 42nd and 
43rd session in September and October 2008, the Board 
rejected an unprecedented proportion of projects – 
reflecting either a toughening of the Board’s criteria,  
or a slackening in those of validators. The relationship of 
private company-based validation to public institution-
based registration is considered briefly in Part III. 
One final observation is that the emerging record shows 
the wisdom of having based the issuance of CDM credits 
on verified, monitored project performance, rather than 
any projections. The investor or buyer thereby takes  
the risks of underperformance (‘buyer beware’), rather 
than the regulators or the environment – a risk which  
for some project types has turned out to be very high. 
In terms of issued credits, the CDM is still in its early 
days, and it remains too soon to evaluate the actual 
delivered performance of the other mechanisms given 
their later start. 
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7. Supply projections, 2008-12
The ‘nameplate’ projections from the Project Design 
Documents of projects in the pipeline – i.e. those that 
have been formally submitted for validation before 
considering any additional potential from future 
submissions – now amount to over 3,000 MtCO2e 
reductions cumulative to 2012. Of these, 90% are CDM 
projects and the remainder JI. As detailed in the previous 
section, however, experience has shown that not all 
these credits will materialise: 
•  Projects may be rejected or revised during the 
validation process.
•  Validated projects may still be rejected by the Executive 
Board or returned for revision to get through to 
registration, bringing delays and potentially reductions 
in estimates of emission savings.
•  Registered projects may start late or otherwise not 
deliver as projected. 
In response to the first studies of actual delivery, during 
2008 analysts cut forecasts. For example, PointCarbon 
and the French bank Société Générale in early 2008 had 
projected cumulative supply of around 2,500 MtCO2e. In 
summer 2008, Société Générale reduced its projection to 
1,950 MtCO2e (around 1,700 MtCO2e from the CDM, and 
250 MtCO2e from JI); a few months later, PointCarbon 
also dropped its CDM estimates below 2,000 MtCO2e. 
Continuing procedural delays, and decisions by the 
Executive Board to reject more projects than anticipated 
in autumn 2008, could further curtail such estimates. 
Our own analysis recognises that the future portfolio and 
performance may differ considerably from the past: 
•  Well-performing industrial gas projects no longer 
dominate the mix, forming only about 30% of total 
projected CERs to 2012; conversely, however, the 
worst-performing project classes (e.g. animal waste) 
are also less significant than before.
•  Wind, biomass and hydro, which account for another 
30% going forward, have had yields to date typically 
around 85-95%. The remaining project types that 
form the balance (methane and cement projects, 
industrial efficiency and fuel switching among others) 
have more varied performance.
•  Much of the under-delivery was due to teething 
troubles – institutional and technical – that delayed 
project start-up. Reports of run-rates for established 
and operating projects are much closer to projected 
output, in the range of 90-100%.
•  In addition experience should improve performance 
more broadly, as existing projects mature, 
methodologies improve, developers gain experience, 
and investors become more discriminating about 
project types.
Set against these broadly positive indicators, delays in 
approval have increased due to overload in the system, 
and the toughening stance of the Executive Board. Time 
lags are typically 1-2 years; some projects have been 
languishing in validation for much longer, raising doubt 
as to whether they are still really being pursued at all.
Chart 13 (over) illustrates graphically the impact of 
these discount factors on the volume of CDM delivery 
from projects at each of the different stages of 
development. It shows a mid-point in the potential  
yield range, which represents a plausible scenario in 
which yield rates improve for certain types of projects  
as developers learn from the experience of earlier 
projects and in which delays in the registration  
process are partially unblocked.
The development of the CDM in particular, combined with the growing 
experience of the other mechanisms, enables more robust estimates to be 
made about the likely volume of emission credits available to 2012. 
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Chart 13  Potential supply of credits from CDM 2008-2012, including future project inflow
The right-hand side of the Chart represents projects 
already registered with the CDM Executive Board. The 
factors discussed above suggest a high yield for these 
projects, though continuing delays in start up will still 
affect the final volumes available by 2012. Projects 
already registered with the CDM are likely to generate 
around 700 MtCO2e over 2009-2012, in addition to the 
200 MtCO2e already delivered by late 2008. 
The bigger questions surround the delivery from 
projects earlier in the process – represented by the 
left-hand side of Chart 13. These face the risks 
discussed – that the projects will not be validated, or 
subsequently registered; downward revisions during 
validation and registration processes; and reduced 
delivery due both to continuing delays in gaining 
approval, and delayed project start. We make 
adjustments based on the historical evidence in  
order to estimate the impact of delays, which are  
set against the ticking clock in relation to estimates  
of credits generated by 2012, and which rapidly  
truncate the volume. 
Projects officially ‘in the pipeline’ but not yet registered 
are likely to generate at least 400 MtCO2e CERs by 2012. 
In addition there is continuing inflow. New proposals for 
CDM projects submitted in the first ten months of 2008 
averaged at least 50 MtCO2e (total CERs projected to 2012) 
per month. If current submission rates are maintained 
this could amount to further nameplate potential of 
around 800 MtCO2e for the CDM, but delivery by 2012 
will, however, start to be cut off by the ticking clock,  
and new projects may be harder to finance given the 
post-2012 uncertainties combined with the credit crunch14. 
A reasonable estimate is that new arrivals into the 
pipeline will add another 200-300 MtCO2e, bringing  
the total CDM estimate to 1,600 MtCO2. 
Any estimate of the number of CERs to be generated  
in the 2008-2012 period is clearly sensitive to the 
assumptions made around project performance, 
continued blockage in the pipeline, rates of validation 
and registration failure and project inflow. Our sensitivity 
studies suggest that the total possible range of CDM 
delivery could be between 1,400 and 1,800 MtCO2e  
(see Table 5 in section 8).
Including a wide range (150-300 MtCO2e) of estimates 
for JI, the total plausible range of project credits by 2012 
is thus 1,550-2,100 MtCO2e.
Two other factors add to the overall supply: 
•  Although firm Green Investment Scheme sales to date 
are very small compared to the project mechanisms, 
they are gaining credibility and interest, and are set 
within the context of the much larger overhang of 
surplus allowances respectively in the new EU Member 
States, Ukraine, and the Russian surplus itself. Some 
estimates are presented in the next section. However 
with the key legislative steps in several countries 
completed, several hundred MtCO2e could be ‘brought 
to market’. 
•  The Kyoto Protocol allows industrialised countries  
to offset their emissions against ‘Removal Units’ 
generated by domestic afforestation, reforestation and 
deforestation. Data on the likely contribution is difficult 
to establish, but an estimate by the EU’s Working Group 
on Forest Sinks suggests a contribution in the EU of 
approximately 30 MtCO2e/yr, or 150 MtCO2e over the 
Kyoto period, whilst the EU Environment Agency 
estimates 57 MtCO2e/yr in the EU-15. A conservative 
range for 2008-12 across the relevant industrialised 
countries is 100-300 MtCO2e15. 
The overall result is that supplies of all forms – excluding 
non-GIS forms of surplus AAUs – will fall in the range 
2,000-4,300 MtCO2e out to 2012. We now consider the 
implications of these levels of supply for the global 
carbon market. 
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14  There was no evidence of slowdown in CDM/JI project submission as of November 2008, as measured by cumulative projected savings to 2012. Until 
new rules are agreed for post-2012, the uncertainties may start to deter developers particularly for projects in which the emission credit sales form an 
important part of the economic returns. The contribution from new projects is most sensitive, however, to the assumption about delay from submission  
to first issuance, which can be at least 2 years or more. Such projects would, of course, deliver most of their emission savings post-2012.
15  Annex to the Fourth National Communication from the European Community under the UNFCCC, SEC(2006) 138/2, available from  
unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/eunce4add.pdf. This estimates a mitigation potential of 14 MtCO2eq/yr for the period 2008-2012 from Afforestation, 
Reforestation and Deforestation, which when added to the estimated mitigation potential for Forest Management (capped at 19Mt CO2/yr by the 
protocol) comes to 33 MtCO2/yr. Land-use contributions in Japan, the transition economies, and Australasia are likely to be bigger.
8. Implications for the global carbon market 
The private sector demand for emission credits comes 
mainly from companies in the EU ETS, together with 
Japanese companies complying with their negotiated 
targets, and smaller additions potentially from a few 
other nascent regulatory systems. These will be 
complemented by public purchases from governments 
which are falling short of their Kyoto targets, and thus 
need to acquire international units to comply with their 
international legal obligations. The World Bank ‘Carbon 
Markets’ report in 2008 estimated total demand of  
2,435 MtCO2e, with 60% of this being private sector 
demand from the EU ETS. Similar estimates have  
been reproduced in other market projections16. 
Re-evaluating the demand for  
Kyoto credits 
There is, however, a long and consistent history of 
inflated industrial emission projections based upon 
classical approaches of estimating future levels of 
industrial activity and GDP17. These tend not to take 
account of policies being implemented to cut emissions; 
moreover, energy prices up to 2008 rose far beyond  
any expectations, driving changes in investments and 
attitudes that are unlikely to reverse quickly as prices 
fall; and the fallout from the credit crunch is likely also  
to have an impact on emissions. To check demand 
estimates against this background, the Carbon Trust 
commissioned Cambridge Econometrics to conduct  
a revised analysis using updated data, and to use 
econometric methods to explore the impact of recent 
developments on future trends, with a particular focus 
on the EU-15 countries (which account for around two 
thirds of expected demand), combined with offline 
estimates for Japan. The results in terms of aggregate 
annual average demand are summarised in Chart 14. 
Demand for international emission units comes from both the private sector, 
and purchases by governments under the Kyoto Protocol. Both have been 
affected by the successful impact of domestic policies combined with the high 
fuel prices and credit crunch of 2008 – to levels well below the likely supply. 
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16  The Société Générale study states demand estimates over 2008-12 are ‘stable at 2,400 MtCO2’. 
17  A short review of evidence is contained in M. Grubb and F. Ferrario, False Confidences: forecasting errors and emission caps in CO2 trading systems 
(Climate Policy, Vol.6 pp.495-501, 2006), and applied to debates about future carbon prices in Carbon prices in Phase III of the EU ETS, Climate Strategies 
briefing note, www.climatestrategies.org
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Chart 14 Annual gap between emissions and Kyoto targets, average 2008-12 under different scenarios for the EU-15
Source: World Bank State and Trends of the 
Carbon Market 2008, Cambridge Econometrics 
analysis 2008
Note: In terms of meeting Kyoto commitments, 
the EU-15 countries remain legally separate 
from (and cannot amalgamate with) the EU-12; 
see note 23.
The scenarios project emissions given a fixed EU ETS 
carbon price of €20/tCO2 – below the trading price in 
Europe for much of 2008. The baseline estimate is that 
the EU-15 countries fall short of their Kyoto targets by 
about 250 MtCO2e/yr, or 1,250 MtCO2e over 2008-1218. 
The impact of updating fuel prices and GDP to 2008  
on its own – assuming everything then reverts to prior 
assumptions – reduces this to 1,000 MtCO2e. However if 
energy prices stay at levels defined by oil at US$100/bbl, 
the net shortfall in EU-15 countries is just 600 MtCO2e. 
Interestingly, the reduced GDP projections have very 
little impact on emissions. This is partly because the 
projection of high international energy prices itself 
reduces EU GDP, so the additional changes are not large; 
reduced GDP also implies less investment in efficient 
new capital stock, which offsets the reduced level of 
economic activity19. 
This represents a radical change compared to other 
estimates. This is not only due to updated data, but also 
reflects a different approach to the EU ETS. With updated 
data and a carbon price of €20/tCO2, the Cambridge 
Econometrics study shows no aggregate shortfall in the 
EU ETS – for which an overall surplus cannot now entirely 
be ruled out20. This result is broadly consistent with 
applying updated data to our own earlier studies, since 
fuel price and GDP trends have both been at or beyond 
the extreme of the uncertainty ranges we considered in 
200621. These earlier studies also imply that a price slump 
from €20 to €10/tCO2 over the period 2009-2012 might 
add around 250 MtCO2e to EU ETS demand compared 
to the ‘baseline’ estimate at €20/t CO222. 
All the other studies cited have simply assumed that 
demand for credits from the EU ETS is at the legally 
capped maximum 1,400 MtCO2e. Our analysis shows 
that this bears no relationship to the actual need, based 
upon emission projections to 2012. The main need will 
be from government purchases for compliance with 
their Kyoto commitments. The combination of EU-15 
governmental demand with plausible range of actual 
shortfall in the EU ETS suggests a range of 550-1,000 
MtCO2e to 2012, or 550-1,250 Mt CO2e if the upper end 
allows for the increased EU ETS demand if the carbon 
price falls to around €10/tCO2. Estimates in the lower 
part of the range appear more plausible given economic 
and policy trends23. 
The offline estimates for Japan project that in the 
baseline case, Japanese emissions will remain at about 
current levels, 120 MtCO2e/yr above their Kyoto target 
(approximately 600 MtCO2e total shortfall over the Kyoto 
period). Updating for 2008 energy prices alone cuts the 
shortfall by 20%; projecting energy prices forward at 
€100/bbl roughly halves it. These are crude estimates, 
not using direct modelling (see separate Technical 
Annex II).
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18  The Kyoto EU targets apply separately to the EU-15 countries as at time of ratification; the EU cannot count the surplus in the new Member States against 
this. The net demand from the EU ETS sectors in the new Member States is negligible, and in practice they may be aggregate sellers in the EU ETS. 
19  These results, however, reflect simple GDP adjustments; a fuller analysis would require considering the impact on the structure of the EU economy.
20  Cambridge Econometrics’ analysis of the EU ETS suggested that at the present price of €20/tCO2, EU ETS emissions will remain below the EU ETS cap 
out to 2012. The average surplus would be 56 MtCO2/yr in the base case, 70 MtCO2/yr taking into account the price shock of 2008, and over 100 MtCO2/yr  
if energy prices of €100/bbl are sustained.
21  Carbon Trust (2007): EU ETS Phase II allocation: implications and lessons.
22  The earlier study (note 21) found that a carbon price of €20/tCO2 might cut emissions from the EU ETS sectors by more than 100 MtCO2/yr – about 5%. 
23  Under the terms of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU-15 is treated as a ‘bubble’, which cannot simply add in the surplus from the New Member States. EU 
shortfall to 2012 is therefore a combination of overall EU-15 shortfall, but some adjustment for EU ETS demand from the New Member States. Scenarios 
with low emissions would indicate a likely surplus in EU ETS particularly in these countries. This informs our estimate drawing on the lower end of the 
Cambridge Econometrics range, which also does not fully reflect possible impact of energy efficiency and renewable energy policies to 2012. The lower 
end of our estimates is also supported, for example, by projections published in November 2008 by the European Environment Agency: for comparison 
see Technical Annex II: Emission and demand projections to 2020 available from www.climatestrategies.org
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Implications for 2008-12 market balance
Table 5 summarises the overall implications. At a 
carbon price of €20/tCO2, the maximum government 
demand for Kyoto credits in all forms will be just short of 
1,600 MtCO2e, if energy prices decline back to the levels 
projected a few years earlier (oil at about $40/bbl), or 
below 1,000 MtCO2e, if they average close to $100/bbl. 
This does not distinguish between private and 
government demand in Japan, and we see little prospect 
of net demand from the EU ETS or voluntary sectors  
at carbon prices of €20/tCO2. We thus see few credible 
scenarios in which the gap between emissions and  
Kyoto targets out to 2012, at a price of €20/tCO2, 
remotely matches the level of assured supply from  
the project mechanisms. 
Additional supplies (from GIS and land-use Removal 
Units) further increase the supply overhang. These are 
relevant only to the intergovernmental Kyoto balance, 
and cannot be used by companies, for example under 
the EU ETS. However the conclusion is just as stark for 
the private sector considered on its own. Individual 
facilities may need to purchase allowances, but the 
shortfall in the private sector is clearly far smaller than 
the supply of CDM and JI credits which it can access. 
The dynamics between private and public sector demand 
could be important. Since government demand is a 
crucial part of the balance, the government supply of 
surplus Kyoto allowances is relevant. And government 
demand is different. It is, quite properly, the result of 
political process, not a purely economic one, and two 
factors will drive some governments towards purchasing 
Kyoto allowances through GIS. Austria is a clear example. 
Burgeoning transport, due to rising trade and tourism 
with the New Member States that surround it, has 
combined with other factors including a very limited 
domestic climate programme, to drive up emissions 
way beyond its Kyoto target. Austria has close political 
relations with many of the New Member States and not 
surprisingly has strong interest in their emerging Green 
Investment Scheme proposals. It would seem politically 
implausible that Austria would try to meet all its needs 
through purchasing CDM and JI credits, if credible GIS 
schemes offered allowances at much lower cost. These 
factors in themselves will exert strong downward 
pressure on CDM and JI credit prices, as governments 
increasingly focus on their compliance needs in 
practice, and ask why they should be expected to eschew 
cheaper options for compliance, if they are just as 
environmentally credible. 
Quite simply, most plausible scenarios now deliver  
a large surplus of aggregate supply compared to the 
plausible shortfall. At a carbon price of €20/tCO2, the 
gap is so big that even a large fall in carbon prices could 
not close it. That leaves a major puzzle: why did the  
EU ETS price remain around €20/tCO2 for most of 2008, 
with most studies projecting increase? Reasons include 
the fact that most market studies have included 
government demand but ignored government supply 
from land-use and GIS; and the fact that the impact of 
higher energy prices and lower expected GDP growth 
has yet to feed through sufficiently to market analysis. 
There are, however, other factors.
Carbon pricing dynamics, the EU ETS  
and banking
The estimates in the table refer to aggregate supply and 
demand over 2008-12, which is the period for national 
compliance with targets under the Kyoto Protocol’s first 
commitment period. Outside of this, three other factors 
could explain continued high prices during 2008: 
•  EU ETS participants require credits to comply during 
2008, and even the CDM was only at the earliest stage 
of actually issuing verified, certified emission reduction 
credits. Any shortfall of needs for compliance with 
2008 obligations under the EU ETS could drive 
transitional demand whilst supplies remain limited.
•  The market may not have confidence in such a dramatic 
turnaround until verified data on 2008 emissions – 
national, and EU ETS under the first year of Phase II  
– are revealed, likely to be in Spring 2009.
•  Allowances still have a value because EU ETS 
allowances, and national AAUs under the Kyoto 
Protocol, can be banked forward for use post-2012. 
The first two are transitional. Under the EU ETS, 
companies have to balance emissions and allowances 
annually, and most EU governments have committed  
to issue EUAs equally across the five years. An overall 
global surplus to 2012 may thus not be incompatible 
with high EU ETS prices, feeding through to the global 
carbon mechanisms, in the early years, before credit 
supplies from the Mechanisms have accumulated. 
However, a decline in EU ETS prices towards the end of 
2008 suggests that companies overall reduced emissions 
enough in 2008 to comply on the basis of the limited 
credit purchases made by then. Companies can ‘borrow’ 
between years in the EU ETS since allowances for each 
year are issued before accounts for the previous year 
have to be settled. Moreover the gathering economic 
recession, and falling fuel prices, make it less likely  
that the market will ‘shorten’ during 2009. The situation 
may become clearer with EU ETS verification reports  
in April 2009, but we consider it unlikely that the 2009 
balance – and by implication prices – will diverge 
fundamentally from the basic pattern of net surplus 
indicated in the table. 
The ability to bank forward post-2012 is not transitional, 
but as a support for prices it depends on faith that 
cutbacks post-2012 will be substantial enough to drive 
up carbon prices again, to levels that make it worth  
EU ETS companies deliberately buying project credits, 
leaving them surplus EU allowances to bank post-2012. 
The potential entry of voluntary market demand for the 
regulated (and thus more credible) compliance units, as 
discussed in section 12, could also help, but only if and 
as their prices fall towards the much lower levels in the 
voluntary sector.
In other words, the private market during 2009 may be 
sustained only by the prospect of ‘jam tomorrow’ – four 
or more years hence – that itself depends upon a strong 
global deal. However, as discussed in the next section, 
such a deal will itself have to absorb a large built-in 
supply of allowances, and the markets will have twice 
experienced the consequences of inadequate cutbacks 
– in the first phase of the EU ETS, and the first phase of 
the global carbon mechanisms. The private sector may 
thus be reluctant to risk much on the prospects for a 
sufficiently tough post-2012 deal, making it hard to sustain 
prices through this route. The evidence suggests that in 
the absence of intervention, prices could average below 
€10/tCO2 until such a deal is completed, though they 
could also be highly volatile as perceptions of the political 
prospects fluctuate. 
The EU ETS Phase I experience occurred partly because 
companies delivered more emission reductions than 
expected, but with strong suspicions also that allocations 
exceeded legitimate needs. The shakeout in the global 
carbon mechanisms will, ultimately, reflect the fact that 
the volume of response has exceeded all expectations, 
and that – combined with the absence of the United 
States (and maybe Canada) – the Kyoto targets have for 
many countries proved less challenging than expected. 
The Kyoto system risks being a victim of its own success, 
but the market players – and potentially its reputation – 
could be victims nonetheless. The question in 2009  
may be what, if anything, should be done to sustain  
the market.
Policy options
Any downward correction in international carbon prices 
(through both the EU ETS and the global mechanisms) 
throughout 2009 could have serious consequences, both 
for individual companies and projects, and more broadly 
for confidence in the Mechanisms. When added to the 
experience of the EU ETS Phase 1, it may also seriously 
undermine the confidence of markets about the ability of 
governments to set targets that drive significant prices. 
Consequently, if the analysis above does indeed prove 
to be robust, governments may wish to consider options 
for sustaining a more significant carbon price during 
2009. The options depend upon which governments are 
willing to act, and how. 
The most obvious step would relate to Canada, which  
is faced with an emissions gap almost as big as Spain’s. 
Its approach to addressing this gap is currently unclear.24 
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24  In 2005 the annual shortfall relative to Kyoto targets was about 25% in both Canada (186 MtCO2e, 25% of their current emission levels) and Spain  
(110 MtCO2e, also 25% of current levels). Japan’s shortfall was 164 MtCO2 (12% of current levels). Under the Kyoto Protocol, compliance measures 
include that a country which exceeds its target will have the difference x 1.3 deducted from allowed emissions in the next period. The ‘enforcement 
branch’ of the Kyoto Protocol compliance system cannot formally act until compliance reports are assessed, in 2014. However, countries in difficulty 
can notify the ‘facilitative branch’ of the system and seek assistance.
If Canada were to stabilise emission levels domestically, 
it would have to purchase about 500-600 MtCO2e of 
emission credits over the Kyoto period. Assuming that 
the government would eschew ‘hot air’ purchases, new 
demand of this magnitude – coupled with the signal it 
would send in terms of the expected legal integrity of 
any future commitments – would clearly make a huge 
difference to the global balance and help to restore the 
global carbon price to significant levels during 2009. 
There are, however, some other options that other 
governments could consider, and different options have 
different consequences. The present focus of EU policy 
to protect its post-2012 package from excessive imports 
can help to sustain EU ETS prices and domestic action. 
However, it does largely isolate the EU system from the 
global mechanisms and this would further depress the 
international price. To support near-term prices more 
broadly, the main options would appear to be: 
•  Leading industrialised countries could retire emission 
units (or buy units specifically for retirement) without 
using them for compliance. However, the direct cost 
this would imply, potentially on those countries already 
bearing the principal costs, makes it look politically 
very difficult at a time of looming recession, particularly 
given the apparent Canadian position of not complying 
with its existing commitments.
•  Governments could commit to bank some of their 
present Kyoto allowances post-2012 to increase 
demand in the present period; however, this would 
add further to the level of post-2012 supply.
•  A reserve price set on forthcoming auctions of EU ETS 
allowances (dominated by the UK and Germany) 
could help to sustain EU ETS prices. If governments 
retired the unused allowances, this would tighten the 
EU ETS and increase overall private sector demand.
•  Those countries with surplus (notably the transition 
countries) could soften the impact by voluntarily 
cancelling some, or all, of their surplus. However this  
in itself is a rather indirect mechanism since it acts 
only on perceptions of the post-2012 balance.
•  Early commitments by key countries to steeper 
cutbacks post-2012, in advance of a global agreement, 
would send the strongest and most consistent signals 
but still only provide a partial solution, again because 
of the indirect nature of the linkage. A declaration by 
the new United States Administration of this nature 
could have a particularly powerful impact, both in terms 
of its scale and the political signals this would send. 
Finally there are in principle options on the supply side, 
to restrict or raise the price of credits, in which China 
would clearly be the only country big enough to make  
a substantial difference.
None of these options look easy, but without them, 
2009 may be a very tough year for those who have 
invested in the world’s carbon markets to date.
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9. Supply post-2012 
The biggest single lesson from the experience of 
carbon markets to date is that they hinge on a balance 
of supply and demand. This is obvious, and yet little 
attention has been given to the obvious corollary – if the 
global carbon mechanisms are to continue post-2012, the 
emission commitments that are expected to drive global 
decarbonisation need to be set against an understanding 
of likely supply. 
Chart 15 illustrates the implications if the recent pace  
of inflow to the project mechanisms were to continue 
out to 2020. Roughly, each year since 2006 has seen  
an inflow of projects, across the CDM and JI, that is 
expected to save at least 190 MtCO2e/yr, after taking 
account of expected delivery shortfalls. Most of the 
emission savings from this ongoing project flow will  
be delivered after 2012, and indeed many of the existing 
projects will continue to deliver long after 201225.  
The chart illustrates that if these projects continue to 
accumulate at the same pace throughout the period, the 
total emission savings over 2013-2020 would be at least 
10 GtCO2e, divided roughly equally between projects 
that start operating before and after the end of 2012. 
Of course, this is simplistic. About one quarter of the 
emission savings from CDM projects so far registered 
have a single guaranteed 10-year crediting period; those 
projects that have started generating CERs before 2010 
will thus cease to do so before 2020. The other three 
quarters of savings arise from projects that have opted 
for successive 7-year crediting periods, subject to two 
renewal reviews; their future crediting level is uncertain. 
However, given that the volume that started before 2008 
is relatively trivial, the drop-off overall from these factors 
will be relatively modest. 
It is also possible that the rate of inflow will slow down 
– indeed it could decline sharply in the face of the credit 
crunch combined with uncertainties about post-2012 
rules. However, this view becomes self-contradictory as 
a way of reassuring investors and analysts that the carbon 
market post-2012 can sustain a good price – investor 
confidence can hardly be maintained by arguing that  
a principal factor supporting future prices will be a 
collapse of ongoing investment. 
The implications of developments in the present period for future supply have 
received little attention. This has to change. 
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Chart 15  Projected emissions savings from CDM and JI by 2020 if project inflow continues at recent pace 
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25  The CDM allows projects to receive credits either for a single 10-year period, or for a 7-year period with renewal. The renewal provisions have yet  
to be tested. 
Source: team analysis using data from UNEP Risoe as at 1st November 2008
A subtly different argument is that the rate of expansion 
in 2007-8 in particular is unsustainable, because it drew 
heavily on ‘one-off’ options like the industrial gas projects 
that will no longer be available. However, set against 
this is the possibility of new frontiers. We have already 
noted that a wider range of mechanisms would unearth 
a wider range of project and programme types. And key 
options – like CCS, nuclear and most land-use activities 
– are currently excluded. There are few pressures to 
narrow the scope further; and quite understandably 
there are many trying to broaden it to include a wider 
range of mitigation options. 
For example, avoiding deforestation offers a seemingly 
obvious, and potentially low cost way of cutting 
emissions, if the finance can be made available  
and targeted effectively. A UK government review 
recommends that the global effort on land-use should 
be linked to the global carbon markets, and estimates 
that forest sector abatement in developing countries 
could generate 3.6 GtCO2 savings annually by 2030,  
of which almost 1 GtCO2/yr would actually be 
reforestation26. One of the many challenges is clarifying 
who would be buying at such scales.
Finally, a considered analysis of the ultimate scale of the 
challenge – as outlined in section 13 of this report – leads 
inexorably to the conclusion that the kind of expansion 
sketched in Chart 15 is the minimum required to actually 
move us towards the objective of getting on a path 
towards stabilising the atmosphere without unacceptable 
risks. In short, if the final deal on post-2012 is to be 
considered a success, it surely has to plan for expansion 
of overall project flow, not contraction. This – however 
derived – implies at least 10 GtCO2e emission reductions 
from project mechanisms in the period 2013-20.
Under the present provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
surplus in the eastern European countries, Russia and 
Ukraine can be banked into Kyoto’s second period. Table 5 
has indicated our best estimates, that this will amount 
to at least 7,500 GtCO2e. Politically it is not easy at present 
to see why this region – which has already demonstrated 
is political muscle around Kyoto ratification – would 
sign up to a deal that simply cancelled its surplus. 
Chart 16 sets out the overall picture, within which the 
present contribution of the Mechanisms is seen to be 
very modest compared to the huge volumes potentially 
available to 2020. The total of around 20 GtCO2e equates 
to roughly the total annual emissions of the entire 
industrialised world, including all of North America, 
Russia and Ukraine. It is a vast amount of credits and 
allowances to be absorbed by stronger commitments 
that have yet to be negotiated27. 
The most troubling aspect, however, is that at present 
the negotiations have little or no process or institutional 
basis for conducting an integrated analysis that can  
set decisions that influence supply against the cutbacks 
that would have to drive purchases. Many have 
proposals for adding to supplies; but in the absence  
of corresponding cutbacks to provide an integrated 
picture, these will simply depress the price rather than 
drive additional actions. 
All these issues combined will also underline questions 
about how much of the projected emission savings are 
real28. In terms of volume, the Kyoto system may risk 
being a victim of its own success, but this will just 
sharpen an underlying debate, which the rest of this 
report considers: how good are the Mechanisms?
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26  Climate Change: financing global forests (Eliasch Review, HMSO 2008), Chapter 11.
27  The UNFCCC update report on financial flows (‘Identifying, analysing and assessing existing and potential new financing resources and relevant 
vehicles to support the development, deployment diffusion and transfer of environmentally sound technologies’, FCCC/S B/2008/INF.7, 20 Nov 2008) 
projects that the likely demand for emission reduction credits in 2020 to be in the order of 0.5 to 1.7 GtCO2/yr.
28  In practice this is a close parallel, since credits are issued in terms of the gap between actual emissions and the projected ‘without project’ baseline. 
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12.6 GtCO2e Developing World
Expected
delivery
from Joint
Implementation
2008-12 
Land-Use
Removal Units
potential
2008-12  
AAUs available
to be banked
forward into
next period
Developing World
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
 Additional potential delivery 2013-2020 from projects active
 from 2013 onwards
 Estimated delivery of CERs in the period 2013-2020,
 arising from new projects starting to generate credits from 
 January 2013, based on historical inflow and delivery rates 
 Additional potential delivery 2013-2020 from projects already
 active by end of 2012
 Estimated delivery of CERs in the period 2013-2020, arising
 from projects in the four categories described below –
 i.e. those that are anticipated to have already started to
 generate credits before the end of 2012
 Future projects
 Estimated delivery of CERs by 2012, associated with future
 project submissions, based on extrapolation of current
 submission rates 
 Pre-registration
 Estimated delivery of CERs by 2012, as projected in the PDDs
 of projects that were not registered by the Executive Board
 as at 1st November 2008, but had begun the validation
 process with a DOE (defined as the commencement of the
 public comment period) or had made a submission for
 registration to the Executive Board
 Registered
 Estimated delivery of CERs by 2012, as projected in the 
 PDDs of projects registered with the Executive Board as 
 at 1st November 2008, and excluding CERs already issued 
 Issued
 Total of CERs issued as at 1st November 2008
Industrialised World
AAU surplus and Green Investment Schemes (GIS)
 AAU surplus available 2013-2020
 Estimate of surplus of AAUs available to bank 2013-2020,
 based on difference between agreed national Kyoto caps and
 current estimates of emissions, excluding any AAUs expected
 to be traded through GIS 
 Potential GIS 2008-2012
 Estimated potential sales of surplus AAUs through Green
 Investment Schemes in the period 2008-2012.  Includes any
 GIS already sold, as based on announced intentions to sell 
 by individual countries as at the time of writing
Joint Implementation (JI)
  Additional potential delivery 2013-2020 from projects active
 from 2013 onwards
 Estimated delivery of ERUs in the period 2013-2020,
 arising from new projects starting to generate credits from
 January 2013, based on historical inflow and estimated
 delivery rates
 Additional potential delivery 2013-2020 from projects already
 active by end of 2012
 Estimated delivery of ERUs in the period 2013-2020, arising
 from projects in the category described below – i.e. those 
 that are anticipated to have already started to generate credits
 before the end of 2012
 JI expected delivery 2008-2012
 Estimated delivery of ERUs by 2012, as projected in the PDDs
 of projects that, as at 1st November 2008 were registered, 
 or had begun the determination process (defined as the
 commencement of the public comment period) or had made
 a submission for registration
 Land-Use Removal Units 2008-2012 (RMUs)
 Potential RMUs  2008-2012
 Estimated mitigation potential in the EU for the period
 2008-2012 from Afforestation, Reforestation and Deforestation
 from UNFCCC data and estimated mitigation potential
 for forest management, plus land-use contributions from
 elsewhere in the world.
CDM Issued = 0.2 GtCO2e
CDM Registered = 0.7 GtCO2e
CDM Pre-registration = 0.4 GtCO2e
CDM Future Projects = 0.3 GtCO2e
CDM Additional potential
delivery 2013-2020
from projects already
active by end of 2012
= 5.0 GtCO2e
JI Additional potential
delivery 2013-2020
from projects already
active by end of 2012
= 0.8 GtCO2e
JI Additional potential
delivery 2013-2020
from projects active
from 2013 onwards
= 0.8 GtCO2e
CDM Additional potential
delivery 2013-2020
from projects active
from 2013 onwards
= 6.0 GtCO2e
Potential RMUs – EU, Japan, Australasia = 0.2 GtCO2e
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Chart 16  Potential supplies of credits and allowances from Global Carbon Mechanisms 2008-2020
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Part III: How good (or bad) are the Mechanisms?
This section turns from explaining (Part I) and analysing the quantitative 
performance (Part II) of the Mechanisms, to consider a more fundamental 
question: how good are the Mechanisms? What do they deliver, and how 
efficiently, compared to other possible alternatives? And what might this  
imply for their future development? 
10. Are credited emission savings real?
A tough assignment
The selection and crediting of CDM projects under the 
Kyoto Protocol is governed by the principles that they 
should contribute to sustainable development, and 
deliver ‘real, measurable and long-term benefits related 
to the mitigation of climate change’, including emission 
reductions that are ‘additional to any that would occur 
in the absence of the certified project activity’. The 
contribution to wider sustainable development is  
left to host countries to determine. Interpreting and 
implementing the additionality of emission savings 
from CDM projects is governed through the decisions 
and processes subsequently established by the 10-person 
CDM Executive Board (see section 2). Amongst its  
first actions was to establish a generic ‘tool for the 
demonstration and assessment of additionality’, setting 
out the basic steps that need to be followed. This covers 
the assessment of: alternatives to the project activity; 
financial and other barriers; and of the extent to which 
the technology is already in use in the relevant area.
Over subsequent years, a deeply technical debate 
ensued about how to establish additionality. This resulted 
in a series of methodologies to assess the emissions 
reductions from, and additionality of, different kinds of 
projects. An indication of the complexity of the issue is the 
number of different project methodologies considered: 
more than 250 have been officially proposed, with more 
than a hundred different methodologies accepted and 
many still pending (Chart 17).
The Executive Board was initially grossly under-staffed 
and under-resourced; demonstrating additionality takes 
time and money. The Board carried a huge workload 
and made many innovations in response to the demands 
of the system, which directly contributed to the 
extraordinary success of the CDM in terms of project flow. 
Whether emission credits generated under the project mechanisms represent 
real and ‘additional’ emission savings, compared to what would have happened 
anyway, was always going to be thorny to assess. Time has not made it easier. 
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Chart 17  Number of accepted and proposed methodologies for baseline and monitoring under CDM 
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Despite this, experience highlights the fundamental 
nature of the challenge of seeking ‘additionality’ in 
emission savings, as was flagged more than a decade 
earlier (see Box 3). For some classes of projects, it 
proved easy to demonstrate at project level: fitting 
equipment to remove HFCs and N2O from industrial 
projects would clearly not happen without some 
incentive to do so. Some low-carbon electricity supply 
projects have been implemented which clearly displace 
coal-powered generation. 
However, the Climate Strategies review of projects 
discussed in section 6 did find cases of approved projects 
which could be debated in each of the most important 
steps of the additionality assessment (barrier analysis, 
investment analysis, common practice analysis, 
demonstration of the impacts of CDM registration). 
Many design documents did not have independent 
evidence to support the assessment of additionality. 
The issue is not which assessment is correct, but rather 
that the task is inherently one requiring judgement. 
Additionality in practice cannot match the black-and-white 
ideal that credits should only go to projects that result 
in proven additional emission savings.
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Box 3  Intrinsic difficulties in assessing additionality of emissions savings from offset (CDM and JI) projects  
– an old warning
“ The problem of defining and measuring the 
‘additional’ emission savings arising from a CDM 
project, as compared with what would have 
happened otherwise, is an Achilles’ heel. The 
fundamental difficulty is having to estimate emission 
savings relative to a ‘baseline’ estimate of ‘what 
would have happened without the project’, that is by 
definition unobservable. For some kinds of projects 
that is easy… but these are exceptions, rather than 
the norm…
  The reasons for this are basically simple: the  
future is uncertain and decision makers are human. 
Businesses make their money by exercising 
managerial judgment in the face of uncertainty…  
is the bureaucracy of the CDM really supposed to 
assess competing claims about long-term project 
viability that depend upon perhaps confidential 
projections of costs and performance, and inherently 
unknown prices?
  There may be also the vicious paradox that the more 
cost-effective the project, the more uncertain the 
additionality… any project that would only require  
a small incremental benefit (such as a CER at low 
cost) to make it proceed would also only require  
a small shift in market conditions to make it viable 
without crediting. This problem is less stark if there is 
consensus to credit projects which are ‘cost-
effective’ but which clearly would not otherwise be 
implemented due to other barriers; but it is enough 
to throw a big question mark over the supposition 
that the CDM should be explicitly oriented towards 
‘least cost’… 
  Another danger of the conventional approach  
to ‘additionality’ is that it gives perverse policy 
incentives. Environmentally sustainable projects are 
least likely where the policy environment is least 
encouraging to them. Therefore, additionality is 
greatest, and most easy to prove, in the worst policy 
environments; this is hardly something one would 
wish the CDM to encourage. 
  A final observation is that market conditions evolve. 
Particularly since the world is supposed to be 
moving towards sustainable development, one 
would expect lower-emitting projects to become 
intrinsically more attractive over time. This indeed  
is the case in many respects: the cost of natural gas 
and of renewable energy sources, for example, is 
generally declining relative to coal-based power, 
and ‘clean coal’ technologies are also improving. 
Similarly, it is obvious that most cities will have to 
develop and improve public transport infrastructure; 
this will have the side-effect of reducing greenhouse 
gases. The most that can be said in many cases is 
that crediting under the CDM might enable certain 
kinds of projects to proceed earlier than they 
otherwise would have.”
Source: Grubb, Brack and Vrolijk (1999), The Kyoto Protocol: a guide 
and assessment, Chatham House/Earthscan, Chapter 7: The Clean 
Development Mechanism. 
A common thread in many approved projects was citing 
barriers to investment that CDM finance could help to 
overcome. Maturing capital markets in the countries 
studied should have helped to ease the investment barrier 
on which many were justified – though the impact of the 
credit crunch may set things back. 
Rejected projects had tended to rely more on arguments 
around other barriers, particularly after the Executive 
Board underlined that citing barriers was not sufficient: 
the case has to show why CDM credits would help to 
overcome the barriers, and many did not and were 
consequently rejected. 
Overall, the dilemma of assessing additionality is a bit like 
the balance of evidence in a legal system. Certainty is 
rare; a high standard of proof risks letting some criminals 
go free, but lower standards risk innocent people being 
convicted. The higher the standard of proof on project 
additionality, the more good emission savings projects 
may be rejected or deterred. Ironically though, it appears 
that assessing additionality of emission savings has if 
anything become harder over time, for several reasons. 
Progress and policy
Few projects can now be simply rejected as having been 
initiated before the CDM. As word of the CDM spread, 
more project developers applied with a wider range of 
projects. With the CDM in full flood, it has become harder 
to identify projects which unambiguously would (or 
would not) have happened without it. 
Moreover, time and success have themselves changed 
the context. For example, many Brazilian CDM projects 
use bagasse – the waste from the sugar cane industry 
– to fuel high-efficiency cogeneration plants. In this 
respect the CDM has succeeded wildly beyond the 
impact of a decade of World Bank efforts in the 1990s to 
encourage the technology. Indeed the CDM has proved 
so successful that using bagasse for co-generation has 
now become the norm in Brazil. This in turn raises the 
question, ‘when does the prevalence of CDM projects 
change the baseline?’29. If it is now common practice – 
thanks to the CDM – does this mean that new projects 
cease to be additional? Some proposals for changing  
the rules, outlined in the next section, would 
automatically cease when a project type reaches  
a defined market share.
The Asian experience sheds light on another potential 
dilemma, namely that of perverse policy incentives (see 
Box 4). To negate the potential perverse incentive either 
to adopt bad policies (to inflate baseline emissions),  
or to eschew good ones (which could make low-carbon 
projects happen in the absence of the CDM), in 2004  
the Executive Board adopted the principle that:
•  Policy changes that drive up baseline emissions  
(‘E+’) could not be counted in the baseline if they were 
implemented after adoption of the Kyoto Protocol.
•  Policy changes that give positive comparative 
advantages to less emissions-intensive technologies 
(‘E-‘), and that have been implemented since the 
adoption of the Marrakech Accords in 2001 (that 
defined the rules for implementing the Kyoto Protocol), 
need not be taken into account. 
Countries thus cannot generate more credits by making 
bad policy, and emission-reduction policies do not reduce 
CDM credits because ‘the baseline scenario should 
refer to a hypothetical situation without the national 
and/or sectoral policies or regulations being in place’.
China’s ambitious programmes for renewable energy 
clearly fall into the latter category. They have helped  
to stimulate a huge surge of wind and small hydro 
power projects, which under the ‘E-‘ rule are generally 
considered additional. Critics argue that given these 
policies would have happened without the CDM, and 
some might even have happened without China’s 
renewable energy support policies (particularly given 
the surge in coal prices). Whether and how to draw  
the line is of course a matter of judgement.
‘Environmental integrity’ across the CDM 
This also complicates a macro-level assessment of the 
overall additional emission savings from the CDM. The 
‘retrofit’ projects for industrial gases and landfill waste are 
clearly additional. The scale of renewable energy credits 
from India and China is now the critical determinant; in 
recent years almost all hydro, wind and other renewable 
energy projects have applied for CDM credits. If these 
are all considered additional – on the basis of the E- rules 
and a judgement that in the absence of supportive 
policies, coal would be the default power source – the 
overall emission savings from the CDM are probably 
close to the credited level. Critics contend that renewable 
energy would be pursued anyway in these countries 
(though perhaps not at such a scale) from which 
perspective the truly additional savings from the CDM 
may be only 70-80% of that actually credited. 
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29  Discussion of examples in this section from Climate Strategies (2008): A. Michaelowa and P. Castro, Empirical analysis of performance of CDM projects, 
www.climatestrategies.org. Specific citation p.48. The Executive Board decision on the E+/E- rules, that were accompanied by similar rulings on 
sectoral regulations (‘L+/L-’) are in http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/016/eb16repan3.pdf
This still, however, represents a major achievement, 
compared to a default of no incentives for emission 
savings in the developing world. Moreover, by 
contributing to the development of whole industry 
sectors – notably renewable energy industries in Asia  
– the CDM over the longer term may have generated 
valuable spillover effects with an enduring legacy.  
The wider contribution to sustainable development 
remains debated, though the growth of renewable 
energy industries and improved industrial energy 
efficiency must be broadly positive. The CDM, through 
various channels, is also likely to reduce potential 
carbon leakage from industrialised countries30. 
Given all the complexities noted, an institutional 
capacity to learn is essential, and this requires 
flexibility; demonstrating this implies changes. Yet 
change implies the possibility that decisions will not be 
fully consistent over time. Apparent lack of consistency 
has now become one of the major complaints of business 
in dealing with the system – and such concerns will hardly 
be softened by an unprecedented number of project 
rejections at a recent meeting of the Executive Board. 
… and across the other Mechanisms
Joint Implementation has a different institutional 
process – which places more onus upon issuing 
governments and less on the Joint Implementation 
Supervisory Committee (JISC) – but the experience to 
date reveals similar dilemmas, particularly with respect 
to the huge volume of methane capture projects now 
proposed. These projects clearly reduce emissions. 
They also clearly yield overall economic benefits, as  
the value of gas saved, at least on the international 
market, greatly exceeds the cost of plugging leaks in 
distribution systems. Yet the projects haven’t happened 
before because the benefits go to the gas producer, 
rather than the distribution companies. Under a more 
efficient regulatory structure, the projects should 
happen anyway. The JISC has so far judged – probably 
correctly – that the projects are providing additional 
emission savings compared to what would have 
happened otherwise. An extension of the CDM’s ‘E+/E-’ 
rules to JI would imply such projects could receive 
credits even if, for example, Russia acts to remove the 
regulatory barriers that currently impede such projects. 
Since in theory national emissions in ‘transition 
economies’ are capped under Kyoto, this shouldn’t 
matter anyway; but in practice given their surplus of 
allowances, it could. However, this also brings in the 
role of Green Investment Schemes, which have emerged 
to date as the only way that any of these countries have 
actually been able to sell any of their surplus allowances. 
These schemes lie at the opposite of the process from 
the strict Executive Board oversight of the CDM, in that 
there is no multilateral oversight at all, beyond verification 
of the Assigned Amount Units and their international 
exchange. In practice, this has slowed down GIS 
schemes, not speeded them up, as explained in Part I. 
Intergovernmental emissions sales implemented through 
Green Investment Schemes face no formal need to 
demonstrate that they yield ‘additional’ emission savings, 
and they can rely on the criteria and monitoring regimes 
that the participants deem appropriate. This enables 
them to ‘reach the parts’ that other mechanisms cannot 
– most strikingly, with respect to energy efficiency in 
buildings and transport, and land-use/bioenergy projects. 
Moreover, a critical difference is the ability of GIS 
schemes to leverage the banking of emission 
allowances over time. This gives far greater flexibility to 
use carbon finance in more imaginative ways, and for 
longer-term programmes and infrastructure-related 
projects whose main environmental benefits may 
accrue over years or even decades. 
The remarkable lack of attention given to Green 
Investment Schemes to date probably reflects the fact 
that the allowances cannot be used by companies under 
the EU ETS, which has to date been the main driver of 
the global carbon market. That driver is likely to change. 
GIS programmes could yet prove to be an important 
long-term product of the Kyoto Protocol, with implications 
above and beyond the current schemes. 
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30  Steffen Kallbekken, Why the CDM will reduce carbon leakage, Climate Policy vol.7 no.3 pp.197-211. This study estimates that the global carbon 
mechanisms halve the scale of potential carbon leakage. 
The surplus behind GIS may not be just a one-off 
phenomenon of the post-communist transition. It 
cannot be assumed that future negotiations would 
result in caps that turn out to bind on all countries, 
given intrinsic uncertainties; and new entrants to 
emission caps post-2012 (such as South Korea) may  
be particularly cautious about their first round of 
commitments. Indeed the general question of whether 
and how other countries trade surplus allowances 
arising in part from domestic policies (such as in the 
UK) remains to be determined. 
In addition, the GIS experience could offer valuable 
insights into the design of some proposals for expanding 
the scope of (or for complementary instruments to) the 
CDM, such as ‘sectoral crediting’ against an aggregate 
baseline – which like national commitments, could turn 
out to be inflated if economic trends change.
Moreover, for all of the attention given to ‘sustainable 
development’ as a (host country) criterion for CDM 
projects, government-driven GIS schemes are showing 
far greater potential to really factor in such wider 
considerations to programme design from the outset. 
GIS programmes are emerging not just as a way to 
reduce emissions, but as a way to use carbon finance  
to drive structurally cleaner and greener investment 
programmes in the transition economies, which in 
some cases address other concerns, such as ‘fuel 
poverty’ in building efficiency programmes.
However, GIS schemes are in their infancy and the lack 
of multilateral oversight obviously poses dangers. There 
are incentives on both parties to GIS contracts to cut 
corners. In particular, the underlying Climate Strategies 
research raises questions about the extent to which 
some of the current GIS programmes will deliver 
emission savings as projected or commensurate with 
the AAUs transferred, even taking account of the longer 
time horizons applicable. If GIS is a potentially valuable 
instrument, it will not help if the first efforts discredit its 
contribution. An international forum of participating GIS 
countries could help to establish norms of good practice, 
monitor the extent to which current schemes deliver 
these, and ensure collective international learning. 
Conclusions
In the international politics of the global carbon 
mechanisms, project-by-project additionality of emission 
savings has become a very strong political driver. Each 
credit generated can be used by another entity – company, 
or country – to emit more greenhouse gases. This makes 
it extremely difficult for a system that is justified in terms 
of environmental objectives through emission caps to 
accept a possibility that mechanisms promoted in the 
name of ‘economic efficiency’ could in fact result in a 
weakening of the net cap. And yet, the empirical evidence 
has now firmly established three things: 
•  Strict project-by-project additionality can be pursued 
as a goal, but rarely fully, objectively ensured, and  
the time and cost of ever more stringent efforts in this 
direction can start to undermine the wider objective 
of securing more investment towards a wider range 
of low carbon developments.
•  The pursuit of strict project-by-project additionality  
is inherently in tension with incentives for wider policy 
reforms – the E+/E- rules used to grapple with this  
are an important step in acknowledging the higher 
importance of policy reform, but of course they mean 
that project-level additionality becomes harder to 
prove as time goes by.
•  It is entirely possible for schemes with less formal 
requirements on additionality (like GIS) to deliver 
greater environmental and social benefits, at  
least when the prime investors and recipients  
are governments. 
Most striking of all, the evidence suggests that the 
challenge of assessing additionality is not getting easier 
with experience – if anything, it is getting more and 
more difficult: as easy and clear cases become a minority; 
as market facilitators become more adept at presenting 
as strong a case as possible; and as time compounds 
changes in national policies and the evolution of 
technologies and systems, to make the question of  
what is truly ‘additional’ relative to the absence of the 
CDM more and more difficult to assess. The potential 
correction in carbon prices – set against fluctuations in 
fossil fuel prices that are far bigger – will only increase 
the problem of attributing a technology choice to the 
incentive of the CDM. The concluding section of this 
report considers some of the possible implications. 
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11. Effectiveness and efficiency 
The Global Carbon Mechanisms have many purposes. The claim of economic 
efficiency – which depends on the alternatives – is but one of the objectives. 
Compliance and supplementarity
In fact, the first declared purpose of the Mechanisms is 
to assist industrialised countries to comply with their 
emission commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. There 
is no question that they are succeeding in this – and 
without any resort to simple ‘hot air’ trading of the 
transition economy surplus. Contrary to early pessimism 
that the project mechanisms might be strangled by 
transaction costs, the CDM in particular has resulted in  
a flood of projects that, as illustrated earlier, are likely  
to be sufficient in themselves to enable compliance. 
Nor is there any evidence that countries have 
deliberately used the Mechanisms to escape domestic 
action. To the contrary, governments that have been 
most active in purchasing credits have in many cases 
also been those most vigorously pursuing domestic 
action – partly under pressure from their Finance 
Ministries to minimise international expenditures. 
The UK, which is on course to over-achieve its Kyoto 
target, is an example where the strength of domestic 
action has entirely obviated the need for the government 
to make purchases. This raises the possibility instead  
of the UK potentially supplying emission allowances 
should it choose to offer this. A couple of OECD 
governments that are falling short of their commitments 
have not been active internationally, drifting further  
on a path towards non-compliance – most notably the 
present Canadian government. The consequences of 
this remain to be played out. For most OECD countries 
however, the Mechanisms have played an entirely 
appropriate role, facilitating compliance and reducing 
costs by enabling money to be spent on emission 
reduction credits that were either cheaper, and/or easier 
politically, to implement. 
Countries that earlier deferred domestic efforts are now 
having to foot a bigger bill to make up the shortfall; as 
with the current Spanish government, that inherited a 
shortfall as big as Canada’s, and has now embarked on 
a huge international purchase programme combined with 
much tougher domestic measures to secure compliance. 
The extent to which countries should actually limit  
their use of international mechanisms remains heavily 
debated. The idea that international purchases should 
be just ‘supplemental’ to domestic action is widespread, 
based on a mix of arguments about moral responsibility 
(cleaning up one’s own mess, not other people’s), political 
leadership, policy demonstration, unspecified reluctance 
to spend money abroad, and the pressure that domestic 
action may create for enhanced innovation. The problem 
is that none of these make sense as absolutes: to 
indiscriminately force high-cost actions in industrialised 
countries whilst ignoring far greater opportunities to 
help poorer countries curtail emissions makes no sense, 
and can result ultimately in futile outcomes – such as 
avoiding international assistance entirely and/or leaving 
the system. Analysts have failed to give governments 
any coherent sense of where the appropriate balance 
between domestic and international action should 
really be struck, but it is not at either extreme. 
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Scope and formal constraints 
One concern about the efficiency of the Mechanisms 
emerged from the experience of early industrial gas 
projects (see Box 4). The fact that industrialised countries 
were paying around €20/tCO2 for credits from projects 
that reduced emissions at a cost of below €1/tCO2 
prompted strong criticism, yet raises an obvious 
paradox. A prime purpose of market mechanisms is to 
uncover least-cost solutions. If the implicit price paid 
for emission reductions suddenly jumps from zero to 
€20/tCO2, it is not surprising to find some very cheap 
reduction opportunities; complaining when this happens 
seems perverse. Critics argue that very cheap projects 
should have been disqualified from the CDM and 
addressed, for example, through targeted funding. With 
hindsight it is easy to argue this, but apparently no-one 
did so before the CDM’s operation highlighted these 
opportunities. Any commodity market is based on 
price, not cost, and this has the potential to generate 
such ‘resource rents’ from the cheapest options. The 
experience of alternative, cost-based international 
funding mechanisms (notably, the Global Environmental 
Facility) is mixed, but as argued below cannot realistically 
address the main dimensions of the climate problem. 
In practice, the CDM’s Executive board moved quickly 
to minimise the more significant problems arising from 
the industrial projects (see Box 4), and the problem of 
large resource rents is by definition most likely in the 
start-up phase; going forward, most of the exceptionally 
cheap options will already have been taken up. 
Another potential inefficiency arises from limits on  
the legal or practical scope of the project mechanisms. 
Nuclear power is explicitly excluded. Carbon Capture 
and Storage (CCS) is under consideration. Emission 
reductions from avoided deforestation were also 
excluded, due to the difficulty of establishing baselines, 
the associated risks of leakage (displacement of 
deforestation to other regions) and perverse incentives 
(threats to deforest an area in order to gain emission 
credits for not doing so) – and also due to fears of 
excessive supply swamping other mitigation efforts.  
In practice the rules around other forestry projects are 
so onerous that only one (a reforestation project) has 
been registered under the CDM at the time of writing.
These are specific constraints, which exist for particular 
reasons, rather than being fundamental to the 
architecture of the project mechanisms; also none in 
principle need apply to Green Investment Schemes. 
Moreover, since the Kyoto first period is probably 
over-supplied already, in practice these constraints do 
not affect its environmental effectiveness. However, 
they could matter if extended to future periods. 
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Box 4  The HFC-23 controversy
An early controversy in the CDM concerned projects to 
remove HFC-23, a potent greenhouse gas produced as a 
by-product of manufacturing the industrial gas HCFC-22. 
Facilities to destroy HFC-23 cost only 0.2-0.5 €/tCO2e 
removed, thus offering potential for huge profits if 
such reductions could be sold as CDM credits. Not 
surprisingly, a methodology for calculating these 
emission savings represented one of the first official 
methodologies submitted and approved in the CDM; 
such projects dominated the CDM’s initial growth,  
and are expected to generate an estimated 20% of all 
credited emission reductions to 2012.
The controversy was not just about the level of profits 
to be made. HCFC-22 is not only a greenhouse gas, 
but also depletes the ozone layer (though by much 
less than some of the gases it displaces). Industrialised 
countries had committed to phase out production 
under the Montreal Protocol, in which developing 
countries had a ten-year grace period for growth up  
to a cap in 2015. The scale of profits threatened 
distortions in competitiveness with plants in 
industrialised countries that had already cleaned up 
the emissions – and could have made it profitable to 
build whole new facilities just for the value of 
destroying the by-product. 
Faced with these concerns, the CDM Executive Board 
stepped in, restricted crediting only to facilities that 
had been operating since 2001, and revised the level 
of crediting downwards, basing it on actual plant 
output during 2001-2004. These steps effectively 
ensured that the potential to capture emissions from 
existing plants was exploited whilst reducing distortions 
and capping the risk of perverse incentives. However, 
the experience served as an early lesson in the 
complexities and risk of unintended consequences – 
and the need to accept that revisions in methodologies 
can sometimes be required in the light of experience. 
Transaction costs 
The most oft-cited inefficiency arises from the transaction 
costs of the mechanisms. The CDM project cycle is long 
and laborious; that for Joint Implementation (Track 2) is 
not much better. Any market system requires regulatory 
oversight, and this is all the more the case when the 
system requires regulation to define and monitor 
legitimate emission reductions that would otherwise 
have no value. Legitimacy does not come cheap. 
Early experience with projects under the pilot ‘Activities 
Implemented Jointly’ phase, the World Bank Prototype 
Carbon Fund, and early CDM project developments 
indicated transaction costs typically of several hundred 
thousand Euros per project31. In addition the CDM charges 
a sliding scale of project registration fees, typically 
US$0.2/CER for projects exceeding 30,000 tCO2e annual 
savings (capped at US$350,000). Finally, 2% of CERs 
generated are set aside to finance the Adaptation Fund 
established under the Kyoto Protocol to help poorer 
countries adapt to the impacts of climate change. The 
relative significance of transaction costs obviously 
depends on project scale, but for most projects they 
amount to a few percent of total project costs, and well 
under €1/tCO2. 
The CDM also introduces special simplified procedures 
for ‘small projects’, defined as those under 15MW 
(electricity production), 60GWh annual energy savings 
(energy efficiency projects), or 60,000 tCO2e annual 
emission reductions. About 45% of projects fall under 
this classification, suggesting that the rules have been 
relatively effective at managing such costs. Overall, 
transaction costs are not such as to eclipse the large 
efficiency gains from accessing the potential for 
emission reduction projects in developing countries  
– as evidenced by their growth, and by modelling 
studies32. In combination with other factors, however, 
they do limit the kinds of projects for which the project 
mechanisms make sense. 
Practical scope and the absence of 
energy efficiency
This is most evident from Chart 18. This divides the 
project portfolio, in terms of potential annual emission 
savings, into the seven main sectors as classified in the 
IPCC Fourth Assessment. The dominance of projects in 
industry and power generation, with a lesser contribution 
from waste (mostly landfill gas capture) is striking. 
There are virtually no projects operating in the 
buildings, transport, or forestry sectors – and very  
few even submitted. 
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31  Climate Policy Vol.3 no.3 (2003): W. Fichtner et al, The impact of private investor’s transaction costs on the cost effectiveness of the project-based 
Kyoto Mechanisms; and A. Michaelowa et al., Transaction costs of the Kyoto Mechanisms. There are a wide variety of more recent, project-specific 
data, though many remain confidential. 
32  N. Anger, C. Bohringer and U. Moslener (2007), Macroeconomic impacts of the CDM: the role of investment barriers and regulations, Climate Policy, 
Vol.7 no.6. 
Chart 18  Total abatement potential from CDM and JI project portfolio 2008-2012, by IPCC sector 
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This is particularly troubling because, as discussed  
in the concluding section of this report, these other 
sectors offer substantial low-cost potential for emission 
reductions. Even setting aside the complexities of 
agricultural and forestry potentials, the lack of projects 
for improving buildings energy or transport sector 
efficiency is striking, given the repeated identification of 
these sectors as offering large, cost-effective potentials. 
The reasons are not hard to identify. There are many 
well-mapped barriers to improving end-use energy 
efficiency (such as split incentives between tenants and 
landlords, or indeed between vehicle buyers and the 
lifetime users), that price incentives alone cannot 
overcome. The scale of building, or even some vehicle 
fleet, investments is off the small end of the ‘small 
project’ scale of the CDM, and thus potentially swamped 
by transaction costs even with simplified rules. It is  
also inherently harder to measure ‘energy use avoided’ 
rather than ‘carbon fuel displaced’ by a low carbon 
supply source. Moreover, energy efficiency projects are 
most prone to the ‘additionality paradox’: that because 
they are potentially so cost-effective, their additionality 
can most easily be challenged. The poor showing of 
energy efficiency is a major limitation to the claim of 
cost-effectiveness in the global carbon Mechanisms – 
as, indeed, it is with respect to many national policies. 
The development of ‘programmatic CDM’, allowing 
bundling of discrete projects into one programme, was 
intended to help with this but has made very limited 
impact in the three years since it was formally adopted, 
with only ten programmes submitted at the time  
of writing. It remains unclear how far an incentive 
structure that is fundamentally based on crediting 
project-by-project additional emission savings can 
really be adapted to the fundamentally different 
characteristics of programmatic activities. 
The experience of the Carbon Trust itself is instructive 
in this respect. Over the six years since its establishment, 
the Carbon Trust has saved an estimated 17 MtCO2 of 
emissions savings (and delivered £1bn of estimated 
associated cost savings) through its carbon and energy 
management activities with UK businesses and the 
public sector. Many of its energy efficiency activities 
have been highly cost-effective to the participating 
companies and public sector organisations (even more 
so as energy prices rose). If credited at €20/tCO2, the 
value of the carbon saved would be €340m – nearly 
twice the cost of the programmes over the same period, 
thus recouping the investment costs in establishing  
and running the energy efficiency programmes over  
the same period.33
Yet, an organisation like the Carbon Trust could never 
have been funded through the promise of sales of 
future emission reduction credits. The investment 
required would have been swamped by the multiple 
levels of risks around institutional costs, performance, 
and prices, and strangled by the transaction costs of 
project-by-project verification, which contrasts starkly 
with the independent assurance of procedures used  
for evaluating aggregate emission savings actually 
developed. A mechanism like the CDM can never  
reach the major potential for energy efficiency from 
distributed sources. 
To reach such potentials through international finance 
will require a wholly different approach. One may be  
to evaluate and build upon the emerging experience  
of Green Investment Schemes. Even though GIS can 
generate upfront financing, there remains a looming 
problem of timescales (as well as questions over the 
scale of demand). In particular, potential investors are 
keen to see their money dispersed on emission-reduction 
projects before 2012. The Carbon Trust experience 
suggests that less than four years risks being too short 
a timescale over which to build up and effectively disperse 
substantial expenditures, given the complexity of 
engaging effectively with the distributed opportunities 
represented by most energy efficiency programmes.
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33  Carbon Trust Annual Report 2007/8. Emissions savings represent estimated annual, persisted energy savings made by business and public sector 
customers working with the Carbon Trust in the six years since 2002/3. Cost of delivering the energy efficiency programmes represents both direct 
programme costs plus relevant overheads and indirect costs.
Technology and capacity transfer  
in the Mechanisms...
Another hope from the Mechanisms was that they will 
help to diffuse lower carbon technologies globally. Early 
evidence tentatively suggests some success in this. Half 
the CDM projects registered by 2006 involved foreign 
technology, and over 60% of the (much smaller set) of 
proposed JI projects did too. If the build-up of renewable 
energy industries in Asia is attributed in large measure 
to the CDM (although it is worth noting that production 
costs will be another driver for European manufacturers 
looking to establish bases in Asia), this represents a 
major success in terms of technology transfer, with 
European renewable energy technology in particular 
playing a dominant role, presumably due to the 
combination of the strength of the European renewable 
industries, and the role of Europe as by far the biggest 
buyer of CDM credits, given the absence of the US34. 
As technology classes become more established in host 
countries, however, continued crediting becomes both 
less likely to contribute to technology transfer, and the 
real additionality of emission savings becomes less 
certain. This is now obvious in respect of technologies 
such as Chinese hydropower. 
To try and increase the focus of the CDM on 
transformational changes and tackle problems of 
weakening additionality, analysts have suggested 
subsidies for investments that contribute more directly 
to technology innovation and transfer (e.g. note 34), or 
have suggested changing rules to phase out crediting 
for established practices. Specifically, automatically 
crediting new low carbon technology investments until 
they achieved 10-20% penetration within a given market 
would focus crediting on ‘take-off’ industries, and lessen 
the scale of emission credits going to industries once 
they become well established35. In effect, this might 
start to move the CDM incentives a little earlier in the 
chain of innovation and diffusion – though like other 
reforms, it would pose other dilemmas, and would 
represent a major step away from the underlying 
principle of creating a level playing field to give value  
to additional emission savings. 
... and geographic spread
A similar challenge is posed by efforts to address one 
other, politically highly-charged issue around the CDM, 
namely the geographic focus of projects on the bigger, 
more industrialised developing countries, and the virtual 
absence of Africa. This is a natural consequence of  
a free market mechanism with carbon savings as the 
prime mover, which attracts private capital to the  
areas (and project types) with lowest risk and greatest 
regulatory stability and implementation capacity. 
These issues are in fact both new manifestations of a 
well-established dilemma. An undifferentiated market 
mechanism will always search to deliver the solutions 
that have least cost and risk to investors. As a 
consequence, the money will flow to the options that 
are best established, whether or not this serves other 
objectives. In the UK for example, the undifferentiated 
renewable obligation incentive mechanism helped  
to support the most cost-effective technologies, such as 
onshore wind energy but little else, until the government 
decided to ‘band’ the mechanism so that some 
technologies were discounted whilst other technologies, 
that were less developed or were applied in more  
risky environments (such as offshore wind) received 
multiple credits. 
In guiding its future evolution, the Parties need to decide 
whether the CDM market is exclusively aimed at cutting 
emissions at least cost and risk, or also is intended to 
achieve political and developmental objectives which 
would include rules and/or incentives to increase the 
relative investment in less established technologies  
and markets. If there is a shift to encompass the latter 
objectives, the means available would include rewarding 
initial market share of low carbon technologies, and/or 
multiple and discounted credits. The fact that one 
adjustment could help to address both the innovation 
and geographic concerns, suggest that these might be 
of particular interest. 
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34  R. Youngman, J. Schmidt, J. Lee and H. de Coninck (2007), Evaluating technology transfer in the CDM and JI, Climate Policy, vol. pp.488-499, found 
that about half of CDM projects and 62% of JI projects sampled as of Jan 2006 involved transfer of foreign technology into the host country. 
Dechezlepretre A. M. Glachant, and Y. Meniere (2008), The CDM and the international diffusion of technologies: an empirical study, Energy Policy Vol.6 
1273-1283, found that 43% of the 644 projects registered at the time of their study involved technology transfer. A report by David Popp (International 
technology transfer for climate policy, Centre for Policy Research, Syracuse University US, 2008) usefully sets the CDM experience in the context of 
wider literature on technology innovation and transfer.
35  A. Mathur, A. P. Chikkatur, A. D. Sagar (2007), Past as prologue: an innovation-diffusion approach to additionality, Climate Policy Vol.7 pp.230-239; 
drawing also upon A. Kartha, M. Lazarus, M. LeFrance (2005), Market penetration metrics: tools for additionality assessment, Climate Policy, Vol.5 
pp.147-166.
The Mechanisms and the Markets
A final set of issues arise from the carbon market itself. 
The carbon price differs significantly between different 
segments of the market, due mainly to differing risk 
profiles36. The price itself has fluctuated considerably, 
driven partly by external factors (like volatile energy 
prices), and by developments in the sector itself (such  
as EU ETS emissions and allocations, and supply 
projections) – but with a large element also attributable 
to fluctuating perceptions of both these factors, and the 
wider political prospects. Part II of this report concluded 
that the carbon price over the coming year (or longer) 
may be largely driven by private perceptions of the 
prospects for a global post-2012 deal. The development 
of derivative markets could amplify price fluctuations 
from all these sources. This does not create an efficient, 
stable basis for low carbon investments. 
The incentives for efficient low carbon investment  
are further undermined by the sequential nature of 
commitments. Future crediting for JI projects is likely 
but not certain; future crediting for most CDM projects 
is reasonably assured, but the value is beset by the 
uncertainties about adequacy of post-2012 commitments; 
and policy will also need to remove uncertainties about 
crediting for projects in countries that may join the club 
of industrialised country commitments. Even a successful 
Copenhagen deal is unlikely to establish commitments 
beyond 2020; the composition and basic structure of 
the longer-term regime is much more uncertain still. 
Ironically, this means that the Mechanisms may most 
reward countries that put greater emphasis upon 
domestic policies. Notably, the huge surge in Chinese 
renewable energy has not been driven only by the CDM; 
its domestic support programmes have been a key 
driving force. The projects receive additional finance 
from the CDM, being eligible under the E- rules. The 
result is that, in effect, the CDM rewards investors in 
Chinese projects and reduces the net costs to China  
of its renewable energy programmes. Since these 
programmes serve both domestic (e.g. local environment 
and energy security) goals, and international (climate) 
goals, such a mix is not inappropriate, but it serves to 
emphasise the complexities of the Mechanisms and 
their interactions with domestic policies. Given perceived 
risks of relying on the Mechanisms alone, the E- rule in 
effect enables the CDM to become a means of rewarding 
developing countries for adopting domestic policies 
that create an additional, and potentially more secure, 
incentive for such investments.
The efficiency of the Mechanisms thus also hinges on 
the stability and longer term predictability of the markets, 
and of the framework of commitments within which 
they reside. Some policy measures – such as price floors 
established through reserve prices on allowance auctions 
– could help considerably. Other uncertainties may be 
much harder to eliminate, being more intrinsic to the 
fundamental problem of negotiating commitments for  
a problem of unfolding severity in an evolving global 
economic and political context. 
Conclusions
Policy assessments are almost always relative. Relative 
to the theoretical economic ideal of a perfect global 
carbon market with long term predictability – residing 
within an equally perfect set of energy and land-use 
markets of equal stability – this section has sketched 
numerous ways in which the Global Carbon Mechanisms 
clearly fall short. 
Yet, in the real world, the extraordinary achievement  
(in terms of EU politics) of establishing within a few 
short years a single carbon trading price across Europe, 
has been matched by the equally remarkable feat of 
establishing working structures with global reach. These 
structures lessen the costs on industrialised countries 
by enabling them to help finance emission reductions 
wherever they are cheapest, within the scope of the 
mechanisms, thus dramatically increasing the reach 
and efficiency of the fundamental commitments to cut 
emissions – and also their political effectiveness, by 
engaging an initially deeply sceptical developing world 
in the global effort to tackle climate change. There is  
no evidence that other mechanisms, like centralised 
funding programmes, would work better as the primary 
instrument. The key is to build on the experience and 
adopt reforms to implement the fundamental principles 
of allowing entities to trade against their comparative 
opportunities and advantages, in this case, for delivering 
emission reductions. 
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36  For example, forward sales of primary CERs sold from CDM projects before registration trade at a discount of 10-40% below the EU ETS marker  
price due to the risks of non-registration or degraded performance; project types which may not be eligible within the EU ETS are still more  
heavily discounted.
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12. Comparison with the voluntary  
carbon market
A small but rapidly growing market
The voluntary market represents purchases of carbon 
credits by organisations or individuals who are not 
legally obliged to make any emissions reductions, or 
who wish to make emissions reductions claims over 
and above that legally required, and therefore are under 
no legal constraints governing the kind of emission 
offsets that they purchase. The market has two main 
elements: the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), 
representing 30-40% of the traded volume in 2007;  
and the remaining 60%+ arising from a diffuse market 
of numerous and varied providers. The concept of 
voluntary offsets predates formalised emissions trading, 
but was stimulated as the Kyoto mechanisms came into 
force in 2005 and the concept of carbon trading became 
more of a reality. 
As shown in Chart 5 (page 17) the volume and value of 
credits traded on the voluntary market is far smaller 
than in the compliance market of the Kyoto Protocol – 
just 65 MtCO2e traded in 2007, with estimates for trading 
in 2008 at around 100 MtCO2e. The price of credits is 
also lower, averaging around $6 per tonne in 200737, 
though with wide variation. Most purchasers are 
businesses in the United States and the EU (including 
end-purchasers, intermediaries and investors), with 
additional demand from the public and NGO sectors,  
and from individuals. However, growth has been  
very rapid, with ~165% increase in 2007 over 2006.
However, initial enthusiasm for the voluntary market  
has been tempered by growing controversy over the 
past couple of years, as it is subjected to scrutiny from 
increasingly educated commentators and purchasers, 
raising obvious questions about how it compares to  
the Kyoto-based compliance market. 
Rules and regulations have  
grown organically
Without the defined regulatory framework that supports 
the compliance market, the voluntary sector has grown 
organically, with many of its mechanisms and controls 
still in the early days of evolution. One example has 
been the demand for credits to be certified to a standard, 
led by concerns over quality. The use of standards has 
been a major development in the last two years, with  
a number of competing and complementary types 
emerging. Many of these standards have only recently 
been introduced, but despite this about 50% of 
transactions in 2007 were verified to a third party 
standard. Of these, the Voluntary Carbon Standard, 
VER+ and Gold Standard account for nearly half of 
market share. All were launched recently.
Compared to the fixed transaction processes of the CDM 
and JI markets, the voluntary market has a profusion  
of market participants offering credits to customers  
at various stages of a sometimes lengthy supply chain. 
Chart 19 provides a schematic of the many ways in 
which credits pass through the voluntary market.
Accurate transaction data is harder to come by for this 
market, and analysis to date has frequently relied on 
market surveys or proprietary data. Registries are now 
growing up which allow credits to be traced through 
their lifetime. This will give confidence as to retirement 
which would prevent selling on the same credit twice  
or more. However, we still do not have a consolidated 
or entirely transparent view of the market.
As climate change rose up the political agenda during the 1990s, some 
companies started acting to offset their emissions, or to offer emission offsets to 
consumers, through purely voluntary channels. The voluntary market has also 
grown rapidly in recent years and adds important complementary experience. 
37  The price estimate is sourced from Ecosystems Marketplace and New Carbon Finance’s publication Forging a Frontier: State and Trends of the Carbon 
Market 2007 and excludes CCX transactions.
Projects appeal to a different sort  
of customer
The types of technology vary more in the voluntary 
market – unlike the dominance of industrial gases, 
renewables and other industrial projects in the CDM 
and JI, voluntary projects are more likely to feature 
forestry projects and a wider mix of other activities. 
Demand on the voluntary market differs in nature from 
that for compliance credits, as purchasers may be looking 
for emotionally-appealing propositions that fit with their 
motivation to demonstrate corporate social responsibility. 
In these cases, a good story is required to acquire 
purchasers who are keen to ‘do the right thing’, and as 
such sustainability benefits or projects involving the less 
obscure technologies are often preferred. 
This is an interesting counterpoint to CDM, where 
sustainability value is judged by the host country and  
is not quantified by the Executive Board as part of the 
assessment process. 
Voluntary projects can occur anywhere in the developed 
or developing world. As with CDM, Asia was the dominant 
seller in 2007 but a very large number of projects are 
initiated in North America and some in Europe. Often 
the rationale is that purchasers can more easily identify 
the source of their credits when closer to home, and 
consequently feel a greater identification with and 
confidence in the emission reductions made. This is 
illustrated in Chart 20.
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Chart 19  Voluntary market supply chain
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Offsetting has been the focus of  
public scrutiny
Given that corporate social responsibility considerations 
drive many voluntary purchases, the decision to offset 
is inherently caught up with an organisation’s branding 
and its communications with stakeholders and customers. 
For this reason the voluntary market is more visible to a 
mainstream audience and has probably attracted more 
popular media debate than the compliance market. 
Additionality has been as much an area of contention for 
the voluntary market as it has been for the compliance 
market. Both the Chicago Climate Exchange and some 
credit retailers have encountered criticism for selling 
‘anyway tonnes’: offsets from projects that commentators 
have claimed would have happened anyway. However, 
other concerns have frequently been more at the 
forefront of public criticism. 
In particular, the higher incidence of forestry-related 
projects, with their associated complexities around 
time-scales, permanence, and leakages as well as 
in-project additionality, means that there have been 
many stories of failed tree-planting schemes in  
the headlines. 
Also, given the absence of a regulatory driver generating 
demand, the calculation of what exactly is offset is 
frequently not transparent. A 2008 survey found widely 
diverging emissions figures being offered to consumers 
for offsetting the same airline journey38.
More fundamentally, some purchasers have been accused 
of ‘greenwashing’, either because the offsets they have 
purchased are not robust, or because commentators 
dispute the acceptability of paying for carbon reductions 
elsewhere if it is at the expense of taking real action  
at home.
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Chart 20  Voluntary market transacted volumes by project type and by geography 2007 (excluding CCX transactions)
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Source: Ecosystem Marketplace, New Carbon Finance. Breakdown of volumes transacted 2007 where information available on type, totalling 28 MtCO2e.
38  Omega and the Centre for Air Transport and the Environment, Manchester Metropolitan University 2008 Final OMEGA Project Report: An Assessment 
of the Potential of Carbon Offset Schemes to Mitigate the Climate Change Implications of Future Growth of UK Aviation.
Interaction with the compliance market
In the desire for high-quality and accredited offsets, 
there is a growing tendency for purchasers on the 
voluntary side to focus on compliance generated credits 
as more reliable investments. Hence there is an overlap 
between the voluntary and CDM markets, as companies 
and individuals outside the regulatory regime look to 
purchase either CERs, or credits from CDM projects in 
the process of validation or registration. In 2007, CERs 
represented around 14% of voluntary purchases 
(excluding the CCX), and some analysts predict that 
CERs could grow to form half of all voluntary trades, 
although this will depend on the evolution of voluntary 
standards as trusted alternatives. The UK Government is 
currently working on a Code of Best Practice accreditation 
scheme for offset providers. The Code will initially 
cover only the sale of compliance credits and will await 
further standardisation of voluntary offset credits by 
the industry before covering these.
In addition, there is a large, but unquantified, market  
for pre-registration CDM project credits, which provide 
a quick and easy income stream for project developers 
caught up in the CDM approval process. Given the 
growing CDM (and JI) pipeline of projects, this available 
volume is likely to be greater in the future.
Where next?
As the market matures, and purchasers feel more able to 
trust transactions (especially if a few commonly accepted 
standards take hold as seems likely), popularity is likely 
to increase further. 
However, there are many factors that could cut short 
voluntary market growth. The current economic 
slowdown may deter new entrants, and also future 
legislation, in particular in the United States, is likely  
to shift more companies into the compliance markets. 
Allied to these uncertainties, the lack of robust data 
makes it hard to predict future market growth, but 
estimates of the voluntary market have projected 
annual volumes of between 200 and 550 MtCO2e  
by 2012.
The voluntary market has proved it has an important 
role to play, on both the supply and demand side. On 
the supply side, it can reach project types and locations 
that are either outside the scope of the regulated market 
mechanisms, or where the transaction costs or other 
factors impeded progress – like land-use. In this sense, 
it is a useful trail-blazer, allowing the private sector  
to pursue more diverse project types and streamlined 
mechanisms whilst shouldering the CSR risks of false 
claims or non-performance. On the demand side, the 
voluntary market has helped to bring in many actors 
that would not have considered buying compliance 
units, but can more readily engage in the lower-cost 
voluntary market. By doing so, they can get used to the 
notion and infrastructure of carbon offsetting, and help 
their customers to do so too. How exactly the balance 
between the voluntary and compliance systems will 
develop remains to be seen. 
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13. The bigger picture 
The question ‘how good are the Mechanisms’ only makes sense when compared 
against alternative and complementary approaches, and set in the wider 
context of the pressing need to foster a global low carbon transition over the 
coming decades. 
Money and the Mechanisms 
As noted in the introduction, the Mechanisms have grown 
rapidly to a significant scale not just in terms of emissions, 
but also finance. The value of CDM and JI emission credits 
in 2007/8 was US$4.5-8.5bn/yr, and this is estimated to 
leverage 10 times as much overall investment (Table 6). 
This far exceeds that from all other UNFCCC and other 
public transnational sources combined. 
It is very hard to define precisely either leveraged 
investment or the overall investment in mitigation 
technology (since this is not easily separated from other 
energy-related investments), but the Mechanisms clearly 
represent a substantial share – perhaps a quarter to a 
half – of the total mitigation technology investment in 
developing countries.
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Source of financing Estimated annual US$bn
Sources under the UNFCCC
The UNFCCC financial mechanisms (funds)a 0.2-0.3
Private and public sources leveraged by the UNFCCC financial 
mechanisms
1.2
Kyoto flexibility mechanisms (CDM, JI) 4.5-8.5
Private sources leveraged by the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms 45-85
Sources outside the UNFCCC
Private investment* 63-103b,c
Export credit agencies* 1-2
Bilateral and multilateral sources* 5-10c
Climate Investment Funds (agreed at G-8, administered by World 
Bank) – Clean Technology Fund, and Strategic Investment Fundd
>1 (6 announced over several years)
Philanthropic private sources 1
Total 121-212*
Table 6 Estimates of current mitigation financing for technology
*  Includes funding for commercially mature technologies not requiring any incremental mitigation finance. Total excludes double-counting of finance 
leveraged from Kyoto mechanisms (note c).
a  GEF (Global Environment Facility) Trust Fund, Special Climate Change Fund, Least Developed Countries Fund. These include funding for capacity 
building and other activities that are not technology-specific.
b   Restricted to energy sector. Does not include all energy efficiency investments or some low carbon technology investments.
c  Excludes some finance leveraged from UNFCCC financial mechanisms. 
d  ‘To be disbursed as grants, highly concessional loans, and/or risk mitigation instruments, will be administered through the multilateral development 
banks and the World Bank Group for quick and flexible implementation of country-led programmes and investments’ (World Bank press release 
01.07.08). The Clean Technology Fund is for ‘demonstration, deployment and transfer of low carbon technologies in the power sector, transportation 
and energy efficiency in buildings, industry and agriculture.’ (UNFCCC, ‘Investment and financial flows to address climate change; an update’ 
(UNFCCC/TP/2008/7), para 357).
Source: UNFCCC (2008), Identifying, analysing and assessing existing and potential new financing resources and relevant vehicles to support the 
development, deployment diffusion and transfer of environmentally sound technologies, FCCC/S B/2008/INF.7, 20 Nov 2008.
The new Climate Investment Funds agreed at the G-8 
summit, are to be administered through the World Bank, 
separately from the Global Environment Facility. With 
US$6bn pledged over the next few years, these are 
significant but still modest in comparison with other 
sources, and will only have a substantial impact if  
they are applied to reach the parts that the crediting 
mechanisms do not reach. The various avenues for 
funding need to complement rather than compete, 
within a clear conception of the overall strategic goals,  
as indicated in this section. 
Energy investment to 2020 
The IEA’s World Energy Outlook (WEO 2008)39 offers  
the most recent and detailed energy sector studies.  
On current trends, energy-related CO2 emissions are 
projected to rise, from the present 28 GtCO2/yr, by 30% 
by 2020, and by 45% (to over 40 GtCO2) by 2030. Three 
quarters of the projected increase is from China, India 
and the Middle East, though on average the developing 
world overall would still be emitting only about a third 
the level of OECD countries per capita. It estimates that 
this ‘Business as Usual’ global energy scenario requires 
cumulative investment totalling $26tr out to 2030, about 
half of this going to the power sector.
The WEO abatement scenarios curtail CO2 emissions  
by just 3.5 GtCO2 below the reference case by 2020, due 
to assumed inertia in the growth of energy-related CO2 
emissions, escalating sharply after 2020 as discussed 
below. This requires additional investments, which are 
largely offset against fuel savings, so that overall over 
the twenty years to 2030: 
•  The 550ppm scenario requires $4.1tr more investment, 
of which most goes to improving energy efficiency 
and $1.2tr to low carbon power generation; the extra 
investments are ultimately eclipsed by the value of 
the fuel savings, at $7tr over 2010-30.
•  The additional investment required more than doubles 
for the 450ppm scenario.40 Again much of this goes to 
energy efficiency, with investment in efficient buildings 
dominating power sector investments, and with $5.8tr 
returned in additional fuel savings. 
The WEO scenarios assume less aggressive action is 
taken in developing countries than in the OECD: they 
account for about half the emission savings by 2020  
but only a quarter of the added investment required  
for the 550ppm case. The cheaper emissions savings  
in developing economies reinforce the case for 
mechanisms that facilitate such action. 
Out to 2020, the additional emission savings and 
developing country investment required for the WEO 
abatement scenarios (a few tens of US$bn)41 is clearly 
within reach of the mechanisms to support, based  
on extrapolation of trends as discussed in section 9.42 
Beyond 2020, the scale clearly falls short of that required 
to achieve 450ppm or the mid-Century 50% target.
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39  International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2008, IEA/OECD Paris. The WEO reference scenario emissions are very similar to those of WEO 
2006, and are similar to those used in the UNFCCC Investment and Financial Flows report (2007).
40  Because of growth in global CO2, even the most ambitious WEO scenarios do not prevent overall atmospheric concentrations rising well above 
500ppm, though they return to 450ppm later in the century. All concentrations are cited in terms of parts per million CO2-equivalent (ppmCO2e), 
covering all the radiatively active Kyoto gases. Concentration-equivalent ppm is a physical measure of atmospheric impact which does not depend  
on an assumed timescale for comparing cumulative impact of different current emissions (taken as 100 years for comparing the climate change 
impact of the different Kyoto gases).
41  A 50% share of 3.5 GtCO2 abatement by 2020 is less than projected in Chart 15. The current capital flow of $5-8bn in the project mechanisms looks 
modest compared to the IEA numbers overall (global average US$200bn/yr), but the developing country share is only a few tens of billions annually 
out to 2020. The UNFCCC offered a similar number for the additional global investment, projecting that even out to 2030 only US$65bn/yr would be 
in developing countries (UNFCCC (2007), Investment and financial flows to address climate change). The UNFCCC 2008 Update reiterates the detailed 
estimate by sector (Table 6), but notes that IEA estimates for all investment requirements increased substantially during 2008. This reflects general 
rises in costs, but it is unclear how sustained the increase will be. 
42  Capital flows in the mechanisms would grow broadly in line with volumes and prices. At a credit price of €20-40/tCO2 by 2020, a projected volume of 
2,000 MtCO2 /yr by 2020 would equate to €40-80bn/yr, say US$50-100bn/yr directed towards decarbonising energy sector growth in developing countries.
The WEO estimate that the incremental cost of the 
measures would have to rise steadily, to US$40/tCO2 in 
2020 and to US$ 90/tCO2 by 2030 (much higher prices 
would be required by the 450ppm scenario, partly  
to bring in CCS at scale). In Chart 3 (see page 10) in  
the Executive Summary, which sets out the sector 
potentials as estimated by the IPCC for different cost 
levels, we placed the main emphasis of the CDM and JI 
on investments in the lowest cost categories. This is not 
only because of our analysis of the supply-demand 
balance to 2012 and beyond, in Part II. It is also because, 
for the present, the private sector may attach 
considerable risks to more costly investments on the 
basis of carbon prices alone, given their historic 
volatility and their dependence upon political decisions 
that are extremely hard for the private sector to judge  
– even more so in developing countries. 
To secure the more widespread investment required, 
industry would need confidence about future (and 
growing) carbon prices. This will be much more difficult 
if 2009 sees a market correction, and if future markets 
are not underpinned by a carbon price floor mechanism 
and/or by more extensive domestic action (as with the 
Chinese renewable energy supports).  
More ambitious targets of course would require more 
ambitious global action. The IEA’s other main study, 
Energy Technology Perspectives, sets out a detailed 
picture of the path required to achieve the G-8 proposed 
goal of 50% reductions by 2050. This would require 
even more rapid and wide-ranging changes across all 
regions and all components of the global energy system, 
as set out in Chart 21. Relative to the reference case, 
reductions of almost 10 GtCO2 by 2020 bring the world’s 
CO2 emissions back close to 2005 levels by 2020 on the 
path to the 2050 goal. This assumes a common global 
‘cost of carbon’ from the outset, in contrast to the WEO, 
which assumes less initial action in the developing 
world – though inevitably this leaves their emissions  
as an even bigger part of the challenge after 2020. 
Reluctance to act more strongly, in both industrialised 
and developing countries, is not a fault of the 
Mechanisms. But improving them, and better 
understanding their role, limitations and potential 
evolution, could facilitate tougher action. The rest of  
this section outlines the issues and options. 
71Global Carbon Mechanisms
Chart 21  Contribution of energy-related emission 
reduction options 2005-2050
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Role and limitations of the project 
mechanisms 
The analysis above suggests that the CDM, given a 
more stable market basis to drive reasonable growth 
projections, could support extensive decarbonisation in 
developing country power supply and industry sectors 
to 2020. However the limitations are also apparent: apart 
from the overall questions surrounding the scale of 
ambition, the cost in the abatement scenarios is contained 
by the energy efficiency improvements, where the CDM 
in particular has delivered little. Moreover, the WEO 
cutbacks are modest compared to the theoretical 
potential identified. 
A broader view, comparing this outlook against overall 
potentials across sectors and over time, shows the 
strategic limitations of the project mechanisms in 
addressing the climate challenge. This is clear from 
Chart 22, which contrasts current delivery against 
abatement potentials estimated by McKinsey for 2020 
and 2030, with the latter also compared against IPCC 
estimates. As noted, CDM and JI projects to date have 
been largely confined to only three out of the seven 
sectors (see Chart 18 for more detail), which represent 
maybe half of the overall mitigation potential. Even  
in these sectors, the actual savings by 2012 from the 
existing project pipeline are tiny compared to any of the 
2030 potentials. Thus the challenges are much greater  
if horizons are expanded, to other sectors and sources, 
and further into the future: 
72 Part III: How good (or bad) are the Mechanisms?
 Energy supply  Transport  Buildings  Industry  Agriculture  Forestry Waste
Common project scale Years construction, lasting 
decades; €m or €bn
Vehicle purchase: few years; 
€1,000s. Infrastructure: 
decades, €bns
Retrofit: household scale, few 
years, €100s. Construction: 
years lasting decades
Varied but often €m 
investments lasting decades
Distributed farm-level 
actions; plans as short  
as annual 
Cumulation over years/
decades 
Varied but often €m 
investments
Dominant investment  
driver/barriers
Costs, risks and returns at 
commercial or World Bank 
interest rates
Behavioural choice:  
fuel cost savings minor 
influence. Infrastructure: 
usually strategic state-
funded decisions taking 
decades
Planning, tenant-landlord 
splits, high consumer 
discount rates. Dispersed, 
small scale companies for 
building insulation/services
Costs, risks and returns at 
commercial interest rates.
Subject to focus on core 
business
Varies between agrobusiness 
and small farmers. Multiple 
considerations including 
nature of national agricultural 
support schemes
Long-term returns subject 
to multiple land risks in 
developing countries
Complex chains: emission/ 
cost savings modest influence
Relevance of CDM/JI Highly relevant for mature 
technologies close to 
cost-effective
Very limited Almost irrelevant – a handful 
of projects – except through 
indirect effect of power 
sector decarbonisation
Highly relevant Poor track record where 
attempted
Only one project Relevant mainly to landfill  
gas capture.
Chart 22 Sectoral breakdown of mitigation potential outside the OECD, 2020 and 2030
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•  Other sources and sectors. Developing countries 
dominate the non-energy-CO2 potentials even to 2020, 
due in part to the contribution of avoided deforestation 
and methane reductions. UNFCCC scenarios 
correspondingly imply that the total reductions 
outside the OECD by 2020 could be up to 7 GtCO2e, 
with the majority from non-energy sources.43
•  ... and longer time horizons. Including all sources, 
global greenhouse gas emissions could reach almost 
60 GtCO2e by 2030 in the absence of any action. There 
is disagreement over the total abatement potential 
relative to this, but there is consensus that less than  
a third of it by 2030 is in OECD countries; investments 
in the rest of the world are thus crucial. At costs up  
to about US $100/tCO2, the non-OECD abatement is 
variously estimated in the range 15-25 GtCO2e/yr.44
The much bigger McKinsey estimates are due partly to 
a far more optimistic outlook on the potential rate of 
growth of CCS in power and industry sectors, particularly 
in the decade 2020-2030. Much of the large potential in 
the power sector, agriculture and industry are at costs 
far above 2008 carbon prices, and for the Mechanisms 
to deliver investment at scale the markets would  
need high confidence in future prices sustaining such 
investments, in addition to the required innovation.
Overall, the comparison gives a sense of the vastly 
greater scale at which the Mechanisms would have to 
operate if they themselves were to deliver a large part 
of the changes to 2030. We return to some implications 
of this at the end of this section.
73Global Carbon Mechanisms
 Energy supply  Transport  Buildings  Industry  Agriculture  Forestry Waste
Common project scale Years construction, lasting 
decades; €m or €bn
Vehicle purchase: few years; 
€1,000s. Infrastructure: 
decades, €bns
Retrofit: household scale, few 
years, €100s. Construction: 
years lasting decades
Varied but often €m 
investments lasting decades
Distributed farm-level 
actions; plans as short  
as annual 
Cumulation over years/
decades 
Varied but often €m 
investments
Dominant investment  
driver/barriers
Costs, risks and returns at 
commercial or World Bank 
interest rates
Behavioural choice:  
fuel cost savings minor 
influence. Infrastructure: 
usually strategic state-
funded decisions taking 
decades
Planning, tenant-landlord 
splits, high consumer 
discount rates. Dispersed, 
small scale companies for 
building insulation/services
Costs, risks and returns at 
commercial interest rates.
Subject to focus on core 
business
Varies between agrobusiness 
and small farmers. Multiple 
considerations including 
nature of national agricultural 
support schemes
Long-term returns subject 
to multiple land risks in 
developing countries
Complex chains: emission/ 
cost savings modest influence
Relevance of CDM/JI Highly relevant for mature 
technologies close to 
cost-effective
Very limited Almost irrelevant – a handful 
of projects – except through 
indirect effect of power 
sector decarbonisation
Highly relevant Poor track record where 
attempted
Only one project Relevant mainly to landfill  
gas capture.
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
   Energy supply Transport Buildings Industry Agriculture Forestry Waste   
Current CDM/JI Pipeline
(annual undiscounted potential)
McKinsey 2020
McKinsey 2030
IPCC 2030
G
tC
O
2e
43  The UNFCCC estimates the potential in developing countries in 2020 to be approximately 7 GtCO2 (UNFCCC, Investment and financial flows to address 
climate change; an update (UNFCCC/TP/2008/7). The UNFCCC estimates that by 2030 the savings from developing countries could expand to 21.7 GtCO2, 
about two-thirds of the global reductions.
44  In the WEO scenarios, abatement rises sharply to 15 GtCO2e/yr by 2030, roughly matching the potential assessed by the IPCC, whilst the non-OECD 
reduction in the UNFCCC scenarios by 2030 exceed 20 GtCO2/yr and the McKinsey study estimates far greater potential still, particular in power 
generation, industry and forestry by 2030.
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Chart 23  Estimates of global mitigation potentials by 2030 – McKinsey
(a) – McKinsey full cost curve
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Performance vs potentials 
Interesting insights emerge by mapping the technology 
focus of the project mechanisms against these identified 
potentials. Chart 23 delves into more detail by dividing 
the options identified by McKinsey (outside the OECD, 
which is shown as white) into four groups: 
•  Potential savings from the kinds of investments that 
have dominated the project portfolio to date, and which 
account for less than a quarter of the total identified 
potential, despite the more optimistic McKinsey 
estimates for renewables and industry potentials. 
•  Options that are formally excluded from the CDM 
(nuclear, avoided deforestation, and currently CCS) 
and which account for about 30% of the total potential.
•  Forestry-related projects, that face particular kinds  
of barriers, and which account for about 7%.
•  Almost 40% of the (non-OECD) potential is attributed 
to non-forestry options that are formally within the 
scope of the CDM, but are in practice largely absent 
(compared to the potential). 
Of the last, ‘absent’ activities, two significant measures, 
saving around 2 GtCO2e/yr between them at moderate 
costs, are land-use related (grassland management and 
organic soil restoration). 
Most of the rest fall into two broad groups. 
The majority are options, particularly related to energy 
efficiency, that dominate the ‘negative cost’ potential. 
This has been partly because many of these would face 
a major struggle to prove their ‘additionality’, given their 
intrinsic cost-effectiveness – the paradox already noted. 
As demonstrated by the Russian methane capture 
projects, this obstacle is not insurmountable if it can  
be reasonably proven that institutional barriers prevent 
projects happening and that the value of the project 
credits enables this to be circumvented. However, most 
of the ‘negative cost’ potential is in energy efficiency in 
buildings and transport sectors, where this is generally 
not the case. Additional barriers include transaction 
costs, split incentives (e.g. between tenants and landlords, 
and between vehicle manufacturers and drivers) and 
lack of focus or awareness due to energy costs being 
small compared to other costs. 
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(b) – McKinsey aggregated to sector level
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The other ‘absent’ activities lie towards the other end of 
the supply curve. These include options like solar power 
and offshore wind, as well as advanced technologies  
in industry and agriculture. The projected costs – which 
include reductions from expected learning at scale – are 
not as high as for CCS, but the costs and risks today far 
outweigh any incentive from credits obtained under the 
project mechanisms. 
In both the IPCC and McKinsey analysis, a big additional 
potential at higher cost arises from CCS. In principle, 
this is a technology that would be almost perfectly 
suited to support by the project mechanisms, since 
additionality would be unquestionable and it would 
feature large, discrete single project investments. The 
challenges lie in the potential scale of its application 
and the extent of innovation required (and the 
associated risks).
In short, despite having surged rapidly to become  
the dominant source of low carbon financing, the 
Mechanisms in their current form will still only tap a 
very modest fraction of the potentials identified. Tapping 
the potential will require tougher action accompanied 
by both reforms and complementary measures.
Reforming CDM rules 
Some modest changes in rules could help to expand  
the scope of the CDM in particular. Approval for 
‘programmatic CDM’ in December 2005 was intended  
to help increase the flow of programmes that aggregate 
many small investments, which could be particularly 
important for energy efficiency. The poor uptake to  
date however indicates some of the difficulties in 
implementing this in the context of the over-arching 
principles around closely-monitored, demonstrated 
additional emission savings. 
Forestry projects have been deterred by severe rules 
relating to the fears of ‘non-permanence’, including 
possible reversal of emission savings if forests burn 
down. This resulted in special categories of ‘temporary 
CERs’; but their temporary nature – combined with the 
fact that the EU ETS does not accept forestry-related 
projects – means that the market discounts these by up 
to 75%, effectively killing such projects. This treatment 
may vastly exaggerate the real risks, and an alternative 
would be for projects to fund a set-aside reserve to 
cover project failures; this would lessen individual 
project risks and could enable the CDM to start fostering 
some land-use projects45. However the underlying fact 
remains that most forestry projects are very long-term 
endeavours, which are unlikely to absorb much CO2 on 
the timescales of the current structures. Moreover, there 
are no easy answers to the questions of ‘crediting’ 
avoided deforestation, given the potential for leakage 
and perverse incentives. A careful, independent 
evaluation of the lessons from the voluntary markets 
would help. 
Another intriguing suggestion would act on the 
relationship between the supply and demand sides,  
by ‘discounting’ CERs for certain types of projects. 
Differentiated crediting ratios, including discounting, 
could in fact be used in many ways to change relative 
preferences between project or technology types, stages 
of development, or host countries/regions – though this 
broad scope of options is perhaps also part of the risk of 
the approach, given the complexity of global negotiations. 
However, it will be hard for modest reforms of the CDM 
– even extending to discounting proposals with some 
associated relaxation of project rules – to magically 
unlock whole project classes and sectors. However, 
much flexibility may be appropriate in interpreting the 
‘additionality’ of emission savings, it remains a bedrock 
principle for a mechanism that provides emission credits 
that might directly be used to offset emission reductions 
elsewhere. Assessment for small projects and 
programmes is inherently costly and complex, and will 
remain an obstacle for classes of investment that have 
either more diffuse or system-wide benefits, or are 
motivated partly by public co-benefits. Moreover, 
contemporaneous crediting within a structure of 
periodic, relatively short-term commitment periods also 
inherently discriminates against investments whose 
main benefits may accrue over the longer term. 
Learning from the experience with the 
industrialised country Mechanisms 
If the big question for the CDM is why it is leaving such 
a large part of other potentials untapped – and what can 
be done about it – a part of the answer can be found by 
looking at the experience amongst the industrialised 
countries of Annex I. This highlights the benefits of having 
‘horses for courses’ through different instruments. 
As much by accident as by design, the industrialised 
countries in effect have four distinct international 
mechanisms. The two different tracks of Joint 
Implementation are institutionally almost different 
instruments, but both appear to provide the same basic 
incentive as the emissions trading context within which 
they both reside – and which itself is now complemented 
45  Climate Strategies (2008): P. Baalman and B. Schlamadinger, Scaling up AFOLU Mitigation activities in Non-Annex I countries. 48  Rae Kwon Chun,  
A CER discounting scheme could save climate change regime after 2020, Climate Policy, Vol.7 pp.171-176.
by the emergence of Green Investment Schemes. From 
a simple economic standpoint this sounds like a huge 
duplication of instruments. 
Yet in practice, each is finding a niche. The EU ETS, which 
rests under the Kyoto structure of intergovernmental 
emissions trading, is central to European implementation 
and a major driver of the whole Kyoto structure. ‘Classic’ 
Joint Implementation (‘Track 2’, under international 
supervision), despite its late start and narrow time- 
window, is generating key large-scale, high-return 
industrial investments that reduce emissions cost- 
effectively, particularly in Russia and Ukraine. 
JI ‘Track 1’ is providing a mechanism for incentivising 
projects in the EU and some other OECD countries that 
fall outside the scope of their internal emission trading 
schemes. Most interestingly, Green Investment Schemes 
are emerging as an instrument to harness international 
finance for precisely the kind of programmes, for 
example on building energy efficiency, that provide 
long-term emission savings with high co-benefits, and 
yet which demonstrably could not be delivered through 
mechanisms operating under the constraints of strict 
project-by-project short-term additionality. 
A key question from our analysis of supply and demand 
is whether there will be enough demand across these 
mechanisms to learn fully from the experience. However, 
the emerging evidence is already clear in one respect.  
It is not that the industrialised countries have too many 
international instruments, but quite the contrary:  
the developing world does not have enough. Key 
opportunities in developing countries will continue to 
languish until that is fixed, and new instruments are 
introduced to support clean investments in developing 
countries that fall outside the natural scope of the CDM. 
Most industrialised countries in reality also use direct 
funding and there clearly is a role for this internationally. 
To avoid excessive profits, exceptionally cheap project 
classes could in theory be removed from crediting 
under the Mechanisms and targeted with direct funding, 
or addressed through other means – such as agreements 
on efficiency standards to a certain level, perhaps with 
some support for implementation. 
Funding is also the most obvious way to support 
technology development. The case for supporting the 
initial build-up of technology-based industries that are 
close to commercial but not yet competitive at prevailing 
carbon prices is debated in theory, but in practice  
most industrialised countries also do this – either with 
direct funding, or by differentiating the level of market 
supports (e.g. with technology-specific feed-in tariffs or 
differentiated levels of crediting in renewable energy 
supports). Each approach, as noted, has parallel 
international options either by funding outside, or by 
creating different crediting ratios within, the Mechanisms. 
Evolving the mechanisms
Finally, sheer scale considerations will limit the extent 
to which global decarbonisation can be delivered  
by mechanisms that hinge entirely upon additional 
international financial transfers. Even for the energy-
related sectors alone, the potential abatement ‘relative 
to reference’ by 2030 in developing countries could  
be 15-20 GtCO2/yr, comparable to the entire projected 
emissions from the present industrialised countries 
under such scenarios. For industrialised countries to 
support the entire difference through credit mechanisms, 
they would thus have to agree to ‘targets’ of zero 
emissions, and financial transfers vastly bigger than at 
present. If other sectors – notably forestry – were to be 
fully included the gap becomes even bigger. With the 
balance of global economic and political power shifting 
anyway, this is clearly implausible. 
Willingness to pay – whether through credit-based or 
other systems – will thus be a defining constraint on the 
use of international mechanisms. The mechanisms must 
become much more selective, and the way in which they 
should be focused will be a matter of enduring analysis 
and political debate. Cost-effectiveness is an obvious 
aim, but raises the question: if some options are so 
cost-effective, why should international finance pay 
rather than developing countries themselves? Thus the 
debate over project additionality in the CDM has some 
analogue with the large-scale political question of who 
should pay for what – as well as how – particularly in 
relation to energy efficiency. 
Arguably the most urgent need is to try and forestall the 
lock-in that would be represented by the construction  
of long-lived capital assets – like coal power plant and 
industrial facilities – and to build up industries capable 
of displacing them, like renewable energy industries. 
From this perspective, the present focus of the CDM 
may thus be quite appropriate.  However, the sooner 
that some of these activities can be migrated out of 
international financing mechanisms, and become more 
reliant on domestic policies, the greater the scope to 
consider other activities. 
The implication is that the Mechanisms could play an 
expanded role in supporting a transition over the next 
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decade or so in key sectors, helping the world to establish 
low carbon industries and lessen ‘carbon lock-in’ at 
least in power generation, if they are complemented by 
appropriate efforts at energy efficiency and technology 
innovation. Major changes are anyway required to 
improve operations and to start tapping the ‘missing 
sectors’. But over time the fundamentals need to 
change even more radically, to focus the Mechanisms 
either on much less developed regions, and/or on more 
confined technology classes, with the decarbonisation 
effort becoming more self-sustaining particularly in the 
major Asian developing countries. 
The pace of such evolution will be influenced by the 
global negotiations, but not solely determined by them. 
Multilaterally-agreed systems can determine what  
kinds of emission credits can be made available with a 
reasonable degree of international assurance; they cannot 
force countries to buy them. The EU ETS has historically 
shunned forestry credits; it is entirely possible that some 
major industrialised countries, like the US, will make 
different unilateral decisions about what kind of project 
credits they are willing to buy. There is, however, a cost 
to such an approach: by making the global carbon market 
progressively more complex and differentiated, rather 
than the opposite, this will clearly reduce its overall 
efficiency. In the long run, to move towards stabilising 
the atmosphere, the most stable way to develop the 
system will be to minimise such distortions and for the 
balance between supply and demand to be maintained 
through negotiations that include increasing the number 
of countries that take on binding emissions caps across, 
at least, important parts of their economy. 
A context for the future
Finally, this observation can be set in the broader 
context of debate about the involvement of developing 
countries in mitigation actions post-2012. The key lies in 
accepting that the current project mechanisms are but 
one part of a much broader span of what needs to be 
done, much of which inevitably falls outside the scope 
of the current project mechanisms. This is illustrated 
schematically in Chart 24, which divides the actions 
required into four main categories: 
•  Unilaterally-adopted policy reforms. These are 
measures that countries could sensibly adopt on their 
own because of domestic benefits, but which also 
contribute to emission reductions. These could include, 
for example, the removal of energy subsidies, which 
totalled a staggering US$300bn in the 20 largest 
non-OECD countries in 2007, and various types of 
regulatory reform, and tougher standards on the 
energy performance of new buildings and cars. 
•  Existing CDM, which is likely to remain the bedrock 
for financing the incremental costs of specific, 
separable emission-reduction projects, but hopefully 
with a number of specific incremental reforms such 
as those indicated in this report and explored much 
more fully in the existing international debate. 
•  Domestic programmes that would benefit from 
international public investment, or other support. 
These could include a wide range of policy instruments 
and programmes. The emerging Green Investment 
Schemes may provide important lessons for the 
possible design of such activities, whether or not the 
actual mode of finance is similar. 
•  Domestic policy reforms supported by an extended 
carbon market. This brings in options for much more 
radical departures in terms of developing country 
engagement with carbon markets. 
At the extreme, the last of these would involve 
developing countries adopting full emissions trading 
schemes and linking them into a global carbon market 
at a common global carbon price. There are, however, 
many intermediate options being explored, often under 
the guise of more radical reforms for the CDM that would 
involve crediting emission savings attributed at the level 
of whole sectors, rather than individual investments; or 
crediting for the adoption of emission-saving policies 
that would fall outside the credible scope of normal 
development policies. 
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Source: M. Ward et al as cited in H. Winkler, Measurable, reportable 
and verifiable: the keys to mitigation in the Copenhagen deal, Climate 
Policy, Vol.8(6), pp 534-547. 
Note: NAMAs = Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
Chart 24  A four-tier categorisation of mitigation activities 
in developing countries
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A qualified success 
Ten years ago, the big political challenge was to find 
any mechanism that could positively engage developing 
countries in the global effort to tackle climate change, 
and to fund investments that would help to tap the 
potential to reduce emissions irrespective of geographic 
boundaries. For wide-ranging reasons it was entirely 
appropriate that such investments should be funded 
largely by richer countries. After the difficult start,  
the volume of response – and its relative integrity in 
terms of avoiding simple ‘hot air’ purchases under 
intergovernmental emissions trading – has exceeded 
expectations. The main prior alternative, of using 
centralised global funding mechanisms, has a useful 
role but does not pass serious consideration as the 
mainstay of global decarbonisation. The generic 
difficulties in any such centralised spending programmes 
have, not surprisingly, become further exacerbated by 
North-South conflict around such funds, underlining the 
implausibility of this as a model for something a hundred 
times bigger.
The CDM, in contrast, is also notable for its political 
success. It has received wide support from both 
developed and developing countries – helping to convert 
many of the latter towards accepting a valuable role for 
international market-based mechanisms after initially 
strong resistance. Through this, it has achieved a 
remarkable level of global engagement around the 
decarbonisation agenda. All countries under the Kyoto 
Protocol – which now means virtually all countries other 
than the United States – have already committed to the 
continuation of the Kyoto Mechanisms post-2012. At this 
broad, high level, the CDM in particular has succeeded 
beyond the wildest dreams of its early architects.
This political success, however, carries with it a real risk 
of sclerosis. The UN is nothing like a company, continually 
assessing its options in the light of experience and the 
threat of competition; nor like an elected government, 
with eyes on the next election and the ideas of opposition 
parties. Its decisions reflect a political compromise 
between almost two hundred sovereign states. Such 
decisions are hard to reach, and even harder to change. 
This study has pointed to a number of searching 
questions around the Mechanisms and the need for 
improvement if they are to fulfil their full potential. 
Supply and demand: the need for 
global participation with an integrated 
perspective 
Part II of this study has explained how the combination 
of rapidly expanding supply, the success of mitigation 
efforts particularly in some of the big EU countries, and 
the current absence of Canadian purchases (as well as 
the US exit), has led to an overall surplus. Even excluding 
the potential supply of Kyoto allowances from transition 
economies, there is not enough demand to absorb 
supply just from the regulated project mechanisms. 
Without US participation, the Kyoto system overall has 
a huge net surplus. None of the options for alleviating 
the problem look easy, and the imbalance will pose 
serious difficulties for the Mechanisms, confined not 
just to the present period, but potentially spilling over  
to their role post-2012. 
With or without banking of the national surpluses  
from the transition economies, there is no satisfactory 
long-term solution without US re-entry into the global 
carbon markets in some form. As noted, however, there 
remains an institutional gap in the system: the lack  
of any internationally-accepted process to analyse the 
interaction of supply from the Mechanisms with the 
demand implied by future emission targets is a huge 
weakness in the current negotiating process. 
The re-entry of the US into the negotiations could also 
provide strong political impetus to implement reforms 
and expand the horizons of the system. Apart from the 
overall need to enhance both the breadth and depth  
of emission cutbacks post-2012, the main issues and 
options fall into the following broad categories. 
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14. Conclusions
The Mechanisms have transformed the global effort, and yet are but a 
beginning. The big outstanding challenge is to build on their core success  
by learning, adapting, reforming, and expanding the set of instruments. 
Reforming the CDM – governance
As described, the CDM is not without its problems. 
Section 10 in this report has explained why debates 
over the ‘additionality’ of emission savings are not 
subject to cast-iron, scientific resolution: they involve 
judgement, which puts the focus on the quality of 
procedures and their efficiency, including the extent  
of delays. Section 11 has noted many other difficulties 
around its efficiency, effectiveness and scope.
A common concern is that the CDM Executive Board is 
both overloaded, and potentially suffers from conflicts 
of interest between its different roles. Many have called 
for ‘professionalisation’ of the Board, which currently 
relies upon elected representatives nominated by and 
still in post with their governments46. More fundamentally, 
the Board’s former Chairman noted that the CDM 
‘monopolises in one and the same body – the Executive 
Board – regulatory, executive, and quasi-judicial 
functions47’. During 2008, the Executive Board rejected 
or returned for revision more projects, and culminated 
with wielding its governance tool – removing 
accreditation from one of the validating agencies (DOEs) 
that had approved the projects in the first place. It would 
be part of a natural evolution of the system that the 
different functions are better separated over time. Several 
specific options are under active consideration by the 
governing UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol Meeting of Parties48. 
Reform in this respect is particularly urgent given  
the looming questions over the design of post-2012 
commitments, and the possibilities for more radical 
reform not just of governance, but of some of the bigger 
issues around the appropriate scope and design of the 
CDM itself. The CDM Executive Board – the first limited-
membership body established under the UNFCCC – is 
the entity best placed to foster such developments and 
take them up to the UNFCCC itself, but this would also 
require reform. Currently, “the Board is so preoccupied 
by issues requiring immediate action that no time 
remains for the ‘big’ issues’” (IETA, note 46). 
As indicated, there is no shortage of bigger issues that 
will need attention, both within and outside the CDM. 
Enhancing the credit-based mechanisms
Apart from implementation structures, the options 
noted in this study for reform of the credit-based 
mechanisms fall into three main categories. 
•  Incremental reform of CDM project additionality and 
eligibility rules. These range from relatively micro 
reforms of assessment methodologies, to big political 
decisions around the inclusion of new categories, and 
bigger shifts to enhance, for example, programmatic 
CDM. Some other modest adjustments could support 
greater take-up in some of the least developed 
regions. They would, however, involve no changes of 
the principles of additionality or the corresponding 
legal basis.
•  Radical reform of project crediting rules towards 
“top-down” assessments based on benchmarked 
performance and/or levels of market penetration.  
Such adjustments could also be accompanied by 
consideration of discounting emission credits for 
some of the more established or debatable project 
classes, to help ‘err on the safe side’ of simplified 
procedures. Some of these reforms could also improve 
the geographic distribution of projects, and credit 
discounting could also offer another means to address 
potential major imbalances in supply and demand. 
Many, however, may not be consistent with a strict 
interpretation of the current international legal basis.
•  Sector and policy-based crediting mechanisms.  
These options are in widespread discussion under  
the banner of ‘enhanced CDM’. In reality they might 
be most effective if considered as quite distinct 
mechanisms, since they represent a fundamental 
departure from the principle of international project-
by-project based assessment, whilst retaining the 
principle of emission crediting as the driving incentive. 
Implementing such changes – in addition to more 
fundamental features of ensuring a greater degree of 
stability and predictability in the emerging global carbon 
market, coupled with adequate investment in innovation 
– should enable Global Carbon Mechanisms to deliver  
a large fraction of the potential in the sectors for which 
they are intrinsically well suited.
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46  The International Emissions Trading Association notes that ‘the CDM necessitates reform precisely because of its astounding success … it needs  
a system-wide upgrade, a grand leap towards the professionalisation of its governing bodies and the management systems they work within … the 
extended and increasing amount of [Executive Board] time spent dealing the registration and issuance of individual projects … has impacted on the 
ability of the Board to address some of its core responsibilities …’ (IETA, State of the CDM 2008, Geneva)
47  H. J. Stehr, Does the CDM need an institutional reform, published within UNEP Risoe Centre CD4CDM Perspectives Series 2008, A Reformed CDM – 
including new Mechanisms for Sustainable Development.
48  UNFCCC Technical Paper FCCC/TP/2008/2 outlined options, and as formal input to the Review of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the Secretariat 
compiled national proposals in UNFCCC, Compilation and analysis of available information on the scope, effectiveness and functioning of the 
flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, 16 October 2008, FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/INF.3. 
Beyond the carbon markets 
The scale of the overall challenge is to greatly expand 
the degree of emission cutbacks globally, in line with 
the scenarios set out in section 13. As also illustrated 
there, this must involve expansion of the effort in three 
key dimensions: 
•  More comprehensive global engagement, including 
the least developed countries and those with 
emissions dominated by land-use. 
•  Wider sectoral focus to encompass the huge 
potentials in buildings and transport, as well as 
agriculture and forestry, which differ fundamentally  
in their characteristics and generally involve smaller 
dispersed activities.
•  The fostering of investments for the longer  
term, through both innovation and appropriate 
infrastructural choices including public expenditure 
decisions with consequences that may persist  
across the whole century.
The global carbon mechanisms encompass a subset of 
these geographic, sectoral and temporal agendas: they 
spread action beyond the industrialised countries, they 
are helping to decarbonise investments in some key 
sectors, and by bringing in international capital they 
increase time horizons beyond those found in many 
developing country domestic markets. But they do not 
fully address any, and it remains unclear how far reforms 
such as those indicated will tackle these wider challenges. 
The fundamental incentive is for the investment to flow 
to the regions with the least political and regulatory 
risk, to the sectors in which additionality can be easily 
established by directly removing emissions or displacing 
carbon-intensive generation in big projects, and to 
those investments that will deliver emission savings  
as quickly as possible. Moreover, if the horizons are 
expanded so widely as to credit all savings in the 
developing world, including those associated with broad 
policy or sectoral reforms, supply will soon flood any 
conceivable level of demand generated by cutbacks in 
the present industrialised countries. 
Some of these challenges can be addressed if more 
countries take on emission caps and utilise the wider set 
of international mechanisms available as a consequence; 
expansion of GIS based on such national commitments 
might help more money flow towards some new and 
longer term investments in those countries. Yet this is 
likely to remain a limited group of countries and still 
begs the question of internationalising policy and 
incentives in some of the most difficult sectors, like 
transport and some land uses. The revenue potentially 
available from auctioning of emission allowances, 
domestically and from international transport, may also 
provide an important link to funding-based approaches, 
but the need for other kinds of interventions cannot  
be avoided. 
Thus the challenges involve more fundamental questions 
about the relationship between international finance and 
development, incentives for good policy and innovation, 
and other regulatory interventions including sectoral 
approaches and global standards. The agenda is huge. 
The Global Carbon Mechanisms are already making  
a big contribution, and they can offer much more with 
appropriate reforms. But they can only ever form a part 
of the overall solution. 
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Term Definition
Assigned Amount 
Unit (AAU)
National emission allowances that are allocated to countries in line with their ‘assigned 
amount’ of greenhouse gas emissions – i.e. the amount that they can emit in accordance 
with their target under the Kyoto Protocol (q.v.). Each AAU is equivalent to 1t CO2e.
Additionality A project activity is additional if GHG (q.v.) emissions are reduced below those that would 
have occurred in the absence of the activity (as defined by the project baseline (q.v.)).
Accredited 
Independent  
Entity (AIE)
National or international legal entities acting as independent verification institutions for JI 
(q.v.) projects. AIEs are accredited by the JI Accreditation Panel.
Activities 
Implemented 
Jointly (AIJ)
A pilot phase of activities under which Annex I Parties (q.v.) could implement emission 
reduction projects in other countries. The pilot did not attempt to issue any emissions 
credits. Effectively this formed the pilot phase for CDM and JI (q.v.).
Annex I/II The UNFCCC (q.v.) divides countries into three main groups (who have differing commitments):
•  Annex I Parties include the industrialised countries that were members of the OECD (q.v.) 
in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition, including the Russian Federation, the 
Baltic States, and several central and eastern European states.
•  Annex II Parties consist of the OECD members of Annex I, but not the EIT (q.v.) Parties.
• Non-Annex I Parties are mostly developing countries. 
Annex B The individual targets for Annex I Parties are listed in the Kyoto Protocol’s Annex B. 
Countries included in Annex B are: EU-15 (q.v.), Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, United States, 
Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Croatia, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Ukraine, 
Norway, Australia, Iceland.
Note: Although they are listed in the Convention’s Annex I, Belarus and Turkey are not 
included in the Protocol’s Annex B as they were not Parties to the Convention when the 
Protocol was adopted.
Banking Process by which Parties may save some emissions allowances or credits for use in the next 
commitment period (q.v.).
Baseline The GHG (q.v.) emission levels that would occur in the absence of the emission-reducing 
project activity – i.e. business-as-usual emissions.
Bilateral projects CDM (q.v.) project activities that have an Annex I Party (q.v.) Letter of Approval (i.e. a partner 
in the industrialised world).
Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS)
The process of capturing and storing CO2 emissions from significant sources such as fossil 
fuel power plants and storing it, thus preventing it being released into the atmosphere.
Carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2e)
A measure used to compare the emissions from various greenhouse gases, given their 
differing potential to contribute to global warming.
For example, methane gas emissions have at least 21 times the warming potential of carbon 
dioxide over 100 years, so 1 tonne of methane is equal to at least 21 tonnes CO2e.
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Certified Emission 
Reduction (CER)
Credits issued by projects under CDM (q.v.), representing the verified emissions reductions 
made by a project. One CER represents 1t CO2e. 
Primary CER (pCER) is a transaction between the original owner (or issuer) of the carbon 
asset and a buyer (e.g. a project developer). In a primary transaction the buyer is subject  
to project risk.
Secondary CER (sCER) is a transaction where the seller is not the original owner (or issuer) 
of the carbon asset (e.g. a broker). The seller provides a delivery guarantee, for which there 
is an associated price premium.
CERs may be traded once issued or sold forward.
Chicago Climate 
Exchange (CCX)
A voluntary carbon trading exchange based in North America.
Members of the CCX make a voluntary, but legally binding commitment, to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions.
Climate Investment 
Funds (CIF)
Funds established in July 2008 and administered by the World Bank, which aim to help 
developing countries with climate change mitigation and adaptation.
Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)
Mechanism provided by the Kyoto Protocol (q.v.) allowing industrialised countries with a 
greenhouse gas reduction commitment to receive credit for investing in projects that reduce 
emissions in developing countries.
Compliance 
(commitment) 
period
A range of years within which parties to the Kyoto Protocol (q.v.) are required to meet their 
greenhouse gas emissions target, which is averaged over the years of the period. 
The first compliance period is 2008-2012. 
Conference of the 
Parties (COP)
The supreme body of the UNFCCC (q.v.).
Crediting period The period for which emission reductions from the baseline (q.v.) are verified (q.v.) and 
certified by a Designated Operational Entity (q.v.) for the purpose of issuance of credits.
Determination The process of independent evaluation of a JI (q.v.) project by an Accredited Independent 
Entity (q.v.) in order to determine if the Project Design Document (q.v.) fulfils all requirements 
under Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol (q.v.) and the JI guidelines.
Designated 
National Authority 
(DNA)
Body granted responsibility to authorise and approve participation in CDM (q.v.) projects. 
A Party (i.e. a country) cannot take part in CDM unless it has established a DNA. The DNA 
provides a letter of approval, which is required for participants to register their CDM projects. 
In practice a DNA is often linked to a country’s environment ministry.
Designated 
Operational Entity 
(DOE)
Independent auditors that assess whether a potential project meets all the eligibility 
requirements of the CDM (q.v.) (validation q.v.) and, once the project has successfully 
registered, whether the project has achieved greenhouse gas emission reductions 
(verification q.v. and certification). DOEs are accredited by the CDM Executive Board.
Executive Board 
(EB)
Supervisory authority of the CDM (q.v.), comprising a board of representatives elected  
from a cross-section of parties. It makes decisions on whether projects meet the CDM rules 
and decides how they are supervised and regulated. Its functions include: maintaining the 
approved methodologies, rules and procedures; approving new baseline and monitoring 
methodologies; accrediting DOEs (q.v.) and reviewing their decisions; making 
recommendations for new policies to the COP/MOP (q.v.) (to whom it ultimately reports); 
maintaining the registry of CERs (q.v.).
Economies in 
Transition (EIT)
A transition economy is one which is changing from a centrally-planned economy to a  
free market. Here we use it refer to states in central and eastern Europe, including Ukraine 
and Russia.
Emission Reduction 
Units (ERU)
Credits issued by projects under JI (q.v.), representing the verified emissions reductions 
made by a project. One ERU represents 1t CO2e.
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European Union 
(EU or EU-27) 
Unless otherwise specified (see below) this is used to denote the European Union in its 
current full membership of 27 countries (i.e. EU-27).
EU-12 countries 
(EU-12)
Comprises new entrants to the EU: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
EU-15 countries 
(EU-15)
Comprises members prior to expansion of the EU that took place in 2004-2007.
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom).
EU Emissions 
Trading System  
(EU ETS)
In January 2005 the EU ETS commenced operation as the largest multi-country, multi-sector 
greenhouse gas emission trading scheme in the world.
The first compliance phase (q.v.) ran from 2005 to 2007; the second runs from 2008 to 2012.
G-8 Forum for the world’s major industrialised democracies comprising: Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Global Environment 
Fund (GEF)
Provides grants to projects in developing countries that tackle biodiversity, climate change, 
water, land degradation, ozone or persistent organic pollutants. It is run by the United 
Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Development Program and the World 
Bank. Since 1991 it has given $7.4billion to 1,950 projects.
Greenhouse Gases 
(GHG)
Gases released by human activity that are responsible for climate change. 
The six gases listed in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol are: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane 
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC-23), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and 
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
Green Investment 
Schemes (GIS)
Under a GIS, a Party commits to use revenues from selling Assigned Amount Units (q.v.) to 
the development and implementation of the emission reduction projects, a process referred 
to as greening (q.v.). 
Greening Terms relating to GIS (q.v.). In ‘hard greening’ proceeds received from AAU (q.v.) sales go 
to projects generating measurable emissions reduction units; in ‘soft greening’ proceeds  
go to projects where emissions reductions cannot be as reliably quantified, e.g. awareness-
raising or capacity building.
Hydrofluorocarbon-
23 
(trifluoromethane) 
(HFC/HFC-23)
A potent greenhouse gas with around 12,000 times the warming potential of carbon dioxide 
over 100 years.
The vast majority of HFC-23 emissions are created as a by-product in the manufacture  
of refrigerant gases. 
Host country The country where an emission reduction project is physically located.
International 
Energy Agency 
(IEA)
Intergovernmental organisation which acts as energy policy advisor to its 28 member countries.
Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC)
Scientific intergovernmental body which provides independent information on climate 
change. Work by the IPCC has been a major source of information for negotiations under 
the UNFCCC (q.v.).
Issuance The instruction by the CDM Executive Board (q.v.) to the CDM registry administrator to 
issue a specified quantity of CERs (q.v.) for a project activity.
Joint 
Implementation  
(JI)
Mechanism provided by the Kyoto Protocol (q.v.), allowing emissions reductions projects  
to generate credits (ERUs q.v.) to be traded amongst the industrialised countries party to the 
Kyoto Protocol. NB Projects that are subject to the oversight of the JISC (q.v.) are referred to 
as Track 2 – those that rely on host country oversight are Track 1.
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Joint 
Implementation 
Supervisory 
Committee (JISC) 
Supervisory body of JI Track 2 projects.
Its responsibilities include: accredits AIEs (q.v.); supervises the verification of ERUs (q.v.) 
generated by JI projects; reviews reporting procedures, guidance on baselines and 
monitoring; recommends revisions to JI guidelines to MOP (q.v.); and verifies monitoring 
results for those JI projects that fall under its scope.
Kyoto Protocol Adopted at the Third Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (q.v.) held in Kyoto, Japan in 
December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol specifies emission obligations for countries (known as the 
Annex B countries) and defines the three Kyoto mechanisms: JI, CDM and emissions trading. 
It entered into force on 16 February 2005.
Land-Use, Land-
Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF)
LULUCF can reduce emissions, either by increasing the removals of greenhouse gases from 
the atmosphere (e.g. by planting trees or managing forests), or by reducing emissions (e.g. 
by curbing deforestation). 
Land-Use Removal 
Units (RMUs)
A unit relating to an emission removal generated by an Annex I Party from LULUCF (q.v.) 
activities. One RMU represents 1t CO2e.  RMUs can be used to meet Kyoto targets. They 
may be converted into Assigned Amount Units (q.v.) and traded between Parties but cannot 
be banked (q.v.).
Marrakesh Accords In 2000, these defined the ‘rulebook’ for implementing the Kyoto Protocol (q.v.):  amongst 
other things they covered the implementation of CDM (q.v.), JI (q.v.) and emissions trading.
Methodology Defines how emissions reductions will be quantified for a particular type of project.
Monitoring The collection and analysis of data in order to determine the emissions baseline (q.v.) and 
measuring the reductions made for a particular project.
Nationally 
Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions 
(NAMA)
The Bali Action Plan of December 2007 calls for “nationally-appropriate mitigation actions 
by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported by 
technology and enabled by financing, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner”.
Nitrous oxide (N2O) A greenhouse gas. 
Meeting of Parties 
(MOP)
MOP is the Supreme Body of the Kyoto Protocol (q.v.).
Organisation  
for Economic 
Co-operation  
and Development 
(OECD)
An international organisation bringing together countries in the interests of helping 
governments tackle the economic, social and governance challenges of a globalised economy. 
The 30 member countries of OECD are: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
Offset The concept of selling emissions reductions from projects made by one entity to another 
who is required to, or wishes to, make a reduction of the same amount in the emissions 
from their own activities.
Project Design 
Document (PDD)
The key document that describes an emission reduction project, and which is completed  
by project developers in order to register their project under the CDM (q.v.) or JI (q.v.).
United Nations 
Framework 
Convention on 
Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)
The UNFCCC was established 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit. It is the overall framework 
guiding international climate negotiations. 
Its main objective is “stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere  
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (man-made) interference with the 
climate system”.
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Unilateral CDM CDM (q.v.) project activities that do not have an Annex I Party (q.v.) Letter of Approval  
at the time of registration of the project (i.e. those that do not yet have a buyer from an 
industrialised country).
Validation The assessment of a CDM (q.v.) project’s PDD (q.v.) by an independent third party  
(a DOE q.v.), which is required before the project can be sent for registration by the 
Executive Board (q.v.).
Verification The process of confirmation by a recognised independent third party that the claimed 
emissions reduction activity has occurred. 
Verified/Voluntary 
Emissions 
Reduction (VER)
The abbreviation VER is used for both verified and voluntary reductions: 
•  A verified emissions reduction is a unit of greenhouse gas emission reductions from  
a project that has been verified by an independent auditor – but are not part of the 
UNFCCC (q.v.) framework such as CDM (q.v.) or JI (q.v.) projects.
•  A voluntary emissions reduction designates emission reductions units that are traded  
on the voluntary market, whether independently verified or not.
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Technical Annexes to this publication are available:
Annex I – Analysis of CDM project performance
Annex II – Emissions and demand projections to 2020
These are available for download from the Climate 
Strategies website at: www.climatestrategies.org and 
from the Carbon Trust website at www.carbontrust.co.uk
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This Carbon Trust report draws upon findings of Climate 
Strategies research on the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint 
Implementation and Green Investment Schemes. A series of 
technical reports are available from www.climatestrategies.org. 
Charts may be reproduced from this report on the condition 
that they are cited either with the full reference accompanying 
the chart, or in the abbreviated form as ‘Source: Carbon Trust 
and Climate Strategies’. All other content is strictly subject to 
the copyright provisions on the back cover.
About Climate Strategies
Climate Strategies is an international network of leading 
academic specialists on economic and policy issues in tackling 
climate change. It provides a bridge between research and 
international policy challenges. Its aim is to help government 
decision makers manage the complexities both of assessing 
the options, and of securing stakeholder and public consensus 
around them. The Climate Strategies secretariat, hosted  
at Cambridge University, convenes international teams of 
leading researchers focused on specific projects; its reports 
and publications have a record of impact in the public and 
private sectors. 
In addition to the support of the Carbon Trust, Climate Strategies 
receives funding from an expanding range of governments, 
foundations and business sponsors. Its work has been primarily 
with decision makers in the public and private sectors in the 
countries of the European Union, initially concerning the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and related issues of 
industrial competitiveness and carbon leakage, but it has 
become increasingly active on other issues and in other regions. 
Climate Strategies’ research programme for 2008 spanned a 
range of topics on the future design of economic instruments 
in industrialised countries and strengthened engagement  
with developing countries. Forthcoming Carbon Trust Reports 
drawing on this work will cover the linkage of emission trading 
schemes, options for tackling carbon leakage, and incentives for 
policy reform and technology transfer in developing countries. 
For 2009 the principal projects on industrialized countries and 
carbon markets will include Kyoto track negotiations; price 
floors, caps, and exchange-rate mechanisms in emission trading 
schemes; and distribution and comparability of effort including 
lessons from effort-sharing in the EU 2020 package. Further 
research on extending and reforming the CDM, and international 
support for domestic policy and implementation, is under way; 
and we plan studies on sector-specific approaches, including 
international marine and steel sector studies.
Collaborating research institutions 2007-2008
Australian National University, Australia 
Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnment et le 
Development, France
Centre for Environmental Policy, Imperial College UK Centre 
for Energy, Environment and Engineering Zambia*
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Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki*
University of New South Wales, Australia 
University of Zurich, Switzerland*
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Managing Director: Jon Price
Contact Details:
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14 Trumpington Street
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ACT ON CO2 is the UK Government’s initiative to help  
individuals understand and reduce their carbon footprint.  
Visit http://actonco2.direct.gov.uk for more information.
The Carbon Trust was set up by UK Government in 2001 as an 
independent company.
The Carbon Trust’s mission is to accelerate the move to a low carbon 
economy, by working with organisations to reduce carbon emissions 
now and develop commercial low carbon technologies for the future.
We cut carbon emissions now
•  By providing business and the public sector with expert advice, 
finance and accreditation.
•  By stimulating demand for low carbon products and services.
We cut future carbon emissions
•  By developing new low carbon technologies through project funding 
and management, investment and collaboration.
•  By identifying market barriers and practical ways to overcome them.
www.carbontrust.co.uk
0800 085 2005
